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Elected multiparty assemblies have existed in Africa on average for no more than two 
decades.   Consolidating democracy and improving the lives of ordinary citizens demands 
guardian parliaments. Parliaments are comprised predominantly of politicians and, 
interconnected with citizens and executives, are perceived as core institutions of 
representative democracies. This dissertation seeks to contribute to a better understanding of 
African multiparty parliaments and their role in consolidating democracy. 
 
The study seeks to comprehend the links between citizens and their elected parliaments in 18 
African countries, in the process attempting to predict the prospects of these new 
democracies. It also focuses on the Assembly of Mozambique to attempt an understanding of 
the evolution, capacity and functioning of an emerging parliament. The study investigates the 
perceptions of Mozambican civil leaders toward their parliament, and it looks at the 
perceptions of Mozambican parliamentarians concerning their roles and their relations with 
the electorate, and concerning the Assembly’s capacity and powers. This is critical to 
understanding how democracy has been and will be exercised, since parliamentarians are at 
the forefront of the process.  
 
Each parliament has distinctive characteristics. However, there are common features based on 
their age and origin. The development of the Mozambican Assembly since the monoparty 
regime illustrates the challenges and achievements that African parliaments have undergone 
in the transition to democracy. The findings reveal that African citizens distinguish between 
presidents and parliaments, which is important given the legacy in Africa of strong executives 
led by dominant presidents. They also reveal that citizens value the gains made by the 
multiparty regimes and that parliaments as lawmakers are preferred to presidents.  
 
In most countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave positive evaluations of their 
parliaments, especially concerning their trustworthiness. Political characteristics outweigh 
socioeconomic status in influencing how citizens perceived parliaments. Party allegiance and 
perception of electoral fairness are the factors that most influenced how citizens perceived 
their parliaments. 
 
Interviews with Mozambican MPs revealed their frustration over the influence of the 
Assembly over the national budget. In the MPs’ opinions, direct foreign aid to the budget 
reduced parliament’s role to that of a rubber stamp, weakening the role of MPs. Mozambican 
civic leaders saw parliament as an indispensable and critical institution, and they expressed 
frustration with the extreme party-centricity of MPs, which is perceived as normal by MPs. 
Distrust between these groups reinforces the sentiment among ruling party members that the 
party deserves protection. In democracies, MPs from different parties are political opponents 
and not enemies. In Mozambique, the transition from enemy to adversary is not yet complete. 
While fragile, parliament has been the only space in Mozambican society where political 
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Throughout out the thesis the names of countries are translated into English and in some 
cases abbreviated; the correct names of countries as they appear in the constitution appear in 
the second column.  
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Botswana     Botswana 
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Madagascar     République de Madagascar 
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Zimbabwe     Zimbabwe 
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1.1 A giant step toward democracy, and subsequently limbo 
 
In just a few short decades, Africans have become voters, their monoparty parliaments have 
been replaced by multiparty assemblies, and African politicians have transformed themselves 
into political candidates. 
 
Political liberalisation has been the modus operandi in many African countries since the 
1990s, which has meant that multiparty assemblies have existed, on average, for no more 
than two decades in the region. Regarding the 18 countries in this study, the number of years 
in existence of multiparty assemblies is 16.2. 
 
It is important to distinguish between a transition to democracy and the consolidation of 
democracy (Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995; Gunther, Diamandouros & Puhle, 1995). Despite 
the rapid spread of democratic transitions across the continent, very few countries have 
reached the stage of an entrenched democracy. Without doubt, the average African citizen is 
today freer than his peer of 20 years ago. Still, following positive steps towards greater 
liberties and the euphoria of the transitions to multiparty regimes in the 1990s, many 
countries seem to have stopped at some point in a middle ground (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 
2002). Citizens in these countries have more liberties and rights than before, but having 
reached this middle ground, progress toward the consolidation of democracy seems to have 
frozen. Even a country like South Africa, despite remaining – according to the Freedom 
House score – a full democracy up to the present (2008), experienced a decline in civil 
liberties in 2007.  
 
Political competition is common practice; however, ruling political elites have often shown 
that they are democrats only if they remain winners. In addition, political accountability and 
good governance are seen as the main areas of fragility of the new multiparty regimes. The 
African executives themselves have identified both of these aspects as priorities. African 
governments have witnessed the popular uprisings that have taken place in other parts of the 
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world because of poor living conditions. Saying this is not saying that the executives are the 
evil in these societies. Elected African executives have inherited frail state administrations, 
and social and economic challenges. It does not help to point out politicians and elected 
executives as being at fault, particularly as it is not as simple as this. There are structural and 
historical constraints that African executives face. In addition, there is also the controversial 
matter of the aid dependency of African countries for whom, as Claude Ake (1996) points 
out, Bretton Woods institutions have – in the name of accelerated development – caused 
greater dependency.   
 
Literature on African politics is normally full of negative considerations; however, as is often 
the case, there are impressive achievements that should not be disregarded. Indeed, it is 
reassuring to state that it is better to be a citizen in a nonracial South Africa than during the 
apartheid era, and it is better to be a citizen in today’s modern Cape Verde than prior to 
independence when famines recurred, and most certainly, it is even better being a citizen of a 
multiparty Cape Verde. The same can be said about Mozambique, which has enjoyed less 
success, that it is certainly better to be a citizen of the relatively democratic Mozambique of 
today than prior to independence.  
 
These achievements do not mean that there is no room for improvement; one clear setback in 
Africa’s multiparty societies is the lack of political accountability. No rulers, politicians, civic 
organisations, parties, or parliaments are angels. That is why it is important to have citizens 
who check and monitor the political institutions, politicians who criticise other politicians, 
and an organised civil society that gives structure to the voices of interest groups. Political 
societies, especially democracies, need this leash. To enhance this mechanism, there is a need 
to fight back the mentality that ‘checking’ is only to be done to enemies and not, for example, 
to members within one’s own party. The mentality that comrades protect each other is 
widespread in African politics.   
 
Partly because of this mentality, African parliaments have been less efficient in keeping the 
executives accountable. Two other main contributors to this less-than-optimal performance of 
parliaments are their curtailment/inhibition by their national constitutions, and a 
predisposition to transfer this role of parliament to civil society. This trend is based on the 
paradoxical criticism that parliaments are too politicised and partidarised. The fault with this 
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last criticism is that parliaments are political institutions composed of politicians, as they are 
in all parts of the world. However, it is not inappropriate for civil society organisations and 
citizens to demand accountability from their rulers, yet this should complement and not 
replace parliaments. This trend can be found, for example, in the case of donors to 
Mozambique, as will be explored in further chapters.   
 
1.2 The halfway inversion of the pyramid of power 
 
Parliaments needed to grow into their new role of representing heterogeneous communities. 
The relative institutional simplicity of an authoritarian regime ceases with liberalisation. The 
political transitions of the 1990s happened abruptly. Voter registrations, party registrations, 
and new constitutions all came about very rapidly in most countries. Following democratic 
elections, parliaments needed to adapt and learn for the first time how to have political 
adversaries alongside them.  
 
Multiparty parliaments are the homes of different voices, mainly antagonists. The people 
cannot be postulated simply as an ideologically homogeneous group. Discordance, debate 
and criticism are the order of the day. This implies a reorganisation of the pyramid of power 
used for the monoparty authoritarian regime. 
 
As the figure below shows, the pyramid of power inverts from an authoritarian monoparty 
regime to a multiparty regime. In the first pyramid, the party represents all interests; 
therefore, it sits atop the pyramid, followed by the executive, which governs according to the 
party’s orientations, followed in turn by parliament. At the bottom of the power hierarchy 
come the people. 
 
In a multiparty regime, citizens are the foundation, since it is through their vote that 
governments and parliaments are elected. Parliaments and citizens are theoretically 
empowered in this model. However, the inverted pyramid cannot in practice be so linear. It is 
common that in emerging democracies the new pyramid of power retains traces from the past 
model. More so in countries where there is a ruling party that holds a comfortable majority 
and is a former liberation movement; under these circumstances, the party believes that it 
holds a superior legitimacy in the new system. 
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Examples of the confusion over the place of the party and the executive were declarations by 
the ANC’s secretary-general, Gwede Mantashe, in favour of the party having power above 
all, and the declarations of the former president, Thabo Mbeki, stating the opposite. Within 
one week, both men stated opposing views on the powers of the party. On 7 January 2009, 
Mantashe announced that in the future, the party, and not the president, would monitor the 
performance of all its ministers and MPs, and those that the party considered incompetent 
would be fired, clearly stating that the party, and not parliament or the executive, would be in 
charge (Monare, 2009). Seven days later, former president Thabo Mbeki pleaded to his own 
party to “Put the people before party politics” (Mbanjwa, 2009).   
 
Figure 1.1: The inversion of the pyramid of power 
 

















1.3 Parliaments, people, politicians and the consolidation of democracy 
 
Parliaments, people and parliamentarians are naturally interconnected; voters go to the polls 
to elect their representatives, who take their seats as members of parliament. A political 
system is no more than a set of related objects (Mahler, 2000). The relationship between 
parliaments and people or, from a microcosmic perspective, between politicians and citizens 
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needs to grow and endure beyond the electoral moment. Parliaments are meant to represent 
the interests of the electorate between elections. This includes keeping the government 
accountable, contributing to the choices of social and economic policies, making laws, 
advancing citizens’ interests, and safeguarding the constitution.  
 
Over the last decades, Africans have become voters. Politically, the lives of African citizens 
have changed considerably during this period, from colonial-era subjects to citizens at 
independence; from there to comrades during the monoparty periods, and more recently, to 
voters. Citizens, more than voters, need to be aware of their duties and rights, and need to 
have representative instruments and institutions. Besides, the elections that allow them to 
keep governments accountable, parliaments and parliamentarians should be the public 
representatives between elections. For this to happen, parliaments and citizens need to 
develop forms of relations and collaboration.   
 
Along with changes in parliaments, and the changes of the political settings of African 
citizens, African people have also changed, not only where significant demographic changes 
are concerned, but also in a socioeconomic context. The present access to and level of 
education is incomparable with three or four decades ago. A rural exodus has occurred across 
the entire continent, creating gigantic urban centres and bringing with it all the 
socioeconomic problems that such unplanned movement creates. Life expectancy statistics 
tell the story of a continent with its youth as the largest group –African citizens on average 
live 18.5 years less than the average citizen in the world (see Table 3.4). Africa is a continent 
of youth – 63.7 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under 24 years old (U.S. 
Census Bureau, International Data Base, 2009). At the same time, never before has it been so 
effortless for African citizens to communicate – over the last two decades mobile networks 
and the Internet have become more and more accessible and prolific.  
 
If representative democracy is to have any meaning, citizens should be – at a bare minimum – 
aware of the most important political institutions, especially their representative legislature. 
They should be aware of how to contact parliamentarians, and be able to communicate with 
them. Citizens should have enough knowledge to be able to form attitudes toward these 
institutions, such as holding them accountable. It is for this reason that it is it particularly 
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important to gain more knowledge about the relations between citizens and legislatures, and 
subsequently to reflect on the consequences of this for democracy. 
 
Under a democratic paradigm, the way citizens perceive, evaluate and support a political 
institution is determinative. Politicians, under normal circumstances, fear the way citizens 
might perceive their performance. And it is right that they should ‘fear’ their electorate. This 
apprehension arises from the concern of losing their place at the political podium through the 
ballot box.  
 
In its recent history, Africa has displayed characteristics that make the politics on the 
continent distinctive. Political participation and political accountability have not been parts of 
the rights and habits of African citizens, firstly denied by the colonial powers, and 
subsequently denied by the repressive regimes that dominated the continent after these 
countries gained independence. Being represented by elected people is a phenomenon that 
has been around for less than two decades for the large majority of African citizens. 
Colonisation, followed by repression in subsequent decades, did not provide space for the 
development of representative institutions such as National Assemblies. In an era where 
democratisation seems to have reached a dangerous plateau, parliaments’ strength is vital. 
Parliaments can be the safety valve, preventing further social conflict in the course of 
channelling the complaints and demands of citizens; this is especially true in new 
democracies, where parliaments can be the mediators between citizens and complex and 
abstract political and state institutions (Packenham, 1970; Norton, 2002). For this to happen, 
parliaments, people, politicians and executives need to march together, even though part of 
this common trajectory means keeping a check on each other’s performances and behaviours.  
 
This study examines eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. With the exception of 
Botswana, these countries were involved in the wave of multiparty elections that occurred on 
the African continent in the 1990s; few of the seventeen other countries had experienced 
multiparty elections before the 1990s. More precisely, the thesis covers 18 elected 
parliaments. The focus on elected is important, since parliaments exist under multiple 
regimes, whether democratic or not. This research undertaking seeks firstly to comprehend 
the links between citizens and their elected parliaments in the new group of democracies in 
Africa, hoping in this way to help predict the prospects of these new democracies. Secondly, 
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the study uses the case of the development of the Assembly of Mozambique to understand the 
development, capacity and functioning of an emerging parliament. Furthermore, using the 
Mozambican case, the study investigates the perceptions of civil leaders toward the role of 
the Mozambique parliament in its process of democratisation, and lastly, it investigates the 
perceptions of Mozambican parliamentarians concerning their understanding of their roles, 
their relations with the electorate, and their own assessments of the Assembly’s capacity and 
powers.  
 
1.4 Research problem 
 
The general research question that the thesis addresses is, What is the role of Assemblies in 
the consolidation of democracy in Africa?  
 
To answer the general research question, a set of specific research questions1 was developed. 
These questions are divided into descriptive and explanatory questions (presented in Table 
1.1). 
 
The descriptive questions are aimed at collecting information, whereas the explanatory 
questions are aimed at determining the reasons behind the findings of the descriptive 
questions (Punch, 2000, 34). 
 
The analysis starts with a comparative study on public opinion data from the eighteen 
countries in the Afrobarometer survey, and is followed by a case study of the Assembly of 
the Republic of Mozambique.  
 
Throughout the study, the role of the Assembly in consolidating democracy is the dependent 
variable. In the comparative study, the independent variable is the relationship between 
citizens and parliament, and in the case study, three independent variables are explored: the 
capacity of parliament, civic leaders’ relationships with parliament, and the opinions of 
parliamentarians with regard to parliament. 
 
                                                 
1 The concepts ‘general research questions’ and ‘specific research questions’ are presented for example by Punch (2000, p.22): 
“General research questions are more general, more abstract, and (usually) are not themselves directly answered because they are 
too general. Specific research questions are more specific, detailed and concrete.” 
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For the consolidation of democracy, the majority of citizens must have an unwavering commitment to 
the system (Alcántara Sáez, 2008). For citizens to be committed to the system, they need to be aware 
of the ‘institutions’ of the system (in this case parliament). They need to be able to distinguish among 
these institutions (for example between parliament and the executive). They also need to be able to 
evaluate the institutions. Therefore, the study raises the following specific questions: What is the 
extent of Africans' awareness of legislatures?; What are the evaluations of those citizens who do have 
some basic level of awareness, of the performance of legislators and their legislatures?; and, Do 
African citizens distinguish between parliament and the president? The descriptive questions are 
followed by an explanatory question: What is the relationship between individuals’ characteristics 
and their evaluations of legislatures? This question tries to explain the relationship between citizens’ 
profiles and their evaluations of their parliament. Chapter 3 describes changes in the sociopolitical 
characteristics of African citizens. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per capita income, the 
lowest life expectancy, and the highest rates of HIV infection in the world. Africa still ranks 
as the region with the largest population living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in 
Table 3.2. This study tests whether socioeconomic conditions can impede a positive 
relationship between citizens and their parliaments. Taking into account socioeconomic 
conditions prevalent on the continent, this could hamper the consolidation of democracy in 
the region, assuming a consolidated democracy needs citizens who are knowledgeable about 
their parliament. 
 
The case study explores the same question – is parliament contributing to the consolidation of 
democracy. The first specific research question is, How has the Mozambican Assembly 
developed, what are its powers and capacity, and what is the extent of its institutionalisation? 
This question aims to investigate the role of parliament with regard to political institutions 
and to make inferences concerning the potential role that parliaments can have in the 
consolidation of democracy.  
 
The second specific question is, How do civic leaders and journalists assess the role of the 
Assembly? This question investigates the view that for a democracy to be consolidated, 
citizens need to know, evaluate and be aware of their parliament. This view is studied 
through in-depth interviews with Mozambican civic leaders to measure their awareness and 
evaluations of the Mozambican parliament as well their capacity to contextualise and 




The last descriptive question is aimed at analysing Mozambican parliamentarians, their 
political profiles and their democratic beliefs. The findings of Alcántara Saez on the 
politicians of Latin America are an example of how ´politicians matter’; as he stated:  
‘The great importance accorded to institutions in the study of politics over the past 15 years 
can be perceived in the widespread use of the phrase ‘institutions matter’. This is certainly the 
case, but it is also true that we should pay attention to actors who move in the institutional 
arena on a day-to-day basis.” (Alcantara Sáez, 2008, p.1).  
 
The specific research questions addressed include the following: How do Mozambican 
parliamentarians see the Assembly, their roles, their electorates and their relationships with 
the political parties, the executive, and donors? and Who are Mozambican MPs? This 
knowledge will also assist in answering our general question on the role of parliament in the 
consolidation of democracy.  
 
Based on the discussion above, it is important to raise the question: What is the role of 
parliaments in the consolidation of democracy? Given that parliaments are interconnected 
with citizens, executives and politicians, this thesis addresses the broader problem with the 




Table 1.1: Research questions 
What are the roles of the Assemblies in the consolidation of democracy? 








Awareness – What is the extent of Africans' awareness of legislatures? 
Can citizens in Africa articulate a preference for what they want their 
legislators to do? Do they know who their representatives are? Are they 
able to offer opinions about various aspects of the performance of both 
legislators and the legislature? In the jargon of public-opinion research, 
how salient are legislators and legislatures in the minds of ordinary 
Africans? 
How do they 
evaluate their 
parliaments? 
Evaluation – For those citizens who do have some basic level of 
awareness, what are their evaluations of the performance of legislators 
and their legislatures? Or, in social science parlance, what is the valence 







Distinguish – What are citizens’ attitudes towards the coexistence of 
these two institutions? 
Explanatory 
questions 







Citizen’s profile – What is the relationship between individuals’ 
characteristics and their evaluations of legislatures? 
Study on the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 
How has the Mozambican Assembly developed? What are the powers, capacity, and extent of 
institutionalisation of the Assembly? 
How do civic leaders and journalists assess the role of the Assembly? 
How do Mozambican parliamentarians see the Assembly, their role, their electorate and their relations with the 
parties, the executive and donors? 
Who are Mozambican MPs? 
 
1.5 Methodology and structure of the thesis 
 
The study progresses from an analysis of the opinions of individuals from 18 countries to a 
comprehensive study of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique.  
The research design of the thesis combines an intensive case study (one country) analysis 
with a comparative study on eighteen countries (Lieberman, 2005). The research method 
applied is a nested analysis. There has been theoretical debate among scholars on how to 
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integrate different methodological approaches, yet little guidance has been given on how to 
blend these analyses (Liberman, 2005, p.435).  That this thesis attempts to apply a mixed-
method strategy therefore posed a challenge. This combined approach has yielded important 
insights that would not have been apparent using other means; however, the method has its 
limitations. 
The use of public opinion data on eighteen African countries was a pragmatic result of the 
availability of data, combined with an understanding that the countries included showed a 
pattern of similarity regarding the subject of study of this thesis – emerging multiparty 
parliaments. The comparison of the eighteen countries is therefore a comparison of similar 
countries, from the perspective that in all these countries multiparty parliaments are a 
novelty, as will be explained in further detail in Chapters 2 and 3. It is important to keep in 
mind that ‘similarity’ is always ‘relative’ as Dogan & Pélassy (1990, p.132) explained in their 
study on how to compare nations: “We must insist on the word ‘relatively’. Indeed, neither 
similarities nor differences are absolute. They are clearly a matter of viewpoint and 
perspective.” 
In addition, the choice of methods and cases was conditioned by the fact that sub-Saharan 
Africa does not offer quantitative data to the extent that other parts of the world do.  Public 
opinion data is still scarce on the continent (Bratton, Mattes, Gyma-Boadi, p.50).  This fact 
directed the primary intention for the study towards a comparative analysis of the citizens 
interviewed, omitting the identities of the countries. However, agreeing with the general 
perception that the identities of the countries are relevant (Gronke, Levitt, 2004) and that, as 
was explained, there are ‘relative similarities’ among the eighteen countries, it was decided to 
undertake the analysis by country instead of having country only as a control variable.  
The study of the eighteen countries is followed by a case study of Mozambique. 
The choice of the case study was deliberate and not random, and came about for two main 
reasons.  The first was the researcher’s familiarity with the country that allowed her access to 
materials and to the Assembly.  A non-random choice carries the potential problem of bias by 
the investigator; however, as Lieberman put it, “Despite certain appeal in the reduction of 
bias associated with a random selection, the promised benefits must be weighed against 
pragmatic investigator limitations” (Lieberman, 2005, p.447). This assumes particular 
importance since the research was conducted inside the political institution of a parliament, 
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where there is no tradition of researchers being present.  Knowledge of the country’s 
language (Portuguese) and familiarity with the country facilitated not only permission from 
the Parliamentary authorities and from the political parties to conduct research on the 
institution but it also allowed the researcher to consult and use available documentation, and 
to conduct interviews with deputies, staff, and civic leaders.   
The second consideration for the choice of case study was the desirability of it in terms of 
potentially being able through it to assess the robustness of the preliminary larger analysis.  
Mozambique’s assembly at the time of the study was in its third term as a multiparty 
parliament, and three terms is an average number of terms for parliaments in the study.  
Another factor dictating the choice of case study was to have a country that was not an outlier 
in terms of parliamentary age. Moreover, the country had been through a political 
liberalisation but was still not considered democratically consolidated.  Rather, it is often 
classified among the countries that have reached a ‘middle ground’ and, consequently, an in-
depth analysis targets an understanding of the role, or lack thereof, of the parliament in the 
process of democratic consolidation.  Findings may then be inferred to other countries where 
the parliaments are equally young and the democratic processes are still in a developing 
phase. 
The ideal situation would have been to have had eighteen case studies.  However, taking into 
account resource and time constraints, this could be the only case study included. As Collier 
puts it “the case study method has the merit of providing a framework in which a scholar with 
modest time and resources can generate what may potentially be useful data on a particular 
case” (Collier, 1993, p. 106). 
Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative methods were combined in the cross-country 
analysis as well as in the case study analysis.  The combination of these methods has in the 
past come in for some criticism, but they have also been postulated as compatible 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).   
 
The layout of the thesis is as follows. The thesis is divided in 10 chapters.  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 outline the research problem, the objectives of the study, and the methods 
and data used. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the literature reviews on parliaments, 
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democratisation, and the relations of both with citizens. Chapter 3 looks at the characteristics, 
in general, of the African citizen, politically, socially and economically. Also in this chapter, 
the main structural characteristics of the 18 parliaments are presented.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 use public opinion data to assess public perceptions of the 18 parliaments; 
Chapter 4 offers a descriptive analysis of the assessments of parliaments by their citizens, and  
Chapter 5 compares public perceptions of parliaments with those of the presidents of the 
countries, looking at whether citizens can distinguish between these institutions. Chapter 6 
uses a regression equation to test which individual characteristics contribute to a higher score 
for parliament by citizens.  
 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are dedicated to the study of the Assembly of the Republic of 
Mozambique. Chapter 7 gives a description of the development, functioning, and 
constitutional powers of the Mozambican Assembly, and analyses its place in the 
Mozambican political context. Chapter 8 examines the perceptions of Mozambican civic 
leaders and journalists of their parliament, and Chapter 9 analyses the opinions and 
perceptions of Mozambican MPs.  
 
The study of the Mozambican Assembly seeks to understand the development of the 
institution, its relations with the parties, the executive, and civil society. The study 
necessitated substantial effort to obtain the opinions and perceptions of the MPs themselves 
on these matters. Besides in-depth interviews, an MP survey was conducted with 50 current 
MPs.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 sums up the main conclusions of the study and suggests areas for further 
research. 
 
1.5.1 Comparative study of 18 African countries 
 
Knowing that representative democracies, more than authoritarian regimes, depend on the 
support of their citizens for the regime and for the political institutions, it is appropriate to 
understand how citizens, the key determiners of regimes, perceive the core institution of a 
representative democracy – parliament. Therefore, comprehending citizens’ perceptions of 
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their parliaments constitutes an important step toward discerning the future consolidation of 
democracy.  
 
The data used is from a single point in time, between 2005 and 2006, depending on the 
country 2.The comparative analysis is divided into three chapters, as follows:  
 
Citizens’ perceptions of parliament (Chapter 4)  
This chapter is a descriptive study of public opinion data on parliaments, using all the 
questions available in the Afrobarometer data (Round 3) regarding the relations between 
citizens and parliaments. The data analysis was carried out for the grouped sample of 
respondents across all countries, followed by a presentation of the same data by country. 
Therefore, this section describes citizens’ trust in their parliaments; citizens’ approval of the 
performance of their member of parliament; citizens’ perceptions of the corruption of 
members of parliament; citizens’ perceptions of the inclination of members of parliament to 
listen to them; how much contact citizens indicated as having had with members of 
parliament; how much time citizens believed members of parliament spent in their 
constituencies; and how much time citizens believed members of parliament should be 
spending in their constituencies.  
  
This descriptive analysis is followed by a test of the hypotheses on the relations between 
public perceptions of parliaments and the electoral system, and the existence of a ruling party 
that dominates parliament. These hypotheses are restated as follows: 
H1: That citizens’ perceptions of parliaments will depend on the electoral system  
H2: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will have a 
tendency to evaluate their parliaments more negatively 
 
Citizens’ perceptions of parliaments compared with their perceptions of their presidents 
(Chapter 5) 
As stated, the previous section describes and explores the perceptions of citizens of their 
parliaments. In this section, using the same data, the ability of citizens to distinguish 
between parliaments and executives is explored.  
 
                                                 
2 See appendix 1 and 2 for the date of each country and a map showing all 18 countries.  
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The political literature has characterised politics in Africa as the politics of the ‘big man’, 
where ruling leaders have manoeuvred formal rules and institutions to their benefit 
(Hyden, 2006; Bayart, 1993; Southall & Melber, 2006, Posner & Young, 2007). Elected 
African parliaments are young institutions, which are expected to perform an important 
role in the consolidation of democracies. However, the rapid democratisation processes 
have allowed very little time for these institutions to consolidate themselves in their new 
role. 
 
African citizens for long have been exposed to executives and especially to the figures of 
presidents, the good and bad of who are icons of African politics. The personalisation of 
politics is a reality in most countries. Against this background, it is to be expected that 
parliaments are publicly perceived as secondary institutions, while presidents are still the 
predominant players.  
 
By extension, it is reasonable to expect that parliaments, as quiescent institutions, receive 
very little support from the public. A comparative analysis was conducted comparing the 
responses on parliaments with the responses on presidents. As in the preceding section, 
the following are analysed: citizens’ trust; citizens’ approval of the performance of 
parliamentarians; and citizens’ perception of corruption.  
 
Again, the two hypotheses from the previous section are tested, as well as the hypothesis 
regarding the constitutional design of the country:  
H3: That citizens’ perceptions of their parliament in comparison with their 
president will depend on the electoral system  
H4: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will show greater 
appreciation for their presidents than for their parliaments 
H5: that the constitutional design will affect citizens’ perceptions of their 




Citizens’ evaluations of legislatures – test and explanatory LegislativeScore3 model, 
explanatory factors (Chapter 6) 
In this section, a multiple regression equation was selected and fitted to the 
LegislativeScore for each country.  
 
The hypotheses are divided into two main groups of individuals’ characteristics: 
socioeconomic characteristics and political characteristics, as is summarised in Figure 6.1, 
below. In the first group, the criteria were socioeconomic characteristics, including aspects of 
individuals’ social and economic statuses such as their level of education; their level of 
poverty, determined by their cash income and the food deprivation to which they are 
exposed; their satisfaction with the national and their personal economy; their trust in other 
citizens; the age group (generation) to which they belong; their gender; and their habitat, 
whether rural or urban. The second group, individuals’ political characteristics, includes their 
party allegiance, their exposure to the media (listening to radio, watching television, and 
reading newspapers), their satisfaction with democracy, their perception of the fairness of 
elections, their perception of democracy, embeddedness, and the frequency of engagement in 
political discussion.   
 
Relating to the two main groups of characteristics (socioeconomic and political), it was 
expected that socioeconomic characteristics would be more relevant in the evaluations that 
citizens made of legislatures. Political characteristics are also important but less so than 
socioeconomic characteristics, e.g. if citizens are poor and live in rural areas, these trying 
characteristics will be so relevant in their daily lives that their party affiliation, their 
perception of the fairness of elections, etc. will be less important in their minds, so as to make 
these citizen less aware of their legislature and therefore less judgmental. 
 
Hypotheses related to the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals  
 That the level of education has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore  
 
 That a  higher level of poverty is associated with a lower LegislativeScore 
 
 That a  higher level of satisfaction with one’s own living conditions has a positive 
impact on the LegislativeScore  
                                                 




 That a  higher level of satisfaction with one’s own economic status has a positive 
impact on one’s LegislativeScore 
 
 That a  higher level of interpersonal trust has a positive impact on the citizen’s 
LegislativeScore (not questioned in Zimbabwe) 
 
 That a  multiparty generation is associated with a higher LegislativeScore 
 
 That males are associated with a lower legislativeScore 
 
 That residents of rural areas are more satisfied with their legislatures 
 
Hypotheses related to the impact of political characteristics 
 That citizens associated with the ruling party will have higher LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens associated with the opposition party will have lower LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens with religious affiliations will have higher LegislativeScores  
 
 That citizens exposed to radio news will have higher LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens  exposed to print news will have lower LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens that display a higher level of satisfaction with democracy will have 
higher LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens who believe that elections were not free and fair will have lower 
LegislativeScores 
 
 That citizens who believe that they do not live in a democracy (embeddedness) will 
confer lower evaluations of their legislatures 
 
 That citizens who engage in political discussions will have higher LegislativeScores.    
 
1.5.2 Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 
 
This part of the study includes data on the functioning of parliament. The data originated 
from staff interviews, interviews with key civil leaders regarding how they perceived the 
Mozambican parliament, and an MP survey. The MP survey examined how MPs perceived 
their relations with citizens and how, in general, they perceived their roles as elected 




Mozambique is one of the countries that embraced democratisation in the 1990s; however, 
the country seemed to stagnate in the wake of its important achievements in the areas of 
electoral competition and civil and political liberties.  
 
After the recognised accomplishment of its transition to a multiparty system, the 
consolidation of democracy seems compromised. The Mozambican parliament has, to its 
merit, the achievement of having for 14 years hosted the two formerly belligerent parties to 
its civil war. This can be seen as a triumph of the Mozambican parliament; yet, this was a 
difficult process. Mozambique has a political system that is highly presidential, with a 
dominant ruling party. It is therefore interesting how in this context the Mozambican 
parliament has developed.  
 
The combination of ordinary Mozambicans’ perceptions and civil leaders’ and journalists’ 
perceptions permits a better understanding of how the Mozambican parliament is truly seen. 
The inclusion of MPs’ opinions completes the triangle and gives insights into the gaps and 
common understandings between citizens and MPs. The study of observers’ perceptions of 
the Mozambican parliament contributes to the general knowledge of how parliaments, as 
emerging institutions, operate in emerging democracies. The analysis of the case study is 
divided into the following three sections: 
 
The Assembly of the Republic Of Mozambique (Chapter 7) 
In this section, there are descriptions of the development, capacity and institutionalisation of 
the Assembly. The methodology for this section comprised collecting official data, 
legislation, and memorandums of the Assembly. In-depth interviews were also conducted 
with staff, former MPs and existing MPs. Plenary sessions and working committee meetings 
were observed during the sitting periods of two plenary sessions, the last session in 2006 and 
the first session of 2007. 
 
Parliament in the minds of national civic leaders (Chapter 8) 
This section investigates how Mozambican civic society leaders’ perceived the Mozambican 
parliament. The methodology of this section comprised in-depth interviews and data collected 
on parliamentary performance indicators related to its interaction with the public. The 
interviews were conducted with a panel of leaders of several key organisations from 
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Mozambican society, journalists with experience in parliamentary affairs, and staff from the 
National Assembly. Due to time and financial constraints, most of the interviews were 
conducted in Maputo. However, a visit to Beira was carried out to interview the mayor and a 
representative of a religious organisation. 
 
The selection of stakeholders was based on organisation type. Organisations who were 
politically involved, but who had no party affiliation were chosen. Additionally, the selection 
was restricted to organisations that were active in the national sphere and not just in Maputo. 
For this reason, based on contact with their members, but taking into consideration public 
activities within the regions, they were asked for both their perceptions and the perceptions 
that they believed existed across the country. An elected member of local government (the 
president of a municipality) was also included on the stakeholders’ panel. Inclusion on the 
panel of journalists was determined on the basis of their experience and interest in 
parliamentary affairs, and on national coverage by them.   
 
Mozambican MP survey (Chapter 9) 
The survey sample comprises responses from 50 sitting members of the Assembly of the 
Republic of Mozambique, elected in the legislative election of 2004. The sample was 
stratified randomly, based on political party affiliation, gender and the electoral circulos 
eleitorais (corresponding to the Mozambique Provinces). The sample reflected the 
proportionality of the parties’ distribution – 32 MPs from FRELIMO and 18 from 
RENAMO-UE. Members were contacted and asked to participate in the survey. The survey 
took place during the Assembly’s sitting in Maputo from February 2008 to May 2008. The 
interviews were conducted in Portuguese, the official language of Mozambique. Most of the 
interviews were conducted in a private room allocated by the Assembly for the survey. When 
this was not possible, assurances were given that there were no other people present or within 
earshot of the interview. Interviews averaged between 1.5 and 2 hours. The questionnaire was 
anonymous, and MPs were previously informed that they were not obliged to respond. 
 
Never before has an MP survey such as this one been conducted on the Assembly of 
Mozambique. For this reason, the research demanded caution in its preparation – it was 
essential to obtain the endorsement of both political parties (FRELIMO and RENAMO) and, 
more importantly, also to have their engagement in the study. As a legacy of the civil war, 
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there is severe distrust between both parties, which extends to strangers who want to research 
their activities. Besides conventional concerns about the research design of the survey, the 
procedures in obtaining authorisations and bringing the politicians on board are essential 
when conducting research in countries that are not yet democratically consolidated. As 
Chapter 9 shows, both political parties accepted collaborating in the study, with no 
conditions. They extended to the researcher full liberty to circulate in their spaces and to 
approach party servants and MPs. The only condition imposed by FRELIMO was that the 
sample needed to be proportionate to the number of seats in the Assembly. The 
proportionality rule is so present in the daily functioning of the Assembly that the RENAMO 
leadership promptly accepted this condition. An important lesson for future research in 
countries with proportional electoral systems with closed party lists is that MPs may be 
reluctant to participate if the party leadership does not give its authorisation for them to do so.       
 
1.6 Sources of data 
 
This dissertation is based on quantitative and qualitative data. At the same time, the analysis 
combines primary and secondary sources. As its primary sources, the study used public 
opinion data, an MP survey, in depth-interviews with journalists and civic leaders of 
Mozambique and the staff of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique. As its secondary 
sources, this study used reports, party programmes, policy proposals, law bills, national 
budgets and other written material produced by the government, as well as the Constitution, 
the database on parliament from the Inter-parliamentary Union, and newspapers. 
 
The research fieldwork was conducted in Mozambique during several visits over the last four 
years; the longest uninterrupted stay in Maputo coincided with the first sitting period of the 
Assembly in the first semester of 2007 and the first sitting period in 2008. The researcher also 
attended a few plenary sessions of the South African parliament. Short research visits to the 




1.6.1 Cross-country data 
 
Afrobarometer data.  
The Afrobarometer surveys are public opinion surveys covering a wide range of areas related 
to democracy, governance, conflict and crime, economics and markets, social capital, and 
others. The data was analysed during the period when it was embargoed; however, the data 
used is presently available both in the form of a comparative tool as well as in the form of 
stand-alone country surveys. The analyses cover Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Note that the Afrobarometer surveys are 
concentrated in countries that have undergone at least some degree of political and economic 
liberalisation in the last decade. As such, the results represent the continent’s most open 
societies and cannot be taken as being representative of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.  
 
Socioeconomic and political indicators4. 
Several sources were used for the socioeconomic and political indicators. Worth noting is that 
the data on parliaments is available online, at PARLINE, from the Inter-parliamentary Union. 
Regarding data on elections, the main source was the website of the Electoral Institute of 
Southern Africa (EISA) and the data available on the website of the Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In general, the socioeconomic indicators for countries were 
from the different sections of the United Nations: the United Nations Statistics Department, 
the United Nations Population Fund, and the United Nations Development Programme. 
Information was also obtained from the website of the World Bank Group. As an overall 
background, the various editions of Africa south of the Sahara were crucial.  
 
Legal documents  
To code the parliaments’ power, the constitutions of the 18 countries were used.  
 
                                                 




1.6.2 Data on the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 
 
MP survey 
The survey included a sample of 50 members of the Assembly of the Republic of 
Mozambique elected in the legislative election of 2004.  
 
In-depth interviews 
The interviews were conducted with a panel of leaders of several key organisations from 
Mozambican society, journalists with experience in parliamentary affairs, and staff from the 
National Assembly. 
 
Official data on the Assembly  
Data was collected on parliamentary performance, indicators with regard to the actions of 
parliament that are open to public scrutiny. As an indicator, the number of visitors to the 
Documentation Centre of the Assembly was incorporated. The data was collected with the 
assistance of the Division of Working Committees and the Documentation Centre.  
 
1.7 Contributions of the study 
 
The main contribution of this study is its bringing of parliaments to the centre of the 
discussion on democratisation, good governance and accountability. To this end, the study is 
innovative in combining in a single study, a study on how people perceive parliaments – 
embracing public opinion and the opinions the elite – with a study on how multiparty 
parliaments have developed in the last two decades, with a study on parliamentarians 
themselves. The MP survey is an important, innovative contribution to the literature on 
politics in Africa, an area which had previously been seriously neglected. A study on 
parliamentary elites has been absent, not just in the African context, but also worldwide. 
Political analysis is inseparable from an analysis of the political actors; however, there has 
been a general lack of empirical studies on parliamentarians. Studies in this area are even 
more salient when there is a need to evaluate and measure quality of democratic life (Díez & 
Díaz, 2008, p. 7). Evidently, politicians are fundamental actors in politics; a study of their 
trajectories, values, beliefs, and attitudes are a sine qua non condition to a more accurate 
political analysis.  
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An important contribution of this study is that it reveals how the characteristics of 
parliaments and their interaction with other institutions impact on an electoral system and the 
development of democracy. Previous studies have dealt with electoral systems and their 
relations to accountability, but there are few empirical studies on the impact of electoral 
systems on parliamentary performance, and this study seeks to provide important insights 
into this topic. This work also points out the distinction between parliamentary efficiency and 
the constitutional or political autonomy of parliaments.  
 
Another important contribution of this study is to emphasise the role that citizens’ political 
characteristics, along with their economic and social characteristics, play in their 
relationships with parliaments. 
  
The thesis presents interesting findings with regard to the relationship between perceived 
electoral fairness and the esteem in which parliaments are held. Here the study shows that 
when citizens believe elections are free and fair they are more likely to approve of 
presidential/parliamentary performance  
 
The research also reveals that the level of trust in parliaments in these eighteen African 
countries is far higher than is the case in the most other countries, established democracies 
included. While it is noted that African citizens are quite capable of distinguishing between 
the performance and institutions of presidencies and parliaments, they do not seem unduly 
perturbed by constitutional arrangements that remarkably extend executive and legislative 
powers for the former, at the expense of the latter.  The widespread distribution of dominant 
parties does not impinge upon citizens’ trust in parliaments. Whilst dominant party theorists 
lament the tendency of strong ruling parties to merge party and state, the survey undertaken 
here seems to indicate that the majority of people who vote for dominant parties seem to be 
reasonably happy with this situation. 
 
In the study of Mozambique, many of the themes mentioned above are pursued. The study 
deals with the political and historical background to the situation with regard to parliament in 
this country. It points out the weakness of parliament relative to the president and the ruling 
party, and the limited impact made by Mozambican parliamentary committees.  The study 
provides data on the socioeconomic backgrounds of MPs, and the differences between the 
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economic situations of MPs from FRELIMO and RENAMO. This work also reveals that both 
ruling party and opposition party MPs concur in their view of the virtues of a strong 
presidency, and seem to have relatively little interest in promoting a stronger parliament. 
Interesting data is provided on journalists’ relatively favourable views on the functioning of 
parliament, although ‘stakeholders’ were shown to be rather more negative. Finally, the 
investigation shows that all stakeholders agree on the importance of parliament and its crucial 
role in the consolidation of democracy.  
 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
 
The first limitation was the lack of data and literature on parliaments in Africa. Very few 
parliaments have websites with sufficient information. Of the 48 sub-Saharan African 
countries, 17 countries do not have a website dedicated to their parliament. Concerning the 
Assembly of the Republique of Mozambique, the website is limited to a part of the 
government’s website, with little information on how parliament functions and its major 
highlights. On this matter, there are very few websites where there is information on the 
procedures of parliaments’, even on access to the agendas or standing orders. Among the 
existing websites, the last update can go as far back as 1999. The exceptions to this are the 
parliaments of South Africa and Cape Verde. The latter went for a period of more than a year 
(2007) where it was not functional, but in 2008 it went online again. This issue with Africa’s 
parliamentary websites ensures that the desk research on parliaments in Africa is inferior to 
the desk research on the parliaments of Europe, where the websites are regularly updated and 
provide large amounts of information. Because of the limited data on parliaments, a 
comparative study on the capacity and performance of parliaments could not be undertaken. 
A second limitation of the study was the use of public opinion data from one point in time. 
To enable a superior and more feasible understanding of the public’s perceptions, a 
comparison should also be done with data from different times, thereby ensuring that the 
noise of particular situations or events does not affect the findings.  
 
1.9 Avenues for further research 
 
There is such a scarcity of studies on parliaments and politicians that there are several options 
for future research. Unfortunately, the statement “we know a great deal about particular 
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legislatures but very little about legislatures as legislatures.” (Norton, 2002, p. xi) does not 
apply to parliaments in Africa, where the scarcity of studies on particular legislatures is as 
rare as the comparative studies. There is a need for case studies on parliaments in Africa, and 
there is also a need for comparative studies on parliaments.   
 
Through the constitutions and standing orders, it is possible to measure the powers that 
parliaments hold in a legal framework; however, the practice of these powers can be very 
distinctive. Therefore, to conduct a study on a parliament’s powers in practice, it is pertinent 
to evaluate the role of that parliament in practice.   
 
Research on the attitudes of the parties within parliaments and in relation to parliaments is 
also vital to measuring the dynamics of parliaments.  
 
The relations between parliament, parliamentarians and citizens need further and consistent 
research. An exploration of the trends in public perceptions toward parliaments is definitely 
required, as is the use of other research methods, such as focus groups, in the study of the 
relations among parliament, parliamentarians and citizens, which could be important 
contributors to an understand of the representation function of parliaments. 
 
Another fundamental area that urgently requires study is the oversight function of 
parliaments, not just descriptive assessments of this parliamentary function, but deep research 
on the roles of the political parties and the executive, and on the interference of external 
actors such as aid donors.  
 
Another area requiring scholarly attention is a study on parliamentarians. Here again, 
research can assume different forms and embrace different methods, but to know who 
parliamentarians are, and what they believe, preach and fear are of special importance to 
political societies in a democratisation process.    
 
One avenue of future research that is an important area to investigate is the relationship 
between citizens and parliaments, and the interrelationship of both with democracy. To 
identify the existence or nonexistence of these, it is important to compare multiparty 








2.1.1 African parliaments prior to independence 
 
This study examines eighteen sub-Saharan African countries. With the exception of 
Botswana, these countries were involved in the wave of multiparty elections that occurred on 
the African continent in the 1990s; few of the seventeen other countries had experienced 
multiparty elections before the 1990s. However, these multiparty periods were interspersed 
with authoritarian regimes. All held multiparty elections in the 1990s, following one-party 
regimes: some occurred after military regimes and some after civil war.5 At some point, all 
had a parliament after independence, but as a result of the nature of the regimes, some of 
these parliaments did not accommodate opposition groups. Before independence, the type of 
parliamentary experience was classified according to that of the respective colonial power at 
that time. 
 
Prior to independence, a pattern of colonial, legislative presence can be identified, with 
minimal parliamentary and representative procedures in place; in this regard, the countries 
colonised by Portugal faced even more constraints, given that Portugal was an authoritarian 
regime. In 1953, the Lusophone Legislative Council was established in the African colonial 
territories. In 1972, these legislative councils in Africa were elected by restricted suffrage. 
Between five and ten members represented each territory in Lisbon. In 1972, Portugal was 
not a democracy. As a result, in the African colonial territories, the elections were controlled 
by the Portuguese one-party state, and, as in Portugal, the vote was given to only a very small 
percentage of the population, which at that time, did not include natives of the colonial 
territories (Ramos, 2004).  
 
                                                 
5 Benin – 1991, Botswana – 1966, Cape Verde – 1991, Ghana – 1992, Kenya – 1992, Lesotho – 1993, Madagascar 
– 1993, Malawi – 1994, Mali – 1992, Mozambique – 1994, Namibia – 1989, Nigeria – 1999, Senegal – 2000, 
South Africa – 1994, Tanzania – 1995, Uganda – 2006, Zambia – 1991, Zimbabwe – 1980. Source: Africa South 
of the Sahara.  
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In the French territories in 1946, small territorial assemblies were established (circa 25 
members). Representatives were also elected to National Assembly in Paris and to the Grand 
Council of Dakar. In 1956, under the loi de cadre, Francophone territories held a referendum 
to decide their future association with France, and this was held under universal direct 
suffrage. In 1956, before independence, the first Guinean president, Sekou Touré, was elected 
as Guinea's deputy to the French National Assembly.  
 
After the Second World War, legislative councils were created in the British territories. 
Elected assemblies were created in the 1960s. However, as with the Lusophone countries, the 
vote was only extended to male property owners.  
 
With independence achieved, assemblies flourished in Africa, although most existed under 
nondemocratic regimes. Assemblies at this stage were used to unify the nation, and in 
countries with one-party systems, the assembly was a form of central committee of the party. 
 
The literature on African legislatures goes back three decades, corresponding to the dawn of 
the newly independent states on the African continent. The first analyses of legislatures in 
Africa were country case studies produced in the decade after independence, including those 
on Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. In the same period, a few studies 
compared the legislatures of the newly independent states to those of the previous colonial 
regimes (Le Vine, 1979; Stultz, 1968). For understandable reasons, during the decades of the 
one-party systems, there were even fewer studies about how the legislative institutions 
operated and survived within these systems (although, for an exception, see Kjekshus, 1974). 
These studies mostly concluded that parliaments in the independent countries were weak 
institutions. Hopkins’s (1970) study of MPs in the parliament of Tanzania explored the 
different roles of parliamentarians and their relationships with political parties, and revealed 
that the parties exerted great influence over MPs and thus rendered them ineffective. Hopkins 
concludes, “The actual role of the MP in the legislature is quite minor” (Hopkins, 1970).  
 
2.1.2 The rise of multiparty parliaments 
 
In the 1990s, single party regimes were forced by domestic and international forces to share 
the political arena with opposition parties, resulting in Africa witnessing an unprecedented 
28 
 
wave of formations of multiparty democracies. During this decade, Africa held 190 
presidential and legislative elections, compared to only 29 elections held in the previous 
decade.6 This wave of elections was global, with elections in the world doubling in one 
decade – from 294 elections in the 1980s to 603 elections in the 1990s. Africa has been the 
region with the largest increase in elections, with the number of elections multiplying six 
times. The end of the twentieth century was definitely marked by the expansion of 
democracy, as is unambiguously stated by Amartya Sen: “This century, they will find it 
difficult not to accord primacy to the emergence of democracy” (1999, p. 3). 
 
As a direct result of this boom in elections, parliaments, which until then were mainly one-
party institutions (or like the South African National Assembly, not representative of the 
majority of the population), needed to accommodate opposition parties. These assemblies 
faced the challenge of institutional and political demands. The procedures of one-party 
assemblies needed to be adapted and, in many instances, created from scratch. Many new 
members of parliament entered an assembly for the first time. Staff remaining from the 
previous one-party systems, a number of whom were also party members, needed to build the 
trust of all the new members. Parliaments also faced high expectations from the media and 
from their citizens. Like elections, these new parliaments were the visible faces of the new 
regimes.  
 
Assemblies became the place where citizens could follow the announcements of political 
overtures. In South Africa, for example, the major political decisions regarding the transition 
made by President Frederik Willem (F.W.) de Klerk between 1989 and 1994 were announced 
in the National Assembly, which could be followed by South Africans though the media. 
African national assemblies took on different roles in transition periods such as these. Some, 
for that reason, could have been perceived by the public as being active agents of these 
transitions. Many countries used national conferences to draw up new constitutions, and these 
conferences worked like large national assemblies. Others preferred to draw up multiparty 
rules under the assemblies of one-party regimes, with no involvement of other political 
forces. The forming of national conferences appears to have been a practice particular to the 
francophone African countries.  
 




The first national conference was organised in Benin and overthrew the authoritarian regime, 
hence being named the first civil coup d’état in Africa. This conference took place on 
February 19, 1990 and included representatives of the ruling People's Revolutionary Party, 
trade unionists, civil servants, students, religious leaders, and representatives of the military. 
The conference took ten days to replace the government, and democratic elections were held 
a year later. The media broadcast the event and its outcome throughout Francophone Africa, 
with special coverage by Benin radio and Radio France International (RFI). Between March 
1990 and August 1991, the rulers of Gabon, Congo, Mali, Togo, Niger, and Zaire faced the 
demands of pro-democracy forces and convened national conferences. During this same 
period, opposition groups in the Central African Republic (CAR), Cameroon, Madagascar, 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania and, later, Chad mobilised campaigns to drive their demands for 
national conferences (Robinson, 1994).  
 
In spite of common patterns, African transitions in the 1990s were not identical, and an 
important difference lay in the manner in which the incumbents of the authoritarian regimes 
reacted to pressure for political change from their citizens and the international community. 
The Nigerian political scientist Claude Ake (2000, p. 132) points out that authoritarian 
African leaders in the 1990s faced the international trend towards democratisation in one of 
two ways. Some leaders tried to postpone and even fight it, while others tried to 
accommodate the new era. Cape Verde is the example given by Claude Ake (2000) of an 
authoritarian regime that promoted rapid political change.  
 
Political liberalisation has been the modus operandi in many African countries since the 
1990s, which means that multiparty assemblies have existed for two decades in the region. 
The average number of years of existence of a multiparty assembly (with no reversion to 
authoritarian rule) in the 18 countries in this study is 16.22 years. The short lifespans of these 
assemblies demands a holistic approach in order not to judge them in a one-dimensional 
mode so that parliaments in Africa are not seen merely as ‘rubber stamps’. As Paterson and 
Copeland state: “Today, parliaments are being recreated or newly established in many 
emerging democracies, and these new parliaments, now in their infancy, struggle to become 




2.2 Literature on democratisation and parliaments 
 
2.2.1 The transition to democracy, democracy and democratic consolidation 
 
It is particularly important to distinguish between the period during which a country 
undergoes a transition to democracy and that of democratic consolidation. It is equally 
illuminating to note that the passage between the stages is not always linear, and countries 
sometimes settle into a hybrid stage that is difficult to classify (Carothers, 2002; Schedler, 
2001; Collier & Levitsky, 1997).  
 
The debate around the definition of both concepts – transition and consolidation – has been 
promoted in recent years.  While the debate is unsettled, it is difficult to define concepts that 
do not enjoy consensus (Schedler, 1997).  A good definition, as a departure point in our 
understanding of both concepts, is the definition given by Gunther, Diamndouros & Punle  
(1995, p.xii): 
“Regime transition entails the creation of the basic political institutions of a new 
democratic system and the drafting of new rules for regulating the political 
behaviour of citizens, organisations and governing elites. Democratic 
consolidation ... involves the legitimisation of those institutions and the 
widespread internalisation of the new democratic regime’s basic behavioural 
norms. It is important to note that transition and consolidation are conceptually 
distinct but that, in reality, they may temporarily overlap or even coincide.” 
 
The eagerness to understand when a country has reached a state of consolidated 
democracy results from the widespread belief that if a democracy is consolidated, it is 
less likely to break down (Schedler, 2001).  According to this author, there has been a 
legitimate but narrowly defined classical anxiety surrounding this definition. Schedler 
(1997) attempts to offer a comprehensive framework for the conceptualisation of 
democratic consolidation.  According to him the concept can be divided into five 
objectives: avoiding democracy’s breakdown, avoiding democracy’s erosion, 
institutionalising democracy, completing democracy and deepening democracy. The 
author regroups these variants into ‘negative’, ‘positive’ and ‘neutral’ forms of 
democratic consolidation.  The first two objectives, namely, avoiding democracy’s 
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breakdown and erosion, are ‘negative’ because they try to prevent democratic 
recessions. The last two objectives are described as ‘positive’ because they try to 
achieve democratic progress. The ‘neutral’ objective consists of democratic 
institutionalisation (Schedler, 1997, p.17).  
 
Regardless of the precision, or lack thereof, of defining democratic consolidation in a 
simplistic way, ‘consolidated’ implies a process of going from one level to reach 
another level, in this case of levels of democracy.  It is therefore equally important to 
discuss the concept of democracy.  The concept of democracy also presents challenges 
and a lack of consensus, as Larry Diamond puts it: 
“… just as political scientists and observers do not agree on how many democracies 
there are in the world, so they differ on how to classify specific regimes, and the 
conditions for  making and consolidating democracy .... A key element in all these 
debates is the lack of consensus on the meaning of democracy ....” (Diamond, 2003, 
p.30). 
 
Robert Dahl’s definition of democracy offers a good guide to what a political system 
needs to have to be a democracy, which is competition, inclusiveness and civil liberties 
(Dahl, 1971).  Dahl actually refers to existing political systems as polyarchies, and to 
‘democracy’ as an ideal  
 
Schmitter & Karl (1991) also contributed to the effort of defining democracy. They 
defined modern political democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.” (1991, p.50). 
This discussion continues in the section 2.2.4 on further distinguishing delegative from 
representative democracies. 
 
2.2.2 Status of parliaments 
 
The third wave of democratisation in Africa has also been paid attention by scholars. 
However, there have been few comparative studies on these new democratic parliaments 
when compared with studies on electoral systems. Scholars have been concerned with the 
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impact of electoral systems as political institutions of democracy (Cho, 2005; Norris, 1997; 
Lindberg, 2005). What is common to these overall analyses is the absence of a resultant study 
on parliaments. Notwithstanding the key function of electoral systems being to elect members 
of a parliament,  the impact that an electoral system has on a democracy is affected by the 
internal characteristics of each parliament and its interaction with the existing political 
institutions and, in particular, with the executive.  
 
There could be several reasons for the exclusion of parliament as a variable in these studies. 
The first reason could be the difficulty of obtaining data on how parliaments in Africa 
operate. Research on African parliaments demands more effort than a study of their 
counterparts in the Western world would. To start with, the researcher, in preparing for the 
fieldwork, will find that very little information is available on the websites of African 
parliaments. Of the 48 parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa, 15 do not have a website, and of 
the 23 that do have a website, eight are non-functional, which leaves 15 functional websites, 
which contain very little information. The short sitting periods of African parliaments can 
also constitute a problem when it comes to undertaking fieldwork. 
 
Also, parliaments are the habitat of the political elite. As institutions, the parliaments in 
Africa must still build trust. In parliaments under new regimes, levels of trust among 
members and staff are still low, and the researcher needs to win the trust of all parties. 
Researching the inner workings of an institution comprising political elites also has its 
difficulties. During the rule of the authoritarian regimes in Africa, research was obviously 
compromised; therefore, there has been no tradition of dealing with researchers. Another 
reason for the exclusion of parliaments from the substantial research on democratisation was 
the time constraints involved. The unpredictable, massive political transitions of the 1990s 
forced political scientists to follow these phenomena as they were happening. This 
compromised the accuracy of the studies, as analyses were constantly being overtaken by 
circumstances. The need to understand the new political transitions on a broad scale 
prevented researchers from attempting to study deeply the political institutions involved.  
 
Last, but of equal importance, is the perception among political scientists of parliaments in 
developing countries being ineffective institutions, which limits the desirability of 
investigating them. Samuel P. Huntington (1968), for example, argues that most legislative 
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institutions in the less developed countries are dominated by traditional elites, who are 
dishonest and block reforms that are needed for modernisation. From this point of view, 
legislatures are the foundation of social and economic stagnation.  
 
2.2.3 The role of parliaments  
 
The role these institutions have played in this universal trend towards political liberalisation 
in Africa therefore still has to be thoroughly explored. The bias regarding parliaments has 
produced, as Mulsof and Smith (1979, p. 28) state, “… a one-dimensional view of legislators 
only slightly caricatured as if they aren’t the central policy-making organ, [and] they’re not 
worthy of attention. But yet they are performing other functions”.  
 
At least legislatures can provide a window between the public and their rulers, as Mulsof 
states: “In many countries legislatures help keep the activities of the executive in the public 
view” (1979, p. 29). The inclusion of parliaments is from Claude Ake’s (2000) perspective 
crucial for Africa; it is “… a democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the 
legislative bodies should in addition to national groups have special representation of youth, 
women’s groups, and unions.”  
 
These positive views of what the role of parliaments are or what they should be are 
challenged by theories that claim democratic parliaments depend on the existence of an active 
middle class (Lipset, 1959), which in Africa are still scarce. Furthermore, Almond and Verba 
(1980) postulate that the survival of democratic institutions requires a strong civic culture. 
However, these presuppositions do little to elaborate on the actual impact of parliaments on 
democratisation.  
 
Steven Fish’s study of the relationship between parliaments and the new democracies in 
Eastern Europe is an exception. His findings reveal a strong correlation between the extent of 
the democracy and the strength of the legislature. Fish’s findings reveal that a powerful 
legislature is an important contribution to the accomplishment of democratisation (Fish, 
2006). This finding is also part of the conclusion of Alence’s work, which shows that 




Nevertheless, little is known about how these functions have been performed, especially 
regarding the second function, representation. Very little research has been undertaken into 
how parliaments in Africa are deploying this function in practice. Furthermore, the law-
making function has been labelled by scholars as a marginal function in developing-world 
legislatures. Mezey agrees with this, but comments further that “if legislatures were not 
central to law-making yet continued to exist, they had to have performed other functions” 
(Mezey, 1983, p. 511).  
 
Emerging multiparliament are not exclusive to Africa, because the rise of multiparty 
parliaments is also a new phenomenon evident in Southern Europe. For example, Portugal’s 
and Spain’s democratic parliaments are just two decades older than most of African 
parliaments, Leston-Bandeira (2005) analysed the development of the parliaments of Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey; their study focuses on the emergence of multiparty 
parliaments with the transitions to democracy.  
 
The findings of Fish and Alence regarding the potential role of a parliament in relation to the 
strength of a democracy constitute a positive outlook, taking into consideration the negative 
attitudes towards democratisation found in Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Several scholars have concluded that democratisation in Africa has been essentially a 
disappointment (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997; Chabal 1998; Van de Walle 2002; Carothers, 
2002). As Nicolas van de Walle (2002, p. 66) points out, this “fin-de-siècle optimism has 
given way to early-twenty-first-century gloom”; multiparty elections and political change 
have not solved Africa’s problems of corruption, lack of efficiency and lack of development. 
In spite of Van de Walle’s sceptical perspective regarding the outcomes of political 
liberalisation in Africa, his findings that institutional learning is important, and yet does 
happen, are good news for parliaments in Africa.  
 
Parliaments can provide a way of assuring the public’s right to hold their rulers accountable. 
As Norton states, parliaments can be the ‘safety valve’ for the complaints and demands of 
citizens, thus preventing further social conflict. In a democratic regime, and especially in new 
democracies, parliaments can be the ‘middle man’ between citizens and the complex and 
abstract political and state institutions (Norton, 2002), even though rulers being held 
accountable to their citizens may still seem to be a remote possibility in Africa.  
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It is therefore generally accepted that parliaments should serve as a bridge between the state 
and society, facilitating the participation of citizens in their own governments in order to keep 
rulers accountable. Democracy needs to deliver the goods; people expect to it to improve 
their lives, and for that, democratisation needs to be accompanied by accountability and good 
governance.   
 
2.2.4 Delegative versus representative democracies  
 
The scepticism about political change in Africa harks back to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s 
(1996) research on the problems of democratic consolidation. Their argument is based on the 
need to distinguish between the transition period and the consolidation of a democracy. As 
the authors state, “The outcomes of these processes are also distinct: Transitions result in the 
creation of a new regime; consolidation results in the stability and persistence of that regime, 
even in the face of severe challenges” (1996, p. 3). Consolidation should not be confused 
with stability. Some of the main influences that the authors mention on the consolidation of 
democracy are the beliefs, values and attitudes of citizens towards the regime. The authors 
note that even if ordinary citizens are not politically involved, their trust in the regime is, in 
the long term, crucial. According to Diamond and Morlino (2005), citizens can be compared 
to the clients of a regime; their satisfaction is therefore essential in the appraisal of their 
regimes. 
 
“The citizen’s role is the distinguishing element between authoritarian and democratic 
regimes” – as is eloquently stated by Schmitter and Karl (1991); all regimes have rulers and 
public realms, but citizens occur only in democracies. The citizens’ role, and particularly the 
notion of citizens’ rights, is the key distinction between democratic regimes and other kinds 
of regimes. These include the right to choose their representatives and the right to exert 
power over their elected representatives. In a democratic political system in which policies 
should be based on consent, the level of support is of major importance. Political support is 
not just about whether people approve or disapprove of their government. It includes whether 
they feel a part of the governing process (Patterson, Boynton and Hedlund, 1969; Boynton, 




Scholars studying Latin American politics stress that democracy in this region does not fulfil 
the principles of representative democracy, but instead the practice is what they conceptualise 
as delegative democracy (O'Donnell, 1994). Delegative democracies occur in countries in 
which the political transition ended in a grey area, meaning that they are not at risk of 
reverting to authoritarian regimes, but they do not, at the same time, show progress toward 
institutionalised democratic practices. 
 
According to Bratton and Logan (2006), African democracies are similar to Latin America’s 
‘delegative democracies’. Elected presidents use the legitimacy acquired from elections to set 
themselves above other institutions. They behave as kings and not as presidents (Malamud, 
2002). They act as superior to all other political institutions, such as parliaments and the 
judiciary. They are, therefore, immune to accountability. Accountability is thus an 
unnecessary impediment to the full authority that the president has been delegated to use.  
 
To understand the difference between representative democracies and delegative democracies 
better, it is important to clarify the concept of representation. Representation is one of the key 
terms used in politics. According to O’Donnell (1994), representation entails accountability: 
“… in other words, it entails an obligation for representatives to answer to the represented”. 
Representation has been a recurrent concern for scholars because of the relevance that it has 
for the model of organisation of our political systems. The debate about what it means is not 
uncontroversial today, and neither has it been over the course of history.  
 
In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill’s (2001) essay ‘Considerations on Representative 
Government’ defended the principle of representative democracy, advocated the adequate 
representation of minorities, urged renewed public participation in political action for 
necessary social reforms, and pointed out the dangers of class-oriented, or special-interest 
legislation (Philosophy, 2009).  
 
One century earlier, the philosopher Burke defended in his writings the need for a 
parliamentarian to have full freedom to act, and not to be subjugated to the will of the 
represented. This debate between Mill and Burke about the conceptualisation of 
representation is accurately summarised by Pitkin (1969). According to Pitkin’s analysis, 
Burke maintained that representation should be the mission of the elite, essentially 
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representing not individual people but the great and stable major interests, which together 
make up the national interest. The representatives should be like trustees: They have an 
obligation to look after their constituents but not to consult or obey them. According to 
Pitkin, Mill thinks of the representative as both an agent and as a trustee. He objects to the 
notion of aristocracy, based on the belief that people know how best they should be 
represented. For Mill, the representative should be an agent of the representative government, 
instead of the trustee that Burke defends. This debate, along with some variation, continues to 
the present. How should the representative be defined, and what constitutes the function of 
representation?  
 
A recent study brings an innovative approach to the debate on representation. Carman (2006) 
endeavours to include the perspective of the public in his study. The literature in general does 
not deal extensively with the direct opinion of the public, but Carman tries to bring the public 
into the debate through a study of the public’s preferences regarding parliamentary 
representation. In his study, he argues that individuals have attitudes about the type and 
degree of relationship that they believe should exist between elected parliamentarians, parties 
and constituents.  
 
Few studies have been undertaken about how citizens perceive parliaments. Peverill Squire, 
in 1993, used public opinion data from seven American states to examine how closely people 
follow the activities of the state legislature. His findings challenge expectations regarding the 
relationship between the level of professionalism of MPs and the evaluation that citizens 
make about them. In Squire’s findings, this level of professionalism is positively related to 
the degree of contact MPs have with constituents, but it is negatively related to the citizens’ 
evaluations of a member of parliament’s performance. They also found that the size of a 
district exerts little influence on public support for the legislature (Squire, 1993). 
 
The fear among political scientists of there being a movement away from representative 
democracy does not exist only with respect to the current affairs of Latin America and other 
regions with emerging democracies. Only four decades ago, the philosopher Arendt 
expressed the same fear regarding Western countries, stating that “the people are not admitted 
to the public realm; once more the business of government has become the privilege of the 
few” (Arendt, 1965, p. 240).  
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Elections are the first instrument for political accountability, because through elections 
incumbents are forced to submit to the scrutiny of the public. However, elections in a 
representative democracy cannot be the only instrument that the electorate has for keeping 
rulers accountable.  
 
O’Donnell (1994) stresses that the weakness of the system lies not so much on the side of the 
public but with institutions such as parliaments. In delegative democracies, these institutions 
struggle to develop their independence, and face a lack of cooperation from the executives, 
who see them as irrelevant. New democracies, where institutions are still embryonic, face a 
greater risk of deficiencies regarding accountability.  
 
Others researching Latin American systems also have a negative opinion about the role of 
parliaments in this part of the world. These authors are more concerned with the detailed 
functioning of legislatures, and claim that the problem is that in Latin America, legislatures 
are reactive and the presidents are proactive (Cox, Morgenstern, 2001). These authors suggest 
that in Latin America the typical situation is that the legislatures cannot remove presidents 
from their positions, and they struggle with a lack of resources, which limits their ability to 
generate their own proposals. Therefore, they are merely reactive to the proposals of the 
executive. However, these scholars do not in suggesting this imply that the reactive nature of 
Latin American legislatures renders them dysfunctional (Cox, Morgenstern, 2001).  
 
Deficiencies in accountability are often more discernible – and critical – in new democracies 
than in long-established democracies (Diamond, Platnner and Schedler, 1999). Regarding the 
assessment of parliaments, autonomy is commonly confused with efficiency. However, 
parliaments in new democracies that arise side by side with strong executives often suffer 
from a lack of autonomy rather than from a lack of efficiency (Carey, Formanek & 
Karpowicz, 1999).   
 
With multypartism, African countries joined the ‘age of parliaments’ mentioned by Norton in 
his classification of the proliferation of parliaments around the world (Norton, 2002). 
Subsequently, this expansion of multiparty parliaments resulted in an edited book, a 
collective effort published on African parliaments in multiparty democracies (Salih, 2005). 
The editor of this book explains that parliaments in Africa are active and execute several 
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important functions, such as legislation (where proposals and programs, in the main, emanate 
from the political executive), representation (by providing the link between government and 
the people), scrutiny of the executive (to ensure that government is accountable, including the 
power to remove it), political recruitment of a pool of talent (some of which is expected to 
find its way to leading political and decision-making positions), legitimisation (through 
representative legislation, the open debating of public affairs, and government performance) 
and conflict management.  
 
Developing simultaneously with the theory of the marginality of the law-making function for 
these legislatures was the view of Africa as an example of a continent ruled by neo-
patrimonialism, and as a continent of the ‘big man’. The Afrobarometer surveys have 
revealed higher levels of trust in presidents than in all other political institutions; this can be 
viewed as a sign that this ‘big man’ concept is still evident in the African political arena, even 
in countries where democratisation has taken place. However, the same surveys reveal an 
important finding that could question whether the theory of the ‘big man’ remains prevalent 
in these countries.  
 
Many post-independence African countries opted for a one-party system, mainly with a 
socialist ideology. The parliaments in these countries began by defining themselves as the 
‘people’s voice’ but changed during the 1960s and 1970s, as the parties made significant 
adaptations that weakened their socialist structures (Salih, 2005). Although their real powers 
were short lived, the existence of these parliaments contributed to a degree of some 
institutionalisation. As mentioned above regarding the post-1990 wave of democratisation in 
Africa, there is little research available on African legislatures, particularly on the 
representative role of legislatures. One of the few comparative studies on legislatures is the 
four-country analysis of ‘emerging legislatures’ in Benin, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal 
coordinated by Barkan, Ademolekun & Zhou (2004). They conclude that “the wave of 
political liberalisation and democratisation that swept across Africa during the 1990s gave 
rise to an expansion of legislative authority in some countries, but not in all” (Barkan, 
Ademolekun & Zhou, 2004).  
 
Even though legislatures in Africa have often been labelled as ‘weak’, this attribute can vary 
significantly across countries: “The authority of the legislature ranged from being very weak 
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in Senegal to being moderately strong in Kenya, with Benin and Ghana falling somewhere in 
between” (Thomas & Sissokho, 2005). Barkan’s (1979) work on the Kenyan parliament has 
provided valuable data on African legislatures. Barkan concluded that both rural and urban 
dwellers in Kenya were better informed about politics than Americans were, at least in terms 
of being able to identify their elected representatives. Barkan (1979) explored how 
legislatures can play an important role in the development of a largely agrarian society, 
especially with regard to the linkages that members of parliament can provide with their 
constituencies in rural areas. 
 
A study conducted in 1978 (Loewenberg & Kim, 1978) tried to measure the 
representativeness of legislatures in six countries (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Korea, and Kenya), solely by using data on the attitudes of MPs. The investigators collected 
data on how members of parliament conceptualised their constituencies, the extent of their 
communication with their constituencies, and their receptiveness to their constituencies’ 
views. 
 
2.2.5 Why the lack of studies on parliaments  
 
In general, the great majority of legislative studies are country-specific, rather than 
comparative. Norton concluded from his review of the literature that “We know a great deal 
about particular legislatures but very little about legislatures as legislatures. There is a mass 
of literature on the US Congress … yet relatively little of that literature helps us advance our 
understanding of legislatures” (Norton 2002). Most of these studies have focused on the 
internal dynamics within specific legislatures, or on the relationship between the legislature 
and executive, with far less attention devoted to the relationship between citizens and 
legislatures.  
 
There are several reasons why Africa’s legislatures have received little systematic attention. 
With regard to the study of the links between citizens and parliaments, the problem is mainly 
a lack of data. With few exceptions, scholars have had no access to reliable data on public 
opinion in Africa. The scarcity of public opinion data is related to the lack of democracy in 
these countries. But it is also a result of an absence of the complex and costly structures and 
reliable census data needed to run public opinion polls.   
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As mentioned above, the literature on parliaments in Africa is mainly negative concerning the 
role of these representative organisations. In addition, African citizens are commonly referred 
to in the political science literature as ‘minor’ citizens, as a result of the legacy of colonialism 
and dictatorships in the region. Additionally, common images in the media of poverty, AIDS 
and malaria reinforce a picture of African citizens as victims or subjects who are illiterate and 
easily manipulated in all spheres – international, national, religious, ethnic, and party.  
 
To add to this picture in recent times is the image of Africans as ‘mere’ voters without being 
‘citizens’. As Bratton and Logan state, “In fact, the problem for many new democracies in 
Africa is not so much that citizens knowingly delegate authority to strong presidents, but that 
democracy remains unclaimed by mere ‘voters’” (Bratton & Logan, 2006, p.iv). This gloomy 
image is not far from that suggested in the literature of parliaments in Africa as being merely 
the rubber stamps of their executives.  
 
While citizens’ perceptions of legislatures have been the subject of scholarly investigation, 
this research has been largely focused on established democracies. The typical research 
design has compared public opinion on a number of policy issues to either the attitudes of 
legislators or their legislative voting records. An important, innovative and atypical 
contribution is Richard Fenno’s (1978) study of US members of Congress in their home 
districts from the perspective of the legislator. Fenno made thirty-six trips with Congressmen 
and Congresswomen, over a period of eight years, to conduct his study. He understood that 
from the perspectives of the Congressman and Congresswomen, keeping the link with their 
district was a difficult but important task. He argues that analysing the behaviour of MPs 
demands an understanding of how they perceive their constituents, and also how they behave 
in ‘their home’ (Fenno 1978).  
 
2.2.6 Public opinion 
 
A more recent example is a study by Squire (1993), who used public opinion data from seven 
American states to examine how closely people follow the activities of state legislatures. His 
findings challenge expectations regarding the level of professionalism of MPs, and citizens’ 
evaluation of them. The study’s findings show that the level of professionalism is positively 
correlated with the level of contact with constituencies, but is negatively correlated with 
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citizens’ evaluations of the performance of MPs. They also found that the size of a district 
exerts little influence on public evaluation of the legislature (Squire, 1993). The literature on 
the relationships between MPs in Africa and their constituencies often characterises these as 
negative and clientelistic (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997; Burnell, 2003).  
 
In Africa, data on public opinion is scarce: “To test competing explanations of attitudes to 
reform in sub-Saharan Africa, one would need a comprehensive set of public opinion data, 
preferably for a range of countries. But since Africa remains an understudied continent, such 
data is scarce, spotty, or entirely nonexistent …. Systematic cross-national comparisons of 
public opinion were not introduced to Africa until the World Values Survey was extended to 
Nigeria and South Africa in 1993” (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, p. 51). The 
same authors express concerns about the democratic process in cases where there is a 
communication gap between citizens and their political institutions: “It is, therefore, with 
some concern for the consolidation of democracy that we further examine the representation 
gap, that is, the dearth of formal contacts between the electorate and their chosen leaders”.  
 
Dalton also expresses this as a general concern among social scientists: “A very short time 
ago, political experts worried about the fragility of democracy … and political institutions 
were having a difficult time adjusting to calls for a more participatory democracy … the 
problem arose because political institutions were not growing to meet the citizenry’s new 
needs and demands” (Dalton, 1996, p.261).  
 
The literature on public opinion tends to be sceptical about how citizens can perform their 
role in democracies, and to what extent politics interests them: “That the mass public opinion 
is typically uninformed and uninterested in policy matters has been a settled question in 
public opinion research” (Kuklinski, 2001, p. 131). However, Kuklinski (2001) points out 
that although they can seem apathetic, citizens are able to exercise their role and hold their 
rulers and their elites accountable. 
 
Concerning this relationship between democracy and public opinion, Hutchings (2003) 
explains that citizens exhibit a lack of clarity in their perception of political affairs. The 
principal lines of the modern critique of citizens’ reasoning were laid down by Walter 
Lippman in his seminal work, Public Opinion (1922). Citizens, he contended, spend the 
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largest part of their time and energy engaged with concerns about their work, their families, 
and the world of public affairs is by contrast remote [and] complex. The ‘pictures in their 
minds’ tend to be crude, oversimplified, and stereotypical (Hutchings, 2003, p. 133)”. 
Hutchings goes on to say, “This view of the mass public suggests that the electorate might 
best be described as a loose collection of sleeping giants … However, they can become 
surprisingly alert” (Hutchings, 2003, p. 3). Awake, then, they can be motivated by the lack of 
compatibility of the elite’s interests with theirs. And while Hutchings’s study is based on the 
American context, when taking into consideration the current lack of confidence in the 
capacity of Africans to be ‘democratic citizens’, it is pertinent to consider whether this is also 
appropriate in the African context.   
 
How citizens assess and support political institutions, politicians and regimes has been one of 
the core topics of research in political studies in recent decades. Based on the belief that 
democratic regimes need political support, scholars have been trying to measure and 
understand the real impact of citizens’ support. Politicians and practitioners have been more 
enthusiastic about understanding how much support they have, especially ahead of elections.  
 
The media also broadcasts regular polls regarding both politicians themselves and their 
policies (Swanson, Mancini, 1996). The development of statistical software and other means 
of testing public opinion towards the end of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the 
twenty-first made polls a political tool accessible not only to Western countries but also to 
emerging democracies. Opinion polls ahead of African elections are starting to become 
common practice.  
 
Tvangarai had opinion polls conducted by the University of Zimbabwe, which put him ahead 
of Mugabe in the elections of 2007.7 In the local elections in Cape Verde in March 2008, 
several opinion polls were conducted; some were requested by the candidates themselves, 
some by local businesspeople, and others by the national broadcaster.8 These are just a few 
examples of how electoral opinion polls are now also reaching African politics. 
 
                                                 
7 See ‘Morgan Tsvangirai leads opinion polls’, http://en.afrik.com/article12842.html, retrieved 8 August, 2008 
8 See, for example, Sondagem (Do Paicv) Dá Vitória A Jorge Figueiredo No Sal, 
http://www.expressodasilhas.cv/noticias/detail/id/1404/, retrieved 5 July, 2008  
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However, these opinion polls are attempts to measure specific support (Easton, 1965) and are 
short-term evaluations of performance or policy decisions. Scholars have been trying to 
determine a measurement of the support that Easton (1965, 1975) has labelled as diffuse, 
because it is generally accepted that democratic regimes, to survive and even to function, 
depend on the public’s will, acquiescence, and support.  
 
These endeavours have varied in their methodology and conceptualisation. Fewer studies 
have been conducted relating to the support of parliaments. On the other hand, the literature 
indicates an attempt to measure support for regimes, because for different reasons, this has 
been a concern of established and emerging democracies.  
 
2.2.7 Citizens’ support of parliaments 
 
With regard to established democracies, scholars have been interested in what seems to be 
citizens’ alienation from politics. With regard to emerging democracies, the studies attempt to 
ascertain whether, based on citizens’ support, these new regimes will survive. As Norris 
points out, “… the consequences for the system of growing political cynicism may be 
expected to prove even more serious for regime stability, particularly in newer democracies” 
(Norris, 1999, p. 264).  
 
The literature that has been dedicated to measuring political support constitutes a large family 
of concepts and measures – as described in the Compendium of Political Measures 
(Robinson, Shaver, Wrightsman, 1999, p. 469). Concerning attempts to use the concept of 
political support in the African context, Achola’s (1984) study regarding public support in 
Ghana deserves particular attention for the substance and pertinence of the analysis. Despite 
the relevance of this study, it should be noted that this was a public survey conducted in the 
Ghanaian city Komasi during the military regime. For this reason, it is peculiar that one of his 
findings is that higher education is statistically significant as a determinant of support for 
central government, local government and the army. However, regarding support for the 
army, high levels of education correlated with less support. The study also points out that in 
the African context the variables urban/rural and formal education should be treated with 




As stated before, few studies have analysed support for parliaments. However, there are some 
noteworthy exceptions. Boynton, Paterson and Hedlun (1968) call attention to the danger of 
confusing support for individuals within an institution with support for the institution itself. 
The authors claim that support for the institution can be diffuse or specific. Diffuse support is 
what they call a ‘reservoir of goodwill’ and is not dependent on the evaluation of a particular 
outcome (Boynton, Paterson and Hedlun, 1968, p. 163). In the same study, they mention the 
difficulty that political science faces in measuring political support for parliaments. They 
developed an indicator for legislative support, composed of seven possible responses (ranging 
from ‘Disagree’ to ‘Agree’) based on citizens’ responses to a survey in the American state of 
Iowa. The questions were related to whether citizens felt that there were times when it was 
almost better for them or the governor to take the law into their own hands, as well as to the 
reduction of the legislature’s powers. They found that people with more political knowledge 
and with a higher socioeconomic status gave more support to the legislature. Variable 
political knowledge was indicated by answers to questions regarding the knowledge that 
respondents had about the legislature itself, and not about political knowledge in general – 
specifically about whether they knew how many times the legislature met and the duration of 
the legislature’s mandate.  
 
The study conducted by Mishler and Rose (1993, 1994) in Eastern Europe exhibited a 
different view of legislative support. It suggests that in emerging democracies legislative 
support needs to be measured differently from the way it is measured in consolidated 
democracies. According to this study, the question in emerging democracies concerns 
whether the public supports the existence of parliaments in these new democracies; in their 
view, a measure of parliamentary performance is at this stage superlative. The existence of a 
parliament in these new democracies, which allows the presence and participation of 
minorities, can exacerbate and mobilise social cleavages, which as a result, can have a 
negative impact on support for the regime. In addition, these parliaments, due to their 
youthfulness, are still inefficient and unruly, which can have obvious consequences with 
regard to public evaluation.  
 
The relationship between African citizens and their parliaments receives even less attention in 
the literature than does the study of parliaments. This study attempts to reduce the gap in the 





Parliaments’ features and individuals’ socioeconomic and 
political milieus  
 
The descriptive analysis carried out in this chapter contextualises the country-specific 
analyses by providing data on their demographic makeup and socioeconomic conditions. An 
examination of the characteristics of the examined countries’ parliaments in terms of this 
framework allows for a meaningful interpretation of the related public opinion findings from 
the Afrobarometer survey. 
 
3.1 Living conditions of African citizens 
 
The realities of adult African citizens in 2008 are considerably different from those of 
citizens of 20 to 40 years ago. It is important to be aware while describing the demographic, 
socioeconomic, communications and political characteristic of a typical African citizen that 
Africa is a continent of great diversity. Citizens have diverse characteristics even within the 
same country, for example, as is the case in South Africa, where citizens living in third-world 
conditions coexist alongside fellow citizens living in the conditions of a lavish and developed 
first world. This coexistence of extreme social disparities is itself one of the characteristics of 
the sub-Saharan African continent, a region with the second most unequal distribution of 
wealth in the world, exceeded only by Latin America (Sparks, 2007).  
 
3.1.1 Socioeconomic conditions of Africans 
 
Africa has the second highest uneven distribution of income of the world; this to some extent 
is a result of the economic growth that the continent has been witnessing in recent decades. 
The average GDP (per capita in constant 2000 USD) went up from 531 USD per capita in 
1990 to 572 USD per capita in 2005. However, this increase did not occur uniformly across 
all countries studied. Botswana has seen the greatest increase in GDP per capita, both in 
absolute and percentage terms, with an increase of 2183 USD between 1990 and 2005, nearly 
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South Africa has shown a consistent rise in GDP per capita during the 1990s, reaching a 
figure of 3429 USD in 2005. This moderate growth of 8.8 percent for the period has allowed 
Botswana to overtake it on this measure as the leading country among the 18 studied. All 
other countries, with a few exceptions, have shown positive economic growth. Cape Verde 
has managed to increase its per capita GDP by 491 USD (58 percent) over the 15 years. The 
GDP per capita for all 18 countries in this study is shown in the table below. The three 
countries whose GDP per capita has decreased are Zambia, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Three of 
the four countries coming off the lowest base in 1990 – Mozambique, Uganda and Mali – all 
display growth rates in the top half of the table, as may be expected, the exception being 
Malawi. 
 
Table 3.1: Real GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD for the 18 countries in the study 
 
GDP pc 1990 GDP pc 2005 Variation
Benin 273 323 50 
Botswana 2 376 4 559 2183 
Cape Verde 852 1 343 491 
Ghana 211 288 77 
Kenya 451 442 -9 
Lesotho 378 547 169 
Madagascar 271 273 2 
Malawi 131 154 23 
Mali 183 244 61 
Mozambique 170 288 118 
Namibia 1 619 2 096 477 
Nigeria 386 456 70 
Senegal 434 503 69 
South Africa 3 152 3 429 277 
Tanzania 259 325 66 
Uganda 173 270 97 
Zambia 361 351 -10 
Zimbabwe 637 432 -205 
Africa sub-Saharan average 531 572 41 




In spite of its economic growth, the region is not doing well compared to the rest of the 
world. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest per capita income, the lowest life expectancy, and 
the highest rates of HIV infection. Africa still ranks as the region with the largest population 
living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 3.2: Population living on less than 1 USD per day (percentage) 
 1981 1990 2004 
East Asia and Pacific 57.7 29.6 9.1 
Europe and Central Asia 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Latin America and Caribbean 9.7 11.3 8.6 
Middle East and North Africa 5.1 2.4 1.5 
South Asia 51.5 41.3 30.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 41.6 44.6 41.1 
Source: The World Bank Group, 2007a 
 
The table below shows the percentage of the population living on less than 1 USD and on less 
than 2 USD a day, by country. Using this measure as the generally accepted indicator of 
progress in poverty reduction, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, all of 
which have more than 80 percent of their populations living on less than 2 USD a day, can be 
considered the poorest countries. At a more severe level of poverty of under 1 USD a day, 
Nigeria stands out clearly for having a poverty level of nearly double the average of 39 
percent among 16 of the 18 countries studied. Nigeria still has the highest level of poverty for 
populations living on under 2 USD a day, but Tanzania, Zambia, Madagascar and Zimbabwe 
follow closely behind it. Botswana and South Africa have the lowest levels of poverty for 
populations living on under 2 USD a day. 
 
It is worth differentiating between the countries that have a greater concentration of their 
populations falling into the 1-2 USD-a-day band from those that fall into the 0-1 USD-a-day 
band. These are Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Botswana and South Africa. This exercise 
may point to a distribution of wealth in these countries that is shifting away from the poorest 




Table 3.3: Percentage of populations living on less than 1 USD and 2 USD per day 
Country % pop < 1 USD/day % pop < 2 USD/day 
Benin 
30.9 (2003) 73.7 (2003) 
Botswana 
23.5 (1993) 50.1 (1993) 
Cape Verde 
Not Available Not Available 
Ghana 
44.8 (1998-99) 78.5 (1998-99) 
Kenya 
22.8 (1997) 58.3 (1997) 
Lesotho 
36.4 (1995) 56.1 (1995) 
Madagascar 
61.0 (2001) 85.1 (2001) 
Malawi 
20.8 (2004-05) 62.9 (2004-05) 
Mali 
36.1 (2001) 72.1 (2001) 
Mozambique 
36.2 (2002-03) 74.1 (2002-03) 
Namibia 
34.9 (1993)*** 55.8 (1993)*** 
Nigeria 
70.8 (2003) 92.4 (2003) 
Senegal 
17.0 (2001) 56.2 (2001) 
South Africa 
10.7 (2000) 34.1 (2000) 
Tanzania 
57.8 (2000-01) 89.9 (2000-01) 
Uganda 
Not Available Not Available 
Zambia 
63.8 (2004) 87.2 (2004) 
Zimbabwe 
56.1 (1995-96) 83.0 (1995-96) 
Source: The World Bank Group. 2007b  
*** All are based on expenditure, except Namibia, which is based on income 
 
As is shown in the table below, none of the countries in the study could be classified as 
‘High’ on the UNDP’s ‘Human Development Index’, which ranks human development in the 
world. In fact, no African country is classified as ‘High’ on this index.  
 
Cape Verde is the African country with the best performance in this regard. Cape Verdeans 
have achieved a development score double that of Malians and Mozambicans. The country 
has shown remarkable development achievements, and their promotion to the rank of 
countries with medium human development was celebrated in 2007, the year in which this 
was achieved (“ONU garante que país continuará a ser apoiado após graduação de 
Janeiro”, 2007).  
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The life expectancy of Africans varies markedly among the 18 countries studied, ranging 
from a low of just over 40 years in Zambia and Zimbabwe to a standout high of 71 years in 
Cape Verde. Other countries that appear at the high end of the life expectancy spectrum are, 
as shown in the table below, Senegal, Ghana, Madagascar and Benin, all in excess of the 
Afrobarometer’s continental average of 50 years – one that is 18 years lower than the world 
average. AIDS, Malaria and a lack of health resources leave the African population more 
vulnerable than the rest of the world.  
 
The African citizen of 2008 will probably have had better access to education than one born a 
generation earlier, as at that time the probability of being illiterate in Africa was 50 percent. 
This rate has now dropped to 20 percent (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 
2007). The inter-country differences regarding education are as equally marked as those of 
life expectancy – Mali ranks at the bottom of the list, with only 24 percent of its population 
being literate. Only three other countries in the study have literacy rates below 50 percent: 
Benin, Mozambique and Senegal. Zimbabwe’s literacy rate of nearly 90 percent in 2005 was 
one of the highest in Africa and the world, and this is owed to an aggressive education drive 
after independence, but the lack of investment in education and the exodus of qualified 
teachers have since put those gains under pressure (‘Zimbabwe humanitarian country’, 2008).  
 
It is also worth noting that among the countries rated as ‘Low’ on the human development 
scale, several have a literacy level verging on 70 percent, namely, Nigeria, Tanzania and 
Zambia. Ghana has the lowest literacy level of countries rated as ‘Medium’ on the scale, 
lower than the continental average. 
 
Africa is a continent of youth, with 63.7 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa 











Table 3.4: Human development. Life expectancy, literacy and GDP for the 18 countries studied 















Sub-Saharan Africa 0.493 49.6 60.3
World  0.743 68.1 78.6
Medium Human Development    
102 Cape Verde 0.736 71.0 81.2
121 South Africa 0.674 50.8 82.4
124 Botswana 0.654 48.1 81.2
125 Namibia 0.650 51.6 85.0
135 Ghana 0.553 59.1 57.9
138 Lesotho 0.549 42.6 82.2
143 Madagascar 0.533 58.4 70.7
148 Kenya 0.521 52.1 73.6
151 Zimbabwe 0.513 40.9 89.4
154 Uganda 0.505 49.7 66.8
Low Human Development    
156 Senegal 0.499 62.3 39.3
158 Nigeria 0.470 46.5 69.1
159 Tanzania  0.467 51.0 69.4
163 Benin 0.437 55.4 34.7
164 Malawi 0.437 46.3 64.1
165 Zambia 0.434 40.5 68.0
172 Mozambique 0.384 42.8 38.7
173 Mali 0.380 53.1 24.0




3.1.2 Demographic conditions 
 
Further to their progress on education, the African citizens of 2008 are more likely to be 
inhabitants of a large city than in the past (United Nations Population Fund [UNPF], 2007). 
According to the United Nations, there has been extraordinarily rapid urban growth in the 
developing world. This is particularly notable in Africa and Asia, where the urban population 
will double between 2000 and 2030. According to UNPF, in 2007, four in ten African 
citizens were city residents.  
 
However, within the 18 countries covered in this study, there are major differences in 
urbanisation rates. In seven countries the urbanisation rate is inferior to the continental 
average of 35 percent: Kenya (21 percent), Lesotho (23 percent), Madagascar (30 percent), 
Mali (31 percent), Mozambique (34 percent), Tanzania (24 percent), and Uganda, with the 
lowest level of urban population, having around only one in ten citizens living in a city (12 
percent) (United Nations World Urbanisation Prospects: the 2007 Revised Population 
Database, 2007). Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe share the same rate of 
urbanisation as the African average (35 percent).  
 
At the other end of the scale, with over 50 percent of the population residing in urban areas is 
South Africa (59 percent), followed by Botswana (57 percent) and Cape Verde (57 percent). 
Ghana’s, Nigeria’s and Senegal’s urban populations make up less than half of their total 
populations, but still exceed the African average, with rates of 48 percent, 46 percent and 42 
percent respectively (UNPF, 2007).  
 
Even though the African countries studied here exhibit differences in urbanisation rates, all 
countries show increases in their urban populations. The rate of urbanisation in Africa has 
been the highest in the world in last two decades (Njoh, 2003).  
 
On average, an African citizen lives 18.5 years less than the average lifespan of citizens of 





Table 3.5: Population density per km2, percentage that is urbanised, and numbers in major towns 
Country Population density (per km2)
Percentage of 
population that is 
urban*
Major town 
Benin 77.8 40.0% Cotonou 762 000 
(2007) 
Botswana 3.2 57.3% Gabarone 210 000 
(2005 ) 
Cape Verde 122.4 (2007) 57.4% Praia 117 000 (2005) 
Ghana 96.5 47.8% Accra 2 121 000 
(2007) 
Kenya 58.3 20.7% Nairobi 3 010 000 
(2007) 
Lesotho 61.7 23.3% Maseru 172 000 
(2005) 
Madagascar 32.6 28.5% Antananarivo 1 697 
000 (2007)
Malawi 114.5 17.3% Lilongwe 676 000 
(2005) 
Mali 9.7 30.5% Bamako 1 494 000 
(2007) 
Mozambique 25.5 (2007) 34.5% Maputo 1 446 000 
(2007) 
Namibia 2.5 35.1% Windhoek 233 529 
(2001 census)
Nigeria 157.2 46.2% Lagos 9 466 000 
(2007) 
Senegal 55 (2005) 41.6% Dakar 2 604 000 
(2007) 
South Africa 39.3 59.3% Johannesburg 3 225 
812 (2001 census)
Tanzania 41.8 24.2% Dar Es Salaam 2 930 
000 (2007)
Uganda 116.9 (2007) 12.5% Kampala 1 420 000 
(2007) 
Zambia 15.5 35.0% Lusaka 1 328 000 
(2007) 
Zimbabwe 33.9 35.9% Harare 1 572 000 
(2007) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32* 40.0%  
World 48* 57.3%  
Source: (Frame et al., 2007). All data from 2006 unless specified, *2005. Source: United Nations 
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revised Population Database 
 




Another important change in the characteristics of the African citizens of 2008 is their access 
to information and communication technology, especially their access to mobile phones and 
the Internet. The 2008 edition of the African Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Report 
examined the state of Africa’s Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector, 
including mobile and Internet/broadband development. This report indicates how Africa has 
changed with regard to ICT in recent years and how it is likely to change in the near future. 
Presently, all countries have mobile networks and are connected to the Internet. Rapid change 
has occurred, particularly with regard to the number of mobile subscribers in the last few 
years. In 2007 alone, 60 million Africans became new subscribers to mobile networks. The 
ITU (ITU Telecom Africa) predicts that mobile penetration in the region is approximately 30 
percent.  
 
The previous ITU report on Africa was published in 1990. In this report, there were only 8.6 
million telephone subscribers in Africa, most of them in North Africa and South Africa. The 
report indicates that in 1990 Norway had more telephone subscribers than the entire sub-
Saharan Africa combined. Moreover, mobile communication was almost non-existent in 
Africa, as the technology was still relatively new. The continent had only six mobile 
networks, and in 1990, no African country was connected to the Internet (International 
Telecommunication Union [ITU], 2008).  
 
Cape Verde, once one of the most isolated countries in Africa, is now a good example of how 
the Internet has been used, not just by the general public, but also by state authorities to 
extend better services to the citizens, addressing in the process the problem that physical 
distance between the isles has posed to the dissemination of state information and services.  
 
In 2007, the government launched a web service called ‘Portal do Cidadão’ (or ‘Porton di 
nos ilha’ in Criuolo). This web service aims to be a technological gateway between the 
government and citizens. Through this service, citizens can, for example, renew official 
documents online, or within a single day, officially register their company. The use of this 
Internet portal is thus a concrete measure to help government improve citizens’ lives and to 
make state services more efficient (Núcleo Operacional da Sociedade de Informação [NOSI], 




In accordance with this effort involving using the Internet to benefit its citizens, the mayor of 
Praia City in Cape Verde announced in 2007 free wireless access in the public ‘praça’ (plaza) 
in front of the municipality. From that day onwards daily life in the ‘praça’ was transformed 
– in the late afternoon and early evening, small groups of youths (around five or six) could be 
found seated around one laptop after school hours.  
 
3.1.4 The political environment of an African citizen  
 
An African citizen in 2008, on average, will be freer than an African citizen of 20 years ago. 
After short periods of freedom following the independences of the 1960s and 1970s, most 
African countries became autocracies. Coups d’état were the norm, and presidents tried to 
perpetuate their stay in power. Many changes have occurred in this regard in the last two 
decades. In sub-Saharan Africa, only the Botswanans have had the opportunity of continually 
choosing their leaders through a multiparty ballot vote, with no interruption of democracy 
allowed following independence.  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, citizens in many African countries expressed in the streets their 
impatience with their autocratic regimes and demanded political change. Citizens caught 
scholars and political leaders by surprise with these popular protests for freedom (Decalo, 
1992). Among the sceptical scholars was Samuel P. Huntington (1984), who predicted that 
democracy would not be embraced in Africa, due to the poverty in the region and the 
violence of African politics.  
 
Contrary to these predictions, in the 1990s many African countries witnessed political 
changes in the direction of more freedom for their citizens. Even though there have been 
important achievements, the progression has not been continual and straightforward as is 
shown in the table below.  
 
In 1994, South Africa elected a president through a system of true universal suffrage, where 
for the first time in the country’s history, citizens of all races were allowed to vote. South 
Africa remains, according the Freedom House score, a full democracy up to the present 




Cape Verde is at the top ranking of the Freedom House score. In addition to being the most 
democratic country in Africa, it has also since 1991 witnessed two replacements of the party 
in power.  
 
The table below shows that in all African countries, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the 
achievements regarding political and civil liberties have been very significant. In spite of the 
positive steps in the direction of more liberty, Kenyans, Madagascans, Malawians, 
Mozambicans, Nigerians, Tanzanians, Ugandans, and Zambians are still in the middle of the 
scale, their countries being classified by the Freedom House scorecard as ‘partly free’. Being 
only ‘partly free’ is reason for concern for democracy theorists. After the euphoria of the 
transitions to multiparty regimes in the 1990s, many countries seemed to have stopped at 
some point in a middle ground (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002). Citizens in these countries 
have more liberty and rights than before; however, having reached this middle ground, it 





Table 3.6: Evolution of political rights and civil liberties, by country 
 1988 1994 1999 2005 
Benin 14 5 5 4 
Botswana 5 5 4 4 
Cape Verde 11 3 3 2 
Ghana 12 9 6 3 
Kenya 12 12 11 6 
Lesotho 12 8 8 5 
Madagascar 10 6 6 6 
Malawi 13 5 6 8 
Mali 12 6 6 4 
Mozambique 13 8 7 7 
Namibia 11 4 5 5 
Nigeria 10 13 7 8 
Senegal 7 9 8 5 
South Africa 11 5 3 3 
Tanzania 12 12 8 7 
Uganda 10 10 10 9 
Zambia 11 7 9 8 
Zimbabwe 11 10 11 13 
Source: Freedom House, 1972-2006. This is the combined score for civil liberties and political rights, 
the best is 2; the worst is 14 
 
Nancy G. Bermeo (2003), in her work called Ordinary Citizens, explains that ordinary 
citizens in some or other way are so busy living their daily lives that politics are not the 
centre of their concerns. The daily struggles of raising children, jobs, family, money, and 
transport use up all of the energy and time of most of whom she calls ordinary citizens 
(Bermeo, 2003). If this is true for the ordinary citizens of the world, it is even truer for 
ordinary African citizens as a result of their social and economic conditions, as described 
previously in this chapter. However, as Bermeo also says, from time to time ordinary citizens 
surprise us with their actions in embracing or disputing political regimes and leaders. This 




In the middle of 2008, African citizens unexpectedly organised popular riots against the 
increase of food prices. Several of the protests turned violent, with African governments 
struggling to calm the violence in the streets. In Burkina Faso, protesters burned government 
buildings and looted stores; in Cameroon, a taxi drivers' strike over fuel prices mutated into a 
massive protest about food prices, with at least 20 people dying in the protests. In Senegal, 
Mauritania, Cote D’Ivoire, and Mozambique, protests exploded in the capitals and in several 
other major cities (Walty, 2008; Bernard & Tuquoi, 2008) 
 
In Mozambique, the main cities were blockaded by the popular uprising. No one could go 
anywhere for two days – roads, and main transport systems were blocked by enraged 
protesters (Serra, 2008). The main appraisal of these popular protests throughout Africa, 
besides all the extraneous causes that can be identified such as the global financial crisis or 
world population growth, is that African governments were placed at the centre of the 
problems. During the protests, better governance was demanded, this time not pompously 
concluded by conferences or by World Bank advisory reports. These were ordinary citizens 
in the streets demanding solutions from their governments. 
 
Better governance in recent years has become part of the lexicon of donors to Africa. African 
governments themselves have announced their commitment to better governance, and have 
even acknowledged that “good governance has been elusive in much of Africa”, as is argued 
by Akokpari (2004, p. 243). To confront this ongoing malfunction, the African union 
launched the African initiative New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), 
evidence of the recognised need for better governance (Akokpari, 2004).  
 
Looking to the World Bank indicator for good governance, only 4 of the 18 countries in this 








Graph 3.1: Quality of governance in the 18 countries (2007) 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, 2007a. The values vary from -2.5 to 2.5, and higher values 
correspond to better governance. 
 
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation is an African initiative that also measures good governance 
across sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2007, this foundation has been classifying African countries 
regarding their good governance, and former presidents have been rewarded annually for 
their contribution to their countries. In 2007, Joaquim Chissano, the former president of 
Mozambique was chosen, and in 2008, the former President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, was 




In the following chapters, public opinion data on 18 African parliaments will be discussed, 
presented and analysed. This section provides a summary of parliaments’ main 
characteristics, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the overall analysis. Besides 
their historical differences, these parliaments have structural and political differences which 
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are important to highlight, and therefore, in this section, the following questions are asked 
relative to each parliament:   
1. How old is the multiparty parliament? Into how many mandates does this period of 
existence translate? 
2. How is the parliament structured? Is it unicameral or bicameral? 
3. How many seats does the parliament have? 
4. How many MPs are there per mille? 
5. What is the electoral turnout? 
6. Has the parliament experienced turnover of the ruling party? 
7. How are the MPs elected? 
8. Is there a majority in the parliament? 
9. How many parties have seats in the parliament? 
 
3.2.1 The age of the parliaments 
 
As was previously stated, multiparty parliaments are still in their infancy in most African 
counties. The average age of multiparty parliaments in the 18 countries that constitute this 
study is 16.2 years. As shown in the figure below, Botswana represents an outlier, with its 
multiparty regime and elected parliament being installed for 42 years as at 2007. At the other 
end of the scale is Uganda, which opened its parliament to parties only in 2005. Perceivably, 
the age of multiparty parliaments derives from the ‘wave of democratisation’ (Huntington, 
1991) that swept across the continent. This can be seen in the small range within which the 
duration of continually elected multiparty parliaments is observed – 13 of the 18 countries 
have experienced continually elected multiparty parliaments for a period ranging between 13 
and 19 years, the six years in which this took place barely accounting for the time span of one 
election cycle. On average, the parliaments of the 18 countries studied have each experienced 
four mandates. As shown in Table 3.11, the parliaments of six countries – Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania – have been given only three mandates.  
 
It is known that the roles of legislatures can be influenced by the circumstances of their origin 
and their age (Muslof & Smith, 1979). The age and the life cycle of a parliament affect both 
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its role and the institutionalisation of its practices, and these in turn affect the learning 
experience of sitting with political opponents. In addition, the age of the parliament affects its 
composition and the experience of the parliamentary staff. Some assemblies inherited a staff 
structure from the previous authoritarian regime; this situation creates an issue of trust 
between the new parliamentarians and the old staff.  
 
In this regard, the parliaments differ – in the case of the South African parliament, the staff 
was inherited from the previous apartheid legislature. As Dr Frene Noshir Ginwala, former 
speaker, put it when she took office, “All staff of the south African parliament were White” 
(Ginwala, 2007). In this case, there was the dilemma of the lack of political trust of the new 
members of parliament in the house staff, and on other hand, this staff was skilled and 
familiar with the legislature’s business, which the new parliamentarians were not familiar 
with, taking into account their newness in the house. The exceptions were the former political 
parties – the NP (former apartheid-era ruling party) and the DP (former apartheid-era 
opposition party); these two parties knew the staff and the house.  
 
A different situation existed in the countries where the ruling party was also the ruling party 
in the former monoparty regime, as was the case with the Mozambican assembly. Most 
parliaments in these countries had very rudimentary staff structures, or nearly none existed, 
since the sitting periods under a monoparty regime are relatively minor.  
 
In these cases, the staff was politically closer to the former ruling party (it is important to note 
that in monoparty regimes, most of the civil servants were as a rule almost members of the 
ruling party, but this needs to be assessed carefully, since as there were no opposition parties 
allowed, there really were no alternatives). Furthermore, in these cases it was the opposition 
who were making their first appearance at parliament; therefore, it was the opposition that 
may have experienced apprehension towards the existing staff.  
 
In Mozambique, for example, the staff in 1994 were mainly from the previous monoparty 
assembly, which meant that they were actually staff of the central committee of FRELIMO. 
The situation has changed over the years, and there has been an effort at departisation; 
however, reticence still exists from RENAMO parliamentarians towards the assembly staff. 
An example of this easing of reticence occurred at the beginning of the third elected term, in 
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2004, when Maria Moreno was elected leader of the opposition parliamentary group. The 
party accepted that her driver and her security personnel would be provided by the Assembly, 
instead of by the political party. Until then, RENAMO had never accepted this type of 
dispensation, fearing that these staff members would originate from FRELIMO, or in their 
opinion, which would almost equate to the same thing, from the ‘State Security’. 
 
Table 3.7: Age of parliaments and number of mandates  
 
Age of multiparty parliament
 (years) 
Number of mandates  
(electoral cycles) 
Benin 17 5 
Botswana 42 9 
Cape Verde 17 4 
Ghana 16 4 
Kenya 16 3 
Lesotho 15 4 
Madagascar 15 4 
Malawi 14 3 
Mali 16 4 
Mozambique 14 3 
Namibia 19 4 
Nigeria 9 3 
Senegal 8 7 
South Africa 14 3 
Tanzania 13 3 
Uganda 2 1 
Zambia 17 4 
Zimbabwe 28 6 
Source: IPU Parliaments Online database (Parline), 2008.  
 
Besides the consequences of age with regard to the staff structure and resources of 
parliaments, there are the obvious consequences regarding the parliamentarians themselves – 
their experience within the parties, their leadership experience, their participation on 
committees, and their experience of existing internal rules, practices, etc. This does not mean 
64 
 
that age is necessarily correlated with efficiency, but nonetheless, the age of an organisation 
does affect its performance. 
 
3.2.2 Parliamentary structure and seats  
 
Equally important parliamentary characteristics are size and structure. Africa, like the rest of 
the world, did not adopt just one model; the continent shows an equal number of bicameral 
and unilateral parliamentary systems. Of the 191 chambers existent in the world, 114 are 
unicameral (60 percent) and 77 (40 percent) chambers are bicameral; in Africa, of the 53 
chambers existent, 32 are unicameral (60 percent) and 21 are bicameral (39 percent) (IPU 
PARLINE database: Structure of parliaments, 2009).  
 
The distribution of the number of seats in African parliaments is also similar to the rest of the 
world. The table below confirms that the majority of the structures are medium-sized, 
between 50 and 199 seats. The largest house in Africa is the 529-member Ethiopian House of 
Peoples' Representatives.  
 
Table 3.8: Number of chambers for all parliaments in the world and in Africa 
Range World Africa 
<50 59 9 
50-99 62 19 
100-199 75 26 
200-299 27 9 
300-399 15 5 
400-499 11 4 
>500 14 1 
Source: IPU PARLINE database: Structure of parliaments, 2009. 
  
 
Within the 18 countries covered, there are also larger and smaller houses of parliament. The 
largest lower house is in South Africa, with 400 members, followed by Nigeria, with 260 
members. Grouped with the smaller houses is Botswana with 63 members, followed by Cape 





Table 3.9: Number of seats in the 18 African countries covered in the study 






Benin National Assembly Unicameral 83 83 
Botswana National Assembly Unicameral 63 63 
Cape Verde National Assembly Unicameral 72 72 
Ghana Parliament Unicameral 230 230 
Kenya National Assembly Unicameral 224 224 
Lesotho National Assembly Bicameral 120 120 
Lesotho Senate Bicameral 33 31 
Madagascar National Assembly Bicameral 127 127 
Madagascar Senate Bicameral 33 33 
Malawi National Assembly Unicameral 193 193 
Mali National Assembly Unicameral 147 147 
Mozambique Assembly of the Republic Unicameral 250 250 
Namibia National Assembly Bicameral 78 78 
Namibia National Council Bicameral 26 26 
Nigeria House of Representatives Bicameral 360 358 
Nigeria Senate Bicameral 109 109 
Senegal National Assembly Bicameral 150 150 
Senegal Senate Bicameral 100 100 
South Africa National Assembly Bicameral 400 400 
South Africa National Council of 
Provinces Bicameral 90 54 
Uganda Parliament Unicameral 333 332 
Tanzania National Assembly Unicameral 323 319 
Zambia National Assembly Unicameral 158 158 
Zimbabwe House of Assembly Bicameral 210 210 
Zimbabwe Sénat Bicameral 93 93 
Source: IPU PARLINE database: Number of seats, 2009); (IPU PARLINE database: Structure of 
parliaments, 2009. 
 
3.2.3 MPs per mille 
 
The table below refers to the ‘density’ of elected MP’s for each of the 18 countries’ 
populations. It is evident that parliaments vary significantly regarding the number of 
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members per mill residents. A headcount of 1 member of parliament per 100 000 of the 
populace appears to be the common measure among the 18 countries. The exceptions, with 
very low and very high numbers of MPs per capita  are, respectively, countries with relatively 
small and large populations – that is, a result of the physical constraints/impracticality of 
having very small or very large assemblies. 
 
In the following chapter, contact that MPs have with the citizens they represent does not seem 
to be correlated with MP density; still, to assess representation, it is necessary to look at how 
physically accessible the elected are to their electorate, and vice versa. 
 
The total land area of the eighteen African countries is 9.7 million km2 (Frame, 2008). The 
total land area of the United States is 9.1 million km2 (The Central Intelligence Agency-USA 
[CIA], 2008), and in the European Union it is 4.3 million km2 (CIA– European Union, 2008). 
However, the road coverage is drastically different on the three continents. Road coverage in 
the eighteen African countries examined is 25 meters of paved road and 91 meters of 
unpaved road per square kilometre. US road coverage per square kilometre is 400 meters of 
paved and 285 meters of unpaved road, and European Union road coverage is 1.2 kilometres 
of paved and only 58 meters of unpaved road per square kilometre. In the eighteen countries 
studied only 20 percent of the roads are paved9.  
 
Among the eighteen African countries, there is also a colossal disparity with regard to roads. 
For example, Mali and South Africa have the same land area of 1.2 million km2, but Mali has 
only 3 368 km of paved roads in contrast to 73 506 km in South Africa (Frame, 2008). 
 
Among the eighteen countries examined, there is a need to keep in mind geographical 
distinctions. For example, Cape Verde is an archipelago composed of ten small islands. The 
ratio of population per legislator in Cape Verde is the lowest in this sample – 6.056. 
However, geographical circumstances should be taken into consideration with regard to a 
country’s place in this study’s ranking: The Cape Verdean Assembly is located in the capital, 
Praia, on Santiago Island. For the Cape Verdean MPs to visit their provinces, they have to fly 
                                                 
9 For the measures of paved and unpaved roads, see Africa South of the Sahara, 2008. The percentages and 
averages were calculated by the author.  
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or use the ferry. Even though in recent years transport links between the islands have 
improved substantially, travelling is still expensive and demands extra time. 
The portrayal of road coverage relative to MPs per inhabitant shows how difficult, in general, 
it is for MPs in Africa to access their constituencies, at least in comparison with their Western 
counterparts. However, the contrary is also true – if it is difficult for MPs to travel to their 
constituencies, it is even more difficult for citizens from distant parts of the country to access 
parliament and their parliamentarians. 
 
Table 3.10: Number of MPs per mille population 
   Population
(in thousands)
Number of MPs per 100 000 citizens
Benin 9 309 0.9 
Botswana 1 905 3.3 
Cape Verde 542 13.3 
Ghana 23 946 1.0 
Kenya 38 549 0.6 
Lesotho 2 020 5.9 
Madagascar 20 215 0.6 
Malawi 14 288 1.4 
Mali 12 716 1.2 
Mozambique 21 812 1.1 
Namibia 2 102 3.7 
Nigeria 151 478 0.2 
Senegal 12 687 1.2 
South Africa 48 832 0.8 
Uganda 31 902 1.0 
United Republic of Tanzania 41 463 0.8 
Zambia 12 154 1.3 
Zimbabwe 13 481 1.6 


























There was a change in the coalition that comprises the government, but the previous ruling party is still dominant within the coalition (ADEMA) 
** Does not refer to the election results of 2008, where for the first time, the opposition has the majority of seats. *** But is a coalition.  
 
 FH Score 
(2006) 




How are MPs elected Majority party in 
parliament 
How many parties 
have seats 
Benin 4 5 Yes Party list No 12
Botswana 4 9 No Constituency Yes 3
Cape Verde 2 4 Yes Party list Yes 3
Ghana 3 4 Yes Constituency Yes 5
Kenya 6 3 Yes Constituency Yes 7 (one is a party 
coalition)
Lesotho 5 4 No Mixed Yes 10
Madagascar 6 4 Yes Mixed Yes (105 in 127) 4 (two are coalitions)
Malawi 8 3 Yes Constituency No 6
Mali 4 4 No* Constituency Yes*** 4
Mozambique 7 3 No Party list Yes 2
Namibia 5 4 No Party list Yes 7
Nigeria 8 3 Yes Constituency Yes 5
Senegal 5 7 Yes Mixed Yes 13
South Africa 3 3 No Party list Yes 12
Tanzania 7 3 No Constituency Yes 5
Uganda 9 1 No Constituency Yes 8
Zambia 8 4 Yes Constituency No 7
Zimbabwe 13 6 No** Constituency Yes (78 in 120) 2 (plus one independent 
that was elected 
speaker)
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3.2.4 Electoral turnout 
 
Voter turnout10 (the number of people voting in legislative elections) is one of the measures of 
citizen participation. It is worth noting concerning the countries studied that, with the exception 
of Botswana, the last three elections were also the first two or three continual multiparty 
elections in the country. Taking into account the novelty of legislative elections, it is pertinent 
to test and compare voter turnout for the last three legislative elections. In the analysis of how 
parliaments are seen by the electorate, it is important to assess whether people even establish 
the first and obvious link between them as the electorate and the elected, meaning do people 
vote, and is this an increasing or diminishing trend?  
 
The table below shows the electoral turnout for the 18 countries. Mali shows the lowest turnout 
with only 2 in 10 Malians voting in legislative elections. The low Malian turnout – barely 20 
percent – is unique, being at present the lowest voter turnout in the world. Mali is therefore 
clearly a ‘deviant’ case with regard to voter-turnout analysis (Blais, Massicotte & Dobrzynska, 
2003).  
 
An interesting aspect of the findings of the global report on turnout is that, regarding the 
evolution of voter turnout, there is no significant difference between the two most widely used 
systems. Among the countries covered in their analysis, the ones with a proportional list 
representation system exhibited an average turnout of 73 percent, and those with a first past 










                                                 
10 According to IDEA, voter turnout is expressed as the percentage of voters who cast a vote at an election. This total 
number of voters includes those who cast blank or invalid votes, as they still participate (IDEA, 2002). 
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Table 3.12: Turnout11 for the last three parliamentary elections 
 Previous Penultimate Latest 
Benin 52% 76% 70% 
Botswana 68% 77% 77% 
Cape Verde 75% 77% 54% 
Ghana 28% 65% 61% 
Kenya Not Available 41% 47% 
Lesotho 82% 72% 72% 
Madagascar 75% 60% 60% 
Malawi 80% 92% 92% 
Mali 21.6%12 21% 22% 
Mozambique 88% 68% 36% 
Namibia 76% 63% 85% 
Nigeria 39% 85% 49% 
Senegal 39% 67% 35% 
South Africa 87% 89% 77% 
Tanzania 77% 73% 73% 
Uganda13 Not applicable Not applicable 68% 
Zambia 79% 69% 71% 
Zimbabwe 31% 48% 48% 
Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2008. 
 
                                                 
11 The number of votes divided by the voting population age. 
12 This election was boycotted by several parties: National Congress for Democratic Initiative (CNID), Sudanese 
Union-African Democratic Rally (US-RDA), Popular Movement for the Development of the Republic of West 
Africa (MPD), Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), Rally for Democracy and Labor (RDT), Union of 
Democratic Forces for Progress (UFDP), and the Malian Union for Democracy and Development (UMDD). 
 
13 Only in 2005 was the constitution amended to allow multiparty participation.  
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3.2.5 Parliamentary turnover 
 
There is no data regarding the turnover of MPs that will allow a comparison of legislative 
turnover, but in the chapter on Mozambique, the turnover of Mozambican MPs will be 
presented.  
 
In this section, parliamentary turnover is discussed. This refers to turnover within the ruling 
party, and consequently, also turnover of the party with the majority of seats (when not in 
minority rule). Western studies of legislative turnover have been concerned with a lack of 
turnover. Matland and Studlar argue that without new parliamentarians, there is no circulation 
of elites, and new ideas will be fewer (2003). As Jackson has stated, a limitation of rotation of 
parliamentarians “… would mean a danger of the three A's setting in – arrogance, apathy, and 
atrophy” (1994, p. 270).  
 
As a result of the limited data on parliamentary turnover periods, it is impossible to verify 
whether the prophecy regarding the three A’s is also applicable to Africa. Still, as stated 
previously, the majority of the countries in this study have not witnessed a turnover of the 
ruling party. As is observable in Table 3.11, nine of the 18 countries have still not experienced 
turnover of the parliamentary majority.  
 
It is equally important to consider that turnover needs to be analysed carefully according to the 
existent electoral system. The constituency electoral system may show more individual MPs 
turned over than the proportional electoral system. 
 
3.2.6 MP election process 
 
The wave of democratisation in the 1990s brought to the centre of the political science debate 
the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems, with theorists advocating which 
systems new democracies should adopt (Norris, 1997). 
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This study is not concerned with the evaluative aspect of which system is better or worse. 
However, it is important to be aware how each MP is elected. The countries analysed have 
different electoral systems, as presented in Table 3.11. 
3.2.7 Party system and distribution of seats 
 
Party systems are crucial features of parliaments. The concept of party system encompasses 
numerous factors and details; however, in this section, the aim is to embrace the existence of 
majorities. Majority is understood as the existence of a party or coalition that controls at least 
50 percent of the seats in a parliament.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3.11, only 3 countries do not have a majority party: Benin, Malawi and 
Zambia. Fifteen countries in this analysis have parties not just with a parliament majority but 
also with a dominant majority.  
 
In these cases, ruling parties control more than 65 percent of the parliamentary seats. Often in 
these instances, recurring signs of authoritarian behaviour towards the opposition parties can be 
observed; also, in these cases, the absolute control of parliament originates with parliamentary 
groups tending to exhibit behaviour which Janis (1982) called groupthinking, defined as the 
tendency of members of a group to develop converging opinions in a given decision situation. 
According to research on groupthinking behaviour, extremely defective decision-making 
performance by the group is exhibited (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998, p. 105). Groups are most 
likely to exhibit groupthinking when they are highly cohesive. These groups tend to believe 
that the group is invulnerable, tend to see ‘outgroups’ as threats, and believe in the inherent 
moral superiority of their group (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998, p. 106).  
 
What remains to be explored is whether this theory can be applied to the dominant parties in 
this study. Opposition parties often accuse these ruling parties of acting as though they were 
omnipotent and of playing dangerous authoritarian ticks. Tony Leon, former opposition leader 
in South Africa, accused the ruling party not only of exhibiting this behaviour but also of 
having weakened the National Assembly, undermining the National Assembly’s dignity and its 






In the last twenty years, African citizens and parliaments have changed considerably. 
Parliaments have started to become multiparty institutions, and it is postulated that they are the 
core institutions of their representative democracies. A consequence of this is that, African 
citizens are now the ones who decide who will sit in their parliaments. Multiparty parliaments 
are chosen at electoral intervals by their citizens. Among the majority of countries in this study, 
the elected and electorate have been though this process at least three times.   
 
Still, the vote has not changed the economic status of the majority of Africans citizens. Africa 
remains a continent of poor people: four out of ten citizens live on less than 1 USD. In Nigeria, 
nine out of ten citizens live on less than 2 USD a day. Africa is also one of the regions of the 
world with the highest income inequality. Africans have seen their economies grow in recent 
years, accompanied by more freedom, although the benefits of these achievements are still far 
removed from the daily life of the ordinary citizen. The quality of governance is seen as the 
main cause of the continual problems of the continent.   
 
Although the region does have common economic, social and political patterns, generalisations 
may misrepresent the complex realities. The same is true in relation to comparative levels of 
democratisation: There are countries doing consistently better, and definitely consolidating 
their institutions and democracy, although there have also been reversals in some countries 
covered in this study.  
 
The youth of the parliaments in this study indicate that these institutions are still finding a place 
in the untamed politics of emerging African democracies. However, politics are not 
experiences in a static mode; as a result, parliaments cannot reschedule or suspend their 
development. The need for better governance, for the consolidation of democracy and, overall, 
to better the lives of ordinary citizens, demands guardian parliaments. Parliaments are 
mandated by citizens to represent and defend their interests. For this reason, it is critical that 
there is a minimum of understanding between citizens and parliaments, and between 





Citizens’ perceptions of parliament 
 
This chapter describes and explores public opinion data pertaining to a single point in time that 
relates to the way citizens perceive their parliaments and parliamentarians. This information is 
then extended to their expectations of these institutions. Describing data implies addressing the 
question of ‘what is there’ at face value (Rindskopf, 2004 p. 137). Following this approach, this 
section aims to summarise as well as, to a lesser degree, to explore the data. Exploration here is 
used to mean formulating hypotheses and seeking to explore the meaning of the data; in other 
words, ‘What might the data mean?’ (Rindskopf, 2004, p. 138).   
 
In this part of the analysis, a broad description of the data is preferred to an in-depth analysis. 
In subsequent chapters, an in-depth analysis of the Mozambican Parliament is conducted. 
 
The data analysis is carried out for the grouped sample of the respondents across all countries, 
followed by a presentation of the same data by country. Under the exploratory analysis by 
country, the particularity of each parliament and the complexity of its context and environment 
limit a full comprehension of the phenomena associated with each of them. This type of in-
depth country analysis is one that will provide fertile ground for future studies. In addition, a 
comparison of the country analyses permits the testing of two hypotheses:  
 
H1: That citizens’ perceptions of parliaments will depend on the electoral system  
 
The key function of electoral systems is to elect members of a parliament. The electoral 
system, in turn, will be affected by the internal characteristics of each parliament. It is therefore 
to be expected that the method used by citizens to choose their parliamentarians will have an 
impact on how the elected are perceived by their electors. This begs the question ‘Does the 
electoral system impact on the way in which citizens perceive their parliaments and 
presidents?’14 
 
                                                 
14 The analysis of the results needs to take in account the electoral system that elects the MP. The Afrobarometer uses the same 




H2: That citizens living in countries with dominant ruling parties will have a 
tendency to evaluate their parliaments more negatively 
 
As stated previously in the introductory chapter, it is reasonable to expect that parliaments will 
enjoy lower levels of approval by citizens in countries where dominance by a particular party is 
prevalent, since citizens will perceive their parliament as a mere extension of the ruling party. 
By the same token, it may be expected that citizens will rate more highly parliaments where 
dominance by a particular party is not prevalent. 
 
In the countries covered in this study, we predict that where there are parties with 
parliamentary majorities in excess of 60 percent (see Appendix 3) – these countries are 
Tanzania, Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
Madagascar, and Mozambique – these parliaments will receive lower ratings from citizens.  
 
This chapter describes and explores the following:  
 citizens’ trust in their parliament 
 citizens’ approval of the performance of their member of parliament 
 citizens’ perception of the corruption of the members of parliament 
  citizens’ perception of the inclination of the members of parliament to listen to them 
 how much contact citizens indicated as having had with members of parliament 
 how much time citizens believe that members of parliament spend in their 
constituencies  
 how much time citizens believe that members of parliament should be spending in their 
constituencies. 
 
4.1 Citizens’ trust in their parliament 
 
The first graph illustrates how much trust citizens expressed for their parliament. The 
respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in their parliament. In order to begin to 
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interpret the answers, it is important to reflect on the meaning of trust, be it relative to an 
institution, a person, or a party. The meaning of the concept trust has been the source of an 
unresolved cross-disciplinary debate (Kramer, 1999). According to Kramer (1999), cited in 
Robinson (1996), by definition, trust is “a person’s expectations, assumptions, or beliefs about 
the likelihood that another’s future actions will be beneficial, favourable, or at least not 
detrimental to one’s interests (1999, p. 576). In applying this definition to the findings, 
respondents who express trust in their parliament are declaring that their expectations of their 
parliament are that the parliament’s future actions will be beneficial, or at least will not be 
detrimental, regarding their interests.   
 
As the graph below demonstrates, the results give a clear indication of the high levels of trust 
that the electorate places in its representatives. Shown on an ascending scale of trust, the replies 
peak at ‘a lot’ of trust (29.6 percent), with a high proportion of respondents (25.1 percent) 
trusting their parliamentarians at least ‘somewhat’. As shown in the next chapter, Africans have 
higher levels of trust in their parliaments compared with the rest of the world. An average of 
over 5 in 10 citizens place some trust in their parliament. Referring to the above definition of 
trust, we can infer that the majority of African citizens see their parliaments as actively 
promoting their interests, or at very least, as being benign, and in particular, they have little or 
no apprehension about the legitimacy of parliamentary decisions or acts.  
 
In general, African multiparty parliaments existed in the early stages of their evolution as 
monoparty institutions under authoritarian regimes. African citizens lived under authoritarian 
regimes, many of them with strong material and ideological links to the former Soviet Union. It 
is therefore interesting to compare the way African citizens perceive their democratic 
parliaments to the views of their Eastern European counterparts of their parliaments, since both 
regions have experienced authoritarian regimes.    
  
Mishler & Rose’s (1997) findings regarding trust in political institutions in post-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe reveal that scepticism is more evident than trust as a legacy of 
communist regimes. In this chapter, it will be shown that African citizens, on average, contrary 
to their Eastern European counterparts, do trust in their parliaments. Parliaments in Eastern 
Europe, as institutions, ranked worst in the world on the measure of popular trust. Only 
political parties do worse than parliaments, according to their findings. 
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The positive trust demonstrated by Africans is given as an average for the respondents of the 
18 countries. The aggregate results, however, hide the skewed outcome brought about by 
results at a country level, which are subsequently investigated 
  
Graph 4.1: Trust in parliament 
 
 
With trust ‘Somewhat’ and ‘A lot’ grouped together to represent significant levels of trust, 12 
of the 18 countries demonstrate a majority of the electorate (≥50 percent of respondents) who 
trust in their parliaments. However, as shown in the graph below, again with ‘Somewhat’ and 
‘A lot’ grouped together to represent significant levels of trust, in 6 of the countries, namely, 
Nigeria (21 percent), Zimbabwe (35 percent), Benin (38 percent), Zambia (40 percent), Kenya 
(44 percent) and Madagascar (46 percent), trust in their parliament drops significantly. With 
the exception of Benin, all of the other countries that express low trust (<50 percent) have a 
constituency-based electoral system.  
 
This tendency does not mean that constituency-based electoral systems are the cause of the low 
levels of trust, but it does contradict the contention that with electoral systems where MPs are 
possibly better known by their constituents, as a result of not having been elected via an almost 
anonymous party list, this will contribute to a higher trust in the institution. The findings reveal 
that other variables influence trust and that the electoral system cannot be regarded as a 
contributor to trust in parliaments.  
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Considering the level of freedom among the six countries with lower levels of trust, there is no 
evidence that that this is the cause of the low level of trust in parliament (measured by the 
number of party seats). With regard to freedom, it can be said that, with the exception of Benin, 
all other low-trust-ranking countries also rank low on the Freedom House scores. As shown in 
Table 3.11 in the previous chapter, with regard to the 2006 Freedom House scores, Zimbabwe 
scores 13, Zambia and Nigeria 8, and Kenya and Madagascar 6, resulting in Zimbabwe being 
considered ‘not free’ on this measure, with the aforementioned other four countries being 
considered only ‘partly free’.   
  
The hypothesis relating to party dominance is also rejected by the analysis of trust in 
parliaments: the four countries on the opposite extremes of Graph 4.2 are all countries with 
party dominances in their parliaments.  
  
The lack of trust exhibited by Zambians in their parliament is consistent with the perceptions of 
civic organisations. In 2005 (the year that the survey was conducted), civic organisations came 
together in a forum demanding a new constitution written by a constituent assembly, and not 
by the existent one, since it did not have their trust (see Appendix 9 ).  
 
In Madagascar, two popular referendums were held, removing the powers of the Assembly and 
thereby entrenching the president’s powers. In both instances, the presidents were committed 
supporters of these changes, while the prime ministers and their supporters opposed these 
decisions. This indicates that in some African countries the relationships between the 
legislatures and presidents have been tense in recent years. This tension reached a peak in 2007 




Graph 4.2: Trust in parliament, by country 
 
 
4.2 Citizens’ evaluation of their MPs’ performance  
 
Similar to their responses concerning trust, citizens also seem to have a propensity to evaluate 
positively the way that their members of parliament have performed. Overall, half of the 
respondents viewed the performance of their MP favourably, with the other half containing a 
fairly large proportion (11.2 percent) of ‘No opinion’ replies. Again, this grouped average is 
skewed, with eight countries having a majority (50 percent) of respondents who were unhappy 




Graph 4.3: Approval of MPs’ performance 
 
 
Of the eight countries with negative performance evaluations, five have constituency-based 
electoral systems, two have party-list systems and one, Senegal, has a mixed system that 
combines both constituency-based and party-list systems.  
 
Before analysing the results based on the electoral system involved, it is necessary to reflect on 
the questionnaire itself. One must take care when comparing electoral systems where MPs’ 
names are on the ballot, and citizens elect a specific candidate, with a system where citizens 
choose their representatives through a ballot paper with a list of MPs under the party logo. 
Among the countries with a party-list system, different options were offered to the respondents: 
in the questionnaire for Cape Verde (in Portuguese), this question is formulated in the plural: 
“Os deputados da Assembleia Nacional” (Reis, Rodrigues & Semedo, 2008, p. 35), but in the 
questionnaire for Senegal (in French), this question is phrased in the singular and refers to a 
particular member of parliament: “Votre représentant à l’Assemblée Nationale” (Kirwin, 2008, 
p. 33).  
 
Since a constituency system, by design, is built around a more direct link between electorates 
and their representatives than is the case under proportional or mixed systems, one might 
expect that this type of electoral system, due to the varying degrees of familiarity with and 
exposure to parliamentarians, would play a role in the way that the electorate assesses 
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parliamentarians’ performances. The findings shown in the graph above suggest otherwise 
though. As with the findings regarding trust, the process through which parliamentarians are 
elected does not have an impact on citizens’ evaluations.  
  
As seen in the preceding analysis of trust, dominance of parliament by one party does not seem 
to affect the way citizens evaluate the performance of their member of parliament.  
 




4.3 Citizens’ perceptions of the degree of corruption of their MPs 
 
Whether due to evidence, anecdotal-based speculation, or general mistrust, the vast majority 
(63.6 percent) of respondents believed that at least some of their parliamentarians were 
involved in corrupt practices. However, it is interesting to note that for this question the 
number of ‘Don’t know’ responses was significantly higher than those of other questions, 




Graph 4.5: Estimations of number of corrupt MPs 
 
 
The analysis by country of public perception regarding corruption reveals a wide range of 
scores. The highest levels of corruption perceived as ‘Most’ or ‘All’ members of parliament 
being corrupt were found in Nigeria where, shortly after the Afrobarometer survey, a scandal 
involving suspected fraud by the speaker of parliament led to her resignation.  In Zimbabwe, 
Kenya and Benin, 4 in 10 citizens believed that most of their parliamentarians were involved in 
corruption, while in Nigeria, this number is 6 in 10.  
 
In the analysis of the perception of corrupt behaviour by MPs, it is important to note that there 
are two distinct realities regarding the involvement of MPs in the management of public funds. 
In some countries, MPs are not involved in the management of public funds, whereas in others, 
they are directly involved through their participation in systems aimed at the distribution of 
development funds in their constituencies.  
 
This is the case in Kenya, where all Kenyan parliamentarians have a constituency development 
fund that is their responsibility to manage for the development of their constituencies. The 
Kenyan government decided to create this Constituency Development Fund in 2003 (Kenya, 
2008; “Where MPs visibly control public spending”, 2008). The fund was proposed by 
President Kibaki in response to the difficulties involved in effectively allocating funds for the 
development of rural areas. This was during a time that saw the suspension of aid from 
international donors due to the increasing corruption in the country (see Appendix 9). The 
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Kenyan Constituency Fund is managed by a committee comprising members of the local 
community, under the chairmanship of their elected members of parliament.  
 
The graph below shows that 4 in 10 Kenyans believed that MPs were involved in corruption. 
This is significantly high, in comparison with the other countries, but considering this figure in 
light of the history of corruption in the country, this value may actually not be high at all. The 
data was collected in 2005, two years after the fund was constituted. A more accurate analysis 
will be possible once more data has been collected from future surveys. It will then be possible 
to understand whether the creation of these funds has impacted on the public’s perception of 
corruption among Kenyan MPs. 
 
Mozambique is a good example of a system where MPs do not manage any public funds. The 
country ranks quite high on the corruption index of the Transparency International15 
organisation, as is revealed in the table below, where in 2008, Mozambique lay in 126th place 
out of 180 countries. However, Mozambican citizens do not see their MPs as corrupt, with only 
1 in 10 citizens expressing concerns that their MPs were involved in corruption.  
 
Graph 4.6: Perceptions of corruption, by country 
 
                                                 
15 Transparency International developed an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The index ranks 180 
countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. 
(Transparency International, 2005b) 
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Table 4.1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (ranking) 
 2005 2008 
Benin 88 96 
Botswana 32 36 
Cape Verde NA 47 
Ghana 65 67 
Kenya 144 147 
Lesotho 70 92 
Madagascar 97 85 
Malawi 97 115 
Mali 88 96 
Mozambique 97 126 
Namibia 47 61 
Nigeria 152 121 
Senegal 78 85 
South Africa 46 54 
Tanzania 88 102 
Uganda 117 126 
Zambia 107 115 
Zimbabwe 107 166 




4.4 Citizens’ perceptions of MPs’ willingness to listen to their constituents   
 
There was a clear and strong view expressed by the respondents that their voices were often 
overlooked by MPs. Just over 1 in 5 respondents felt that they found a willing ear among their 
MPs often or at all times.   
 
Graph 4.7: Effort to listen 
 
 
The Botswanan and Namibian parliamentarians are seen as the most attentive while Benin’s, 
Nigeria’s and Malawi’s MPs appear to disregard their electorate at large.  
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Graph 4.8: Effort to listen, by country 
 
 
4.5 Citizens’ perceptions of how much contact they have with their MPs 
 
The data analysis suggests that among the countries surveyed there is little contact between 
citizens and parliamentarians. Only 1 in 10 respondents said that they had had some form of 
contact with parliamentarians. The percentage of citizens that responded ‘Don’t know’ to the 
question ‘Have you had any contact with a member of parliament?’ is the lowest out of all of 
the ‘Don’t know’ options in the survey.   
 
In the African context, however, cognisance must be taken of infrastructural peculiarities. 
Among other peculiarities, let us take transport as an example. The continental mean ratio of 
population per legislator in this study is 109.599. In Europe, the continental mean is 89.387.16 
These values could lead to an interpretation that the African ratio and the European ratio of 
population per legislator are similar and consequently comparable at face value. However, the 
infrastructural conditions that Western MPs face in order to visit their constituencies are very 
different to those African MPs face, as is evidenced by the difference in the number of paved 
roads in the two regions. 
                                                 
16 See Table 1.1, Ratios of population per legislator: EU member states, 1996 in NORTON, P. (ed.) (2002) 




Given the above remark about African infrastructural particularities, it is paradoxical that the 
country with the best transport infrastructure in the region, South Africa, is among the 
countries in which citizens report having the least contact with their parliamentarians. 
 
Graph 4.9: Contact with MPs 
 
 
Only 10 percent of the Afrobarometer-surveyed public have had some form of contact with an 
MP. In absolute terms, this number swells in magnitude to over 10 000 contacts per year, 
spread over the 18 countries. 
 
Graph 4.10: Contact with MP by country. 
 
 
Comparing this multicountry chart to the number of MPs per mille presented in the previous 
chapter suggests that the density of MPs does seem to affect the amount of contact that takes 
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place. Madagascar, with the highest number of contacts, has 0.6 MPs per mille, while at the 
other end of the scale, Tanzania, with the lowest number of contacts, has 0.8 MPs per mille 
citizens. The differences in figures between the numbers of contacts by citizens with MPs, by 
country, are so small that greater credibility is thereby given to the conclusion that in Africa 
there is little contact between citizens and MPs. 
 
4.6 Citizens’ perceptions of how much time MPs spend in their constituency 
 
The following graph suggests that a significant proportion of respondents (>80 percent) are 
aware, or claim to be aware, of the presence, or lack thereof, of MPs in their particular 
constituency. When viewed in light of the results for citizens’ contact with their MPs, this 
suggests that the low levels of contact are due to reasons other than lack of awareness, such as 
public apathy or the inaccessibility of the MP.  
 
Graph 4.11: Time that MPs spend in their constituencies 
 
 
Here, among the different countries, we see large disparities between the periods spent by MPs 
in their constituencies – Madagascar’s, Malawi’s and Benin’s MPs are thought by over 50 
percent of respondents never to spend any time in their constituencies. However, parliaments 
differ substantially in their sitting periods.  
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The Mozambican assembly sits for approximately 180 days of the year, which means that 
usually MPs will spend at least half of the year in their constituencies. The Mozambican sitting 
periods are concentrated over 3-month periods at the beginning and end of the year. This is 
aimed at reducing the travelling costs of several trips during the year.  
 
On the other hand, the annual sessions of the South African National Assembly are on average 
divided into four sessions, each lasting between one-and-a-half and three months. These shorter 
sessions are separated by recesses, which are referred to as constituency days or leave days. 
These constituency days are set aside for members to attend to their duties relating to the 
constituencies allocated (since the MPs are elected on a party-list, the Assembly in accordance 
with the political parties allocates constituencies to the MPs) to them (South Africa, National 
Assembly, 2004).  
 
The Madagascan assembly holds two ordinary annual sessions that constitutionally are limited 
to being not more than 90 days each, so again, in theory, MPs have 180 days in their 
constituencies (Madagascar Constitution, 1998, Art. 71), but half of the respondents believed 
that their MPs were ‘Never’ in their constituency. 
 
Not all constitutions stipulate sitting periods, thus leaving the way open for standing orders to 
be established with regard to sitting periods. The French-speaking countries in the study do 
specify the number of ordinary sessions and give some indication of the number of days that 
the sitting period should comprise (Benin Constitution, 1990; Madagascar Constitution, 1998; 
Senegal Constitution, 2001 and Mali Constitution, 1992).  
 
However, the Botswanan Constitution stipulates that there shall be a session of parliament at 
“least once in every year so that a period of six months shall not intervene between the last 
sitting of parliament in one session and the first sitting thereof in the next session” (Botswana, 
1997 Constitution, Art. 90). Botswanans indicated that they knew of the presence of their MP 
in their constituencies, as did Namibians and Lesothoans. Botswana and Lesotho are small 
countries, so this does not constitute a surprise.  
 
On the contrary, Benin is another small country that is at the other end of the scale, with 7 in 10 
respondents indicating that their MPs do not spend time in their constituencies. In addition, a 
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surprise is the answers from the Nigerians citizens. In this chapter, the Nigerian Assembly was 
evaluated negatively, and it is, therefore, intriguing that this is not a result of citizens’ 
perceptions that their MPs were not present in their constituencies.  
 




These results for the foregoing question indicate a clear disparity between the demands of 
citizens on the time of their MPs and what they see occurring in practice. The demands are 
encouraging, in that the low number of ‘Never/Not necessary’ replies indicates an active 
interest by the electorate in the activities of their MPs. The demands are also of a reasonable 
nature, with most participants wishing to have MPs visit their areas at least monthly. 
 
If one compares the most common demand by respondents on the time of their MPs, that is, for 
monthly visits (accounting for 45.3 percent of all replies) to the impression these same 
respondents have of the practices of their MPs (with 26.6 percent assessing MP visits as taking 





Graph 4.13: Time that MPs should spend in constituencies 
 
 
The country with the youngest multiparty parliament, Uganda, has the largest percentage of 
citizens expecting to see their member of parliament in their constituency at least monthly. 
Again, there is no clear pattern that emerges when the results are grouped by electoral system 
(no specific electoral system exhibits the same demand from citizens for visits from their MPs). 
In South Africa, with its party-list system, the lowest demand is exhibited by citizens for the 
regular presence of their MPs in their constituencies, with a figure that is very close to that of 
Nigeria, which has a constituency-based electoral system.    
 
Graph 4.14: Time that MPs should spend in their constituencies, by country 
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4.7 Citizens’ LegislativeScores 
 
As stated in Chapter 1 (Introduction) and in Chapter 6 (Exploratory model), a dependent 
variable was constructed for the analysis, namely LegislativeScore. For this index, four 
questions were selected (Q55b, Q56b, Q62a and Q68b) from the seven in the Afrobarometer 
questionnaire relating to parliament. The criterion for selecting these questions for inclusion in 
the index was whether they related to citizens’ evaluation of parliament.  
 
The three questions that were excluded from the LegislativeScore dealt only with contact 
between MPs and citizens: Question 61 asks how much time the citizen perceives an MP to be 
spending in the constituency, Question 60 relates to the time that the citizen feels the member 
of parliament should spending in the constituency, and Question 32 refers to the number of 
times the citizen has contacted the MP. These questions are still relevant for an understanding 
of the relationship that citizens have with their legislatures, and their perceptions of these 
legislatures. However, they do not allow one to measure the levels of satisfaction that citizens 
have with these institutions and their members.  
 
On the other hand, the four questions selected to construct the LegislativeScore give actual 
measures of evaluation: Question 55 reveals how much the citizen trusts parliament; Question 
68 gives a measure of job approval, since it asks whether the citizen approves or disapproves of 
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parliamentarians’ performance; Question 62 measures the citizen’s evaluation of the MP’s 
commitment to listen to the people; and Question 56 gives a measure of the citizen’s perception 
of the levels of corruption among members of parliament. The foregoing four variables show 
internal consistency reliability for inclusion in the index, with a standardised Cronbach's alpha 
of 0.6. 
 
All responses used to construct the score were reordered on an increasing scale, from a poor to 
a positive evaluation. The LegislativeScore is an index of scores that summarises citizens’ 
evaluations of parliament, and is calculated by adding the ordinal-equivalent values of the 




The response categories for each of the four evaluation questions were recoded as: ‘Don’t 
know’=0; ‘Strongly disapprove’=1; ‘Disapprove’=2; ‘Approve’=3; ‘Strongly approve’=4. The 
resulting LegislativeScore index consequently has a possible range of 0-16. 
 
As Graph 4.15 illustrates, the lowest LegislativeScore is shared by countries that perform better 
and worse with respect to democracy and good governance. Cape Verde, which ranks top of 
the democracy rankings and the good governance17 scores, ranks alongside Nigeria – one of the 
countries in the study where democracy is seen as not yet having been achieved, it being rated 
as only ‘partly free’, with its good governance scores indicating serious problems. 
 
As stated previously, regarding the question relating to citizens’ trust in their parliaments, the 
African parliaments in this study scored above the world average. This appears to be the case 
for new democracies as opposed to more established democracies, as Newton concluded based 
on his analysis of the World Values Survey. In his findings, countries such as Poland, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania Chile, and South Africa showed high levels of confidence in their 
parliaments. He goes on to state that the common denominator in these countries was that all 
were newly democratising nations (Newton, 2001). Newton argues that these results suggest 
that in new democracies confidence in parliaments “may be an expression of faith in the 
                                                 
17 In the Good Governance Index, developed by the Ibrahim Foundation for sub-Saharan Africa, Cape Verde ranked 
in 3rd place, Benin in 13th place, and Nigeria ranked in 39th place (The Ibrahim Index of African Governance, 
2008).  
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principles and potentials of democracy as a form of government, rather than as an evaluation of 
how parliament is currently working in practice” (Newton, 2001, p. 209). The author, in 
agreement with Newton’s (2001) conclusion as to why parliaments in new democracies tend to 
be more ‘trustworthy’, believes that a caution must be sounded that there is a risk that an 
overabundance of trust can compromise citizens’ vigilance over these institutions.  
 
As Mishler and Rose argue, “trust, however, is double edged” (1997, p. 419), meaning that 
democracy requires trust, but at the same time, it requires an active and vigilant citizenry, one 
with a healthy scepticism relating to government and political institutions – as Gamson puts it, 
“Whereas insufficient trust presages the disintegration of civil society, excessive trust 
cultivates political apathy and encourages a loss of citizens’ vigilance and control of 
government, both of which undermine democracy (cited in Mishler & Rose, 1997, Gamson 
1968, p. 46-8). 
 
The Afrobarometer survey that supports these findings was conducted in South Africa in 2006, 
which at that time, in recent years had witnessed serious scandals involving its 
parliamentarians. There were three prominent scandals: ‘Travelgate’, where MPs were 
convicted of fraudulently expensing travel costs; The ‘arms deal’ scandal that allegedly had the 
implicit and explicit involvement of a number of parliamentarians, and the High Court decision 
condemning and sentencing to prison one of the top parliamentarians of the ruling party for this 
complicity in it. In 2000, the arms deal was raised for questioning in parliament, bringing to the 
attention of the public accusations of fraud and, with this, the internal divisions between 
parliamentarians (IDASA, 2008). In 2003, the ANC Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni, was charged 
with fraud relating to a bribe, in the form of a luxury vehicle, by the European Aeronautical 
Defence & Space company (Gumede, 2007). Yengeni lost his seat in parliament and was sent 
to jail to serve a four-year prison sentence – which ended up being five months (Gumede, 
2007). In 2006, fourteen ANC MPs were convicted on fraud charges relating to the abuse of 
parliamentary travel vouchers and were fined for theft. (South African Press Association, 
2006). 
 
Despite this sequence of scandals, the LegislativeScore for the South African parliament is still 
positive. This can mean that, for now, parliament is still viewed positively by South Africans as 
a result of its complex nature and development, i.e. if one is a member of an opposition party, 
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the scandals might be viewed with a certain detachment that would not affect one’s confidence 
in parliament; the fact that these scandals were brought to light in parliament by an opposition 
party member may indicate an openness and accountability by this institution. 
 
Those who affiliate themselves with the ruling ANC may view these scandals as one-sided 
witch-hunts that are driven by the media and do not accurately reflect on their MPs. This 









People’s perceptions and evaluations of their parliaments are not consistent with the standard 
of their countries’ democracies. In terms of democracy, the worse- and better-performing 
countries rank side by side in terms of their citizens’ evaluations of their parliaments.   
 
However, there are three countries that scored consistently poorly on the measures of trust, job 
evaluation and perception of corruption) – Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya. All three are also 
among the lowest on the ‘liberty’ ranking. But the lowest appreciation of parliaments by 
citizens is also shared (not repeatedly thought) by the countries faring better in democracy – 
Cape Verde, Benin and Botswana. This piece of evidence reveals the complexity that is 
implied in evaluating parliaments and interpreting these evaluations. 
 
Democracy requires a fine balance between scepticism and trust by citizens in their political 
institutions. Governments are analysed repeatedly by scholars, sometimes including 
parliaments in the same ‘basket’ as all political institutions. However, it is crucial to keep in 
mind that parliaments are very particular institutions – they are constituted of political rivals, 
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competitive elements whose role is to question, to raise doubts. Governments and political 
parties, on the other hand, are generally constituted by groups or individuals that share the 
same objectives.  
 
Described accurately as representative institutions, parliaments clearly cannot please all 
citizens in equal measure if they are to perform this role. Which political parties citizens 
support can be a factor that contributes to their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their 
parliament. However, saying this implies that it is not possible to analyse citizens’ appreciation 
of parliaments, and therefore, this should be undertaken with caution and moderation. The 
repeated low scores for the three countries mentioned previously (Nigeria, Zimbabwe and 
Kenya) need to be taken as a warning by citizens of their dissatisfaction. 
 
The two hypotheses tested throughout the chapter were refuted in the analyses – the type of 
electoral system and the existence of party dominance do not show patterns that prove that 
there is a relationship between a particular electoral system and a parliament’s support by its 
citizens; throughout the analyses of parliaments, there is no common behaviour among the 
countries with party dominance.  
 
Tanzania, which has a parliament where 87 percent of the seats are occupied by the ruling 
party, exhibits consistently higher appreciation from its electorate; on the other hand, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe and Kenya exhibit the lowest scores on average for citizens’ appreciation. Although 
it is important to note that in the recent elections of 2008, Zimbabweans gave the majority of 
seats in parliament to the opposition, this had in practise already happened in the previous 
election. But constitutionally, the ruling party held onto their majority through the seats 
appointed by the president of the republic. These constitutional powers were removed in the 
constitutional reform that took place in 2007. As a result, for the first time, the majority in 
parliament actually corresponded to the will of the electorate, and the opposition won the 
presidency of the Assembly (“Zimbabwe opposition wins speaker vote”, 2008). This country is 
currently experiencing a political crisis; however, with all the limitations on democracy and 
liberty, the Zimbabwean parliament may well be the only remnant of democratic institutions in 




In the majority of the countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave a positive evaluation of 
their parliaments, especially on the measure of ‘trust’. This seems to indicate a vote of 
confidence by citizens in these institutions, which is good news and bad news. This confidence 
should give parliaments the motivation to perform, but at same time, it could also mean that 








This chapter analyses the perceptions among survey participants of African parliaments and 
presidents, and it examines citizens’ attitudes towards the coexistence of these two institutions. 
It aims to test the way citizens rate their parliaments compared to what they might say about 
their presidents. It will further seek to answer the question of whether Africa remains the 
continent of the ‘big man’, where absolute power lies with an individual, feeding clientelistic 
relationships. 
 
In the decades following the transitions to independence, the major part of the continent was 
marked by a proliferation of monoparty regimes; in many cases, these were almost one-man 
regimes. The majority of the leaders symbolised, at an early stage of independence, the birth of 
the nation itself. In many instances these presidents sought to extend their incumbency 
perpetually.  
 
However, over the last two decades, this scenario has changed considerably. Monoparty 
parliaments were replaced by multiparty parliaments and executives, and presidents have found 
themselves needing to share their leadership of the nation with parliamentarians. Not much is 
known about how these emerging parliaments have been operating, but the little that is known 
tells us that the parliaments have faced a lack of institutionalisation and still struggle to assert 
their independence from strong executives. It is therefore reasonable to expect that parliaments 
will not be perceived as dormant institutions in the public eye. 
 
Before attributing any conclusions of the analysis to constituent changes in the political actors 
and institutions, the fact that the makeup of African citizens has itself changed over recent 
decades must be taken into account. Africa is a continent of youths. The majority of the 
population is under 25 years of age, which means that few witnessed the post-independence 
movements; most did not live under colonial domination. Instead, the majority of African 
citizens belong to the generation that witnessed political liberalisation. 
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In recent decades, the development of elected African parliaments has been notable. Until the 
1940s no African country had held a parliamentary election. By comparison, 13 Latin America 
countries had held elections by this date, and five countries had undergone the process in Asia.  
 
During the 1950s two parliamentary elections were held in Africa (Ghana and Nigeria) 
compared with five in Asia and 41 in Latin America. African parliamentary elections slowly 
grew in numbers until the boom of the 1990s. In that decade Africa held 86 parliamentary 
elections. During the previous decade, they had numbered just 26 (Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2008). 
 
Compared with other parts of the world – in particular with Western countries – the large 
majority of African legislatures are ‘emerging’ legislatures (Barkan, Ademolekun & Zhou, 
2004). However, not all countries and parliaments have witnessed liberalisation, and even 
among those that have, there are substantial differences in institutionalisation levels and roles.  
 
The eighteen countries covered in this study have multiparty parliaments that are, on average, 
16.2 years of age. The outliers are Botswana (42 years) and Uganda (2 years). The majority of 
these institutions did exist before political liberalisation, although as one-party institutions or, 
as in the South African case, a multiparty assembly where a large part of the population was 
excluded from representation (Murray & Nijzink, 2002).  
 
In spite of the fact that the emergence of democratic parliaments has been one of the visible 
consequences of the wave of democratisation that spread across Africa in the 1990s, this has 
not received substantial attention in the academic literature. The scarcity of studies on the 
relationship between African parliaments and their citizens may be attributed mainly to two 
factors: a historical lack of public opinion data and the fact that only as recently as the 1990s 
did a group of countries in Africa become politically liberalised. The two reasons are 
interrelated: The scarcity of public opinion data is in part a result of the lack of democracy, and  
public polls require the existence of liberty.  
 
The combination of the recent availability of relevant data and the number of countries 
experiencing observable liberalisation processes allows us to seek new insights about politics 
in Africa from the perspective of ordinary citizens. The first question that needs to be 
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addressed in this study is whether these citizens are able to form basic opinions about their 
political institutions. This becomes important because citizens’ awareness of their political 
institutions is seen as a prerequisite for accountability. 
 
In addition, social and demographic changes have been so profound in sub-Saharan Africa that 
they have altered the nature and size of the electorate. The distribution of Africa’s population is 
markedly different to the current ageing trends observed in the Western world. Life expectancy 
statistics show a continent with a dominant youth. Nearly 50 percent of the African population 
are under 25 years of age and are generally more highly educated and urbanised than in the past 
(The World Bank Group, 2007a).  
 
On the political front, Africans have had increased opportunities to vote in recent years; indeed, 
elections have been blooming across the continent. However, Bratton and Logan (2006) argue 
in this regard that Africans are “voters but not yet citizens”, implying that they are committed 
voters but not yet at the point of demanding political accountability from their rulers. In this 
case, accountability is still to mature to the point where citizens are able to assert their rights.  
 
Comprehending citizens’ perceptions of their parliaments constitutes an important step towards 
discerning the future of democracy. Citizens’ perceptions of parliaments have been 
investigated, but the research has focused on established democracies, and even for those, the 
relationship between citizens and parliaments has barely been studied (Norton, 2002). The 
study of politics in Africa has tended to focus on democratisation and regime transitions 
(Hyden, 2006). Despite the fact that parliaments are crucial in these processes, they have been 
largely excluded. By contrast, presidents and executives have had the major share of academic 
attention, although often with a negative undertone.  
 
5.2 Parliaments in the land of the ‘big man’  
 
The political literature has characterised politics in Africa as the politics of the ‘big man’, 
where ruling leaders have manoeuvred formal rules and institutions to their benefit (Hyden, 
2006; Bayart, 1993; Southall & Melber, 2006, Posner & Young, 2007).  
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In the 1990s, with increased political openness, elected African presidents have been sharing 
the rule of the polis with new institutions, and opposition parties have been legally allowed to 
have a place in political affairs. In the 1990s, for the first time, the continent witnessed ruling 
presidents defeated at the polls and accepting the results (e.g. President Aristides Pereira of 
Cape Verde, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia). In fact, Posner and Young (2007) showed that, until 
recently, African leaders were typically forced to leave office by force or through death. Using 
data from the Archigos project, which codes the way that heads of state in every independent 
country in the world have entered and exited power (between 1875 and 2004), they showed 
that in the 1960s and 1970s nearly 75 percent of the African leaders left power as a result of a 
coup, violent overthrow, or assassination. Between 2000 and 2005, the share of leaders leaving 
power by unnatural means dropped to 19 percent, primarily due to an increase in voluntary 
resignations, in most cases triggered by constitutional term limits (in 9 of the 17 cases between 
2000 and 2005) (Posner &Young, 2007). 
 
The wrangle over amendments to constitutional term limits is one of the rare examples of 
visible disputes between presidents and assemblies. Some of the constitutions of Africa’s new 
democracies established term limits on presidential tenures. Nonetheless, some presidents have 
been trying to amend constitutions to change this restriction: In Namibia in 1998/99, in Zambia 
in 2001, in Malawi in 2002 and, in 2006, in Nigeria. Only the Namibian president, Sam 
Nujoma, succeeded in his bid. President Obasanjo of Nigeria faced the embarrassment of a 
defeat by the National Assembly of his attempt to amend the constitution that would allow him 
a third successive term. This rejection was confirmed by the Senate. President Thabo Mbeki of 
South Africa tried to extend his mandate of the ANC presidency in 2007 to a third term, 
knowing that holding the party’s presidency virtually guarantees control over the country’s 
presidency. This attempt was thwarted by the ANC congress and led to the party forcing him to 
resign just a few months before the 2009 election.   
 
The table below shows the duration that the presidents of the countries in this analysis have 
held office (at the time the data was collected). Of the 18 countries, three presidents had been 
in office for extremely long periods: President Kérekou, who by 2005 had been in office as 
president of Benin for 28 years (although not continuously: 18 years until 1991, and from 1996 
to 2006); President Museveni of Uganda, who had been in office for 19 years; and President 
Mugabe who by 2005 was serving his eighteenth year in office as president (he had also served 
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as prime minister in the seven years preceding his presidency). Only President Kérekou has left 
power at the time of writing – 2008. In 2006, Kérekou stepped down after agreeing not to 
attempt to change the constitution, which prohibited him from running because of a two-term 
limit on the presidency, implemented in 1990, and a maximum age limit of 70 years (Benin, 
1990, Article 44); Kérekou was 72 when he stepped down (Signouret, 2005). 
 
All eighteen presidents served as both heads of state and of government, with the exception of 
Cape Verde and Senegal, where the head of government is the prime minister. Lesotho is a 
constitutional monarchy headed by King Letsie III. However, the prime minister is the head of 
the government while the king is constitutionally not allowed to be politically involved. In the 
case of Lesotho, the Afrobarometer questionnaire replaced ‘President’ with ‘Prime minister’. 
Among the presidential newcomers, there is an emerging breed of leaders who hold past 
experience in the executives or assemblies, as either MPs or members of government with 
related parliamentary experience. One such example is President Armando Guebuza of 





Table 5.1: Duration of presidential incumbents to survey date  
  President Duration (in years) 
Benin Mathieu Kérékou 28 
Botswana Festus Gontebanye Mogae 7 
Cape Verde Pedro Pires  4 
Ghana John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor 3 
Kenya Mwai Kibaki 3 
Lesotho 
Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili 
( Prime-Minister) 
7 
Madagascar Marc Ravalomanana 3 
Malawi Bingu Wa Mutharika 1 
Mali Amadou Toumani Touré 1 
Mozambique Armando Guebuza just started 
Namibia Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba just started 
Nigeria Olusegun Obsanjo 6 
Senegal Absoulaye Wade 6 
South Africa Thabo Mbeki 7 
Uganda Yowesi Museveni 19 
Tanzania Jakaka Kikwete just started 
Zambia Levy Patrick Mwanawasa 3 
Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe 18 
Source: (Frame et al, 1993, 2005, 2006, 2007) 
 
The relatively short collective period these presidents have been at the helm of their respective 
countries may lessen the likelihood of their parliaments being overshadowed by the executives. 
However, African parliaments seem to be in the position of their Latin American counterparts, 
where parliaments are perceived as reactive institutions and executives as proactive ones.  
 
African parliaments fit the description of Cox and Morgenstern (2001) with regard to Latin 
America. They argue that typically in Latin America the legislatures cannot remove presidents 
from their positions, and they struggle with a lack of resources, which limits their ability to 
generate their own proposals. The same could be said in general of the emerging African 
legislatures. The primary consequence of this weakness of the legislatures is difficulty in 
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keeping the executives accountable. Accountability can therefore be compromised. 
Deficiencies in accountability are often more discernible and critical in new democracies than 
in long-established democracies (Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner, 1999).   
 
These parliaments, as a result of their short-lived existences, are still largely inefficient and 
unruly, which can have obvious consequences with regard to public evaluation. This power 
imbalance between executives and parliaments can also negatively affect citizens’ views of 
parliaments. 
 
5.3 The marginalisation of parliaments by international donors  
 
To more fully understand the relationship between parliaments and executives in Africa it is 
important to recognise that Africa is a continent still struggling with the fight against poverty 
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2005). Poverty necessitates the 
implementation of effective policies to combat this scourge and promote development. As a 
result, donors and international agencies together with the executives in the host countries have 
tended to establish and drive policies and budget agendas. These agreements are often made 
without the involvement of parliaments. The urgent need to implement these agendas 
effectively marginalises parliaments, which are viewed as over-politicized and hence 
inefficient.  
 
To further ‘make the case’ against their involvement, parliaments in most countries are not full-
time institutions; they have short sitting periods, which reinforces the reason for their exclusion 
on this matter. They also suffer from a lack of resources and technical capacity. These factors 
conspire to constrict the role of parliaments as the watchdogs of executives. The political 
debates within parliaments are often reduced to discussions of political scandals or procedures, 
where the political party comprising the executive acts as the protective guardian of the 
executive. The impact of such debates on the public’s image of parliament is to portray it as a 
sterile contributor to the development agenda. Parliaments are seen as mere puppets of the 
political parties’ interests and not as institutions that represent the people’s interests.  
 
In the Mozambican case, where the parliament has only two parties, FRELIMO and 
RENAMO, there have been only a few occasions where both political parties have voted 
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unanimously. The party lines are towed strictly by the deputies of both political parties. The 
extreme party-centricity of the assembly is seen as the main problem of the Mozambican 
parliament by journalists and civil leaders alike, as will be seen in following chapters. 
 
In this context it may be expected that parliaments are publicly perceived as secondary 
institutions, while presidents are still the predominant players. By extension, it is reasonable to 
expect that parliaments, as quiescent institutions, receive very little support from the public. 
The data analysis was performed both collectively and at a country level on the various factors 
of ruling party dominance, the electoral system and the constitutional design.  
 
5.4 Dominant parties, electoral systems and constitutional design  
 
5.4.1 Parliaments in the context of dominant parties 
 
A further element that needs to be considered in the study of the balance of power between 
parliaments and executives in these countries is the existence of dominant ruling parties that 
have almost absolute control over the parliaments. Dominance of parliament by the ruling party 
is not an exclusive feature of African parliaments. Several European parliaments are known for 
having the same characteristic. However, in new democracies where there is still a lack of 
institutionalisation of the parliaments and systems, this dominance can hamper the 
development of parliaments as houses of debate and accountability.  
 
Dominant ruling parties are a widespread phenomenon, with these parties holding large 
electoral majorities, as is the case with the BDP in Botswana (77.1 percent); FRELIMO in 
Mozambique (62 percent); SWAPO in Namibia (75 percent); the ANC in South Africa (69.7 
percent); the RSP in Tanzania (81.4 percent); the NRM in Uganda (59.3 percent); and ZANU-
PF in Zimbabwe (59.6 percent) (Nunley, 2008).  
 
This phenomenon can obstruct competitive politics within parliaments, where party dominance 
can weaken the relations between parliament and the executive. In order to protect the 
executive from public scrutiny, members of the ruling parties in parliament advocate that their 
government be monitored behind closed party doors. Accountability of the executive to 
parliament is therefore similarly constrained. Moreover, many of Africa’s dominant political 
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parties were previously liberation movements, where internal discipline was a fundamental 
credo.  
 
To the advantage of political movements that fought for independence, the creation of the state 
is often perceived as an achievement credited to the party. In these movements, unity was a 
doctrine that facilitated the nation-building process and provided a front against any would-be 
challengers. As a result, there is at present a tendency to view the opposition as ‘enemies’ of 
the party and subsequently enemies of the state, with the distinction between the state and the 
ruling party often being indistinguishable.  
 
In addition, members of liberation movements find it hard to understand the lack of support 
from or ingratitude of the people for their achievements in liberating them. It is in this 
minefield that multiparty parliaments have entered the political landscape, as counter-powers to 
executive powers that traditionally have been unquestionable.   
 
This democratic predicament is further compounded by the near-certainty that these ruling 
parties will hold onto power in the next election. This certainty violates Przeworski’s (1991, p. 
10) criteria that are essential for democracy; as he states, “Democracy is a system in which 
parties lose elections”. Furthermore, democracy is made of losers and winners. In some of the 
countries in this study, the institutionalisation of certainty by powerful dominant parties is 
evident.  
 
This also serves to explain instances of political violence, as recently seen in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, where opposition parties have managed to defeat the incumbents through elections. 
When studying parliaments and executives in Africa, the ‘dominant party’ context is therefore 
a key element to consider. In this analysis it is reasonable to expect that parliaments will enjoy 
lower levels of citizens’ approval in countries where there is a prevalent party dominance, since 
citizens will perceive their parliament as a mere extension of the ruling party. By the same 
token, it may be expected that citizens will evaluate more highly parliaments with no clear 




5.4.2 The electoral system18 
 
The impact of the electoral system on levels of satisfaction with democracy and political 
institutions has been studied extensively, albeit with asymmetric results. Some scholars argue 
that proportional systems facilitate a better representation of societal and minority groups, and 
therefore, citizens will be more supportive of their institutions (Lijphart, 1999; Anderson, 
1998). Other scholars, by contrast, argue that constituency systems show higher levels of 
satisfaction with the state and the regime, since under such systems the voter has greater choice 
through their vote, which serves to strengthen the link between the voter and the elected (Farrel 
and McAllister, 2006; Norris, 1999). Cho (2005) refined this debate by adding the distinction 
between winning and losing citizens.  
 
Using the Lesotho electoral reform as a case study, Cho (2005) has shown that citizens on the 
losing side (opposition supporters) were more satisfied with the country’s state and regime 
following the reform. The Lesotho election of 2002 gave the opposition 40 parliamentary seats, 
which under the previous constituency system would not have been possible.  
 
However, Cho (2005) also shows that in spite of their levels of satisfaction with the electoral 
system they still feel that the ruling party acts as though it were a ‘winner takes all’ race. A key 
point to note is that levels of satisfaction can be positively influenced by meaningful inclusion 
and representation of all political players.  
 
In this study the analysis tests whether citizens’ satisfaction varies by institution type rather 
than by citizen groups (i.e. external factors rather than internal ones). Does the electoral system 
impact on the way in which citizens perceive parliaments and presidents? 
 
 
                                                 
18 Among the eighteen countries covered in this study, five have adopted proportional representation: Benin, Cape 
Verde, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa; eight countries have adopted a majoritarian electoral system 
(constituency) – Botswana, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; and two – Lesotho 
and Senegal – have adopted a mixed electoral system (International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008). 
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5.4.3 The constitutional design 
 
In an analysis of citizens’ views on parliaments and presidents, it is reasonable to question 
whether the constitutional design impacts on these views. In analysing the eighteen 
constitutions, the countries were divided by constitutional design as follows: Hybrid – Benin, 
Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal, Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – 
Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia; and Parliamentary – 
South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana.  
 
Following Lipjart’s (1999) argument that under parliamentary systems the executives are more 
collegiate than under presidential systems, in which ‘one-man’ executives are more common , 
it is expected that this analysis will show higher levels of satisfaction with presidents under 
presidential systems, and that under parliamentary systems parliaments will be evaluated at 
least as highly as presidents. 
 
5.5 Empirical analysis of public opinion data on parliaments and presidents 
 
The quantitative analysis is divided into two main parts: firstly, an analysis is made of the level 
of awareness that citizens exhibit towards parliaments compared with those exhibited towards 
presidents. A lack of awareness, represented by ‘Don’t know’ responses that citizens gave for 
both institutions, is compared and contrasted with responses for both trust and the evaluation of 
the performance of these institutions; the same analysis is then applied using different 
groupings of respondents, by electoral system and then by constitutional design.  
 
Secondly, a comparison is carried out of citizens’ trust in parliaments and executives in Africa, 
Asia, Europe, and the world, followed by an analysis of the opinions of the Afrobarometer 
respondents regarding their presidents and parliaments. At this point, the results relating to trust 
in, and performance of, the executives and parliaments are presented for each country. As for 
the analysis of the ‘don’t know’ respondents, the results are also analysed by grouping them by 
electoral system and constitutional design, as well as by party dominance of the ruling party. 
To enhance the comparison of how citizens perceive parliaments and presidents, consideration 
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is also be given to the respondents’ preferences for which institutions should be responsible for 
law-making.  
The penultimate question contemplated in this analysis does not compare the two political 
institutions, but rather elucidates the desire, or lack thereof, of respondents to return to one-man 
rule and to a one-party regime. The results are presented by country and on aggregate. The last 
question presents the results relating to the impression that citizens have of the degree to which 
their presidents respect the country’s constitution. 
 
Within the text the words assembly, legislature and parliament are used interchangeably, but 
are applied to the second house in case of lower houses. The term Africans will be used in this 
paper to refer to the citizens of the countries covered in the study.  
 
To facilitate a contextualisation of the findings, the table below shows the countries in the 
analysis, number of chambers, and number of seats. When attempting to make generalisations 
it is important to bear in mind the limitations of the study. As the table shows, the study covers 
a wide array of assemblies, ranging from a headcount of 63 deputies in Botswana to 400 
deputies in Nigeria. This characteristic alone reminds us that not all parliaments are equal. 
They may even share a similar period of democratisation and therefore face similar difficulties 
and challenges. However, they are still unique institutions with their particular legacies and 
development trajectories. Even so, this study provides important insights into the public’s 
perceptions of parliaments in Africa. For a deeper understanding of the findings, country 
analyses are essential. One such analysis is conducted, in the case of Mozambique, in Chapters 













Benin National Assembly Unicameral 83 83
Botswana National Assembly Unicameral 63 63
Cape Verde National Assembly Unicameral 72 72
Ghana Parliament Unicameral 230 230
Kenya National Assembly Unicameral 224 224
Lesotho National Assembly Bicameral 120 120
Lesotho Senate Bicameral 33 31
Madagascar National Assembly Bicameral 127 127
Madagascar Senate Bicameral 33 33
Malawi National Assembly Unicameral 193 193
Mali National Assembly Unicameral 147 147
Mozambique Assembly of the Republic Unicameral 250 250
Namibia National Assembly Bicameral 78 78
Namibia National Council Bicameral 26 26
Nigeria House of Representatives Bicameral 360 358
Nigeria Senate Bicameral 109 109
Senegal National Assembly Bicameral 150 150
Senegal Senate Bicameral 100 100
South Africa National Assembly Bicameral 400 400
South Africa National Council of Provinces Bicameral 90 54
Uganda Parliament Unicameral 333 332
Tanzania National Assembly Unicameral 323 319
Zambia National Assembly Unicameral 158 158
Zimbabwe House of Assembly Bicameral 210 210
Zimbabwe Sénat Bicameral 93 93
Source: IPU PARLINE database: number of seats, 2009; IPU PARLINE database: structure of 






5.5.1 Analysis of ‘Don’t know’ responses for parliaments and for presidents 
 
A positive finding of the analysis of Afrobarometer responses is that African citizens have been 
shown to have opinions about their main political institutions. Over 9 in 10 respondents are 
aware of these institutions and are able to evaluate them. The data shows that they are not just 
aware of them but they are also able to distinguish between the positions and roles of the 
presidential figure and the legislature.  
 
However, while being able to distinguish between the two institutions, Africans are shown by 
the data to have limited knowledge about their parliaments relative to their presidents. As is 
visible in the table below, the percentage of people unable to express an opinion about their 
parliament is almost double that of those who were not able to give an opinion about their 
president. This trend is visible across all questions analysed.  
 
Table 5.3: ‘Don’t know’ replies for questions relating to awareness of trust and approval of president 
and parliament (% of total responses) 
 President Parliament
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say? (Trust the President/Trust Parliament/Trust the 
National Assembly) 
3.6 7.5 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way in which the following people 
have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say? (President/MP/National Assembly Rep.) 
5.8 11.2 
 
The table below shows that when the ‘don’t know’ responses are analysed under the subgroups 
of ‘electoral system’ and ‘constitutional design’, the discrepancies among the ‘don’t know’ 
responses assume a detailed shape at the different levels of these two factors: citizens in 
countries under electoral systems that are ‘mixed’ or ‘proportional’ display significantly higher 
levels of ignorance about trust and performance than those analysed under the category 
constituencies. 
 
In terms of constitutional design, citizens in countries that have a hybrid system display higher 
levels of ignorance than those that are distinctly parliamentary or presidential. It is interesting 
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to note that citizens of presidential systems have better-formed opinions of their parliaments 
than those under parliamentary systems. A likely cause of this is that even under parliamentary 
systems, the parliament is viewed as a secondary institution relative to the executive rather than 
a core one.  
 
Table 5.4: ‘Have no opinion’ on trust and performance of the president and parliament, by electoral 
system and by constitutional design (% of total responses) 
  Performance Trust 
  President Parliament President Parliament
Electoral 
System 
Constituency (plurality)  4.3 7.0 2.9 5.4 
Mixed 4.7 19.4 4.0 9.9 
Proportional (closed party list) 9.2 17.6 5.0 11.2 
Constitutional 
Design 
Parliamentary 4.1 11.4 2.7 7.8 
Presidential 4.7 7.1 3.1 4.8 
Hybrid 7.7 15.6 4.6 10.2 
Records have been grouped according to electoral system: Proportional – Benin, Cape Verde, Mozambique, 
Namibia and South Africa; constituency – Botswana, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zambia; mixed – Lesotho and Senegal. Source: International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008 
 
Records have been grouped by the author according to current constitutional design: Hybrid – Benin, Cape 
Verde, Madagascar, Mali, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia; Parliamentary – Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa. Source: 
Constitutions.  
 
5.5.2 Analysis of ‘opinions’ about parliaments and presidents 
 
In order to assess the responses from individuals able to offer opinions about presidents and 
parliaments, an analysis of the questions relating to trust and job approval was carried out. As a 
starting point of the analysis of how much trust parliaments and presidents received from 
Africans, the table below compares the levels of trust in African, Asian, and European 
countries as well as worldwide. Citizens’ trust in political institutions has been a recurring 





Table 5.5: Citizens’ trust in parliament and the executive in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the world 
  
Africans’ trust Afrobarometer 







  How much do you 
trust each of the 
following, or haven’t 
you heard enough 
about them to say? 
 For each one, could 
you tell me how 
much confidence you 
have in them: Is it a 
great deal of 
confidence, quite a 
lot of confidence, not 
very much 
confidence, or none 
at all?
How much do you 
trust the institutions? 
For each of the 
following 
institutions please 
tell me if you tend 
to trust it or tend 
not to trust it? 
(Tend to trust/No 
trust) 
  Executive Parliament Executive Parliament Executive Parliament Executive Parliament 
No 
Trust 15.5 17.6 18.8 22.6 12.1 19.9 63.1 68.1 
Little 










44.8 32.0 16.8 10.6 22.2 15.9 
Table based on data analysis of Asiabarometer dataset 2003 (Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Laos, China, and Brunei); European 
and World Value Surveys Integrated Data File, 1999–2002 (The survey includes 80 independent 
countries; Afrobarometer’s dataset, 2007; and Eurobarometer‘s dataset 2002.
 
Africans clearly rate their political institutions more highly than any other group surveyed in 
the above barometer studies. Collectively, Africans’ level of trust in these institutions is more 
than double Asia’s, the region with the second highest levels of trust. Compared to Europe, 
Africa is virtually an inverted mirror image. Moreover, parliaments are consistently trusted less 
than executives in every region surveyed, Africa not being an exception to this.  
 
5.5.2.1 Trust and performance evaluation of parliaments relative to presidents 
 
The following figure illustrates that, at an African country level, trust in presidents tends to be 
higher than that in parliaments, in all but three countries – marginally in Zambia, moderately in 
Cape Verde and quite clearly in Zimbabwe (with a level of trust in parliament 14 percent 
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higher than that in the president). The five countries with the highest levels of trust in the 
president relative to the parliament are South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal and Benin. 
Of further interest are Nigeria, which displays the lowest levels of trust in both institutions 
(about 55 percent) and Zimbabwe, which clearly bucks the African trend in putting trust in 
parliament significantly above that of President Robert Mugabe. 
 
Table 5.6: Percentage of trust in president and parliament and the relative difference (in ascending 
order) How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
Country Trust in President Trust in Parliament Relative
Zimbabwe 63.2 73.2 -14%
Cape Verde 63.3 66.3 -5%
Zambia 82.0 83.8 -2%
Botswana 81.4 80.8 1%
Uganda 90.9 90.2 1%
Nigeria 55.4 54.4 2%
Tanzania 96.7 93.9 3%
Ghana 86.9 83.3 4%
Namibia 90 85.8 5%
Mozambique 88.6 82.8 7%
Mali 89.2 81.8 9%
Kenya 84.4 76.7 10%
Lesotho 86.8 77.5 12%
Malawi 76.8 67.6 14%
South Africa 87.5 75.8 16%
Benin 75.6 64.6 17%
Madagascar 90.4 74.1 22%
Senegal 82.9 67.1 24%
 
Broadly consistent with the pattern observed for levels of trust, there is far greater approval of 
executives’ performance relative to that of parliaments. The exception to this is, once again, 
Zimbabwe where approval of the president is lower than that of the parliament. Senegal stands 
out for significantly rating its president’s performance above that of its parliament. Here too, 
Nigeria has the lowest overall level of approval of its political institutions – with 29.6 percent 
for President Obasanjo and 21.8 percent for its parliament – while at the other end of the scale, 
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Namibia (89.8 percent and 74.8 percent respectively) and Tanzania (93.1 percent and 67.2 
percent) have the highest approval ratings. 
 
Table 5.7: Percentage of positive evaluation of performance (difference in ascending order) 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 
twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? (Answers regarding approval are the 
sum of the answers ‘Approve’ and ‘Strongly Approve’) 
Country Approval of president’s 
performance 





Zimbabwe 26.8 28.3 -5% 
Nigeria 29.6 21.8 36% 
Zambia 40.6 26.4 54% 
Cape Verde 44.9 41.8 7% 
Malawi 55.5 42.1 32% 
Kenya 61.9 37.6 65% 
Benin 65.1 48.6 34% 
Senegal 68.2 36.8 85% 
Botswana 70.4 67.6 4% 
Mali 73.3 55.0 33% 
Ghana 76.0 64.8 17% 
South Africa 76.8 56.3 36% 
Lesotho* 77.7 57.5 35% 
Uganda 79.6 63.2 26% 
Madagascar 80.6 56.9 42% 
Mozambique 80.7 72.7 11% 
Namibia 89.8 74.8 20% 
Tanzania 93.1 67.2 39% 
* In Lesotho the question was approval of the prime minister’s performance 
 




Whether a legislature is part of a parliamentary or presidential system undoubtedly affects 
relations between the legislature and the executive, but it also affects relations between the 
public and its representatives. Generalisations about the magnitude and character of structural 
effects are difficult to make because government structures vary considerably within and 
among countries. 
 
Still, presidents are the most highly evaluated players regardless of the prevailing constitutional 
system. Even citizens within parliamentary systems have a more positive evaluation of their 
presidents than of parliament. As is evident in the table below, Africans express more trust 
towards presidents across all subgroups. The same trend is shown with regard to presidential 
job approval. Furthermore, evaluations of both institutions are consistently higher under 
parliamentary and hybrid systems than under presidential ones. A third category of ‘party 
dominance’ is added to the analysis in the two tables presented below.  
 
Table 5.8: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 















Absolute majority 88.6 82.6
Simple majority 75.4 70.8
No majority 82.8 77.8
Answers were aggregated from the categories ‘Just a Little’+’Somewhat’+’A lot’. Country records for 





Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, and Senegal; Simple majority, between 50 
percent +1, Simple – Ghana, Mozambique, Lesotho, Kenya, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, and 
Benin; and no majority, less than 50 percent, No majority – Zambia, Mali, and Malawi.  
 
5.5.2.3 Analysis of satisfaction with performance, by constitutional design, electoral 
system and party dominance  
 
An analysis of the opinions in the table below, by system construction factors, reveals that 
under mixed electoral systems (Lesotho and Senegal) there are unusually low levels of 
satisfaction with the performance of political institutions. The other types of electoral systems 
or constitutional design do not appear to have a significant influence on satisfaction ratings (see 
Table 5.9). 
 
It is worth noting that the most marked margin of opinions on the performance of the president 
relative to that of parliament is, paradoxically, found under a parliamentary constitutional 
design (South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana), in favour of the president. 
 
The dominance of a ruling party across institutions raises the issue of how much capacity for 
resistance the legislature has with regard to the executive.  
 
Somewhat at odds with the prevailing theory outlined above, it is shown below that citizens of 
countries with an absolute ruling majority have higher levels of trust in both their presidents 
and parliaments than those with simple or no majorities. Less straightforward is an 
interpretation of the results of performance approval. Still, attention can be drawn to the fact 
that under an absolute majority, approval of the president is highest, while the highest approval 
levels for parliaments can be found in countries with no ruling majority. 
 
Survey respondents in countries with absolute party dominance rate the performance of their 
assemblies more highly than might be expected; there is a 50.7 percent approval, on average, in 
Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. This might serve as a 
panacea to the concern that these institutions are undermined in such countries by the strong 
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domination, at least in the short term, subsequent to the democratisation era by one party or by 
the executive, although this may reduce over time. 
 
Another point to note is that the dominance of the ruling party does not seem to be a factor in 
how citizens perceive the performance of their political institutions – the differences among 
countries with absolute, simple and no majorities are insignificant. 
Analysing responses by electoral system groups provides no profound insights into a preferred 
system evidenced by higher evaluations. It is apparent that citizens under a pluralistic system 
have lower levels of trust in their political institutions than under a mixed system, while 
approval ratings are highest under proportional systems and lowest under a system of plurality. 
 
5.5.2.4 Performance analysis, by constitutional design, electoral system and party 
dominance 
 
Table 5.9: Satisfaction with performance of parliament and president  
Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the 
past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? (Answers regarding 
approval are the sum of the answers ‘Approve’ and ‘Strongly Approve’) 
 
 President 
Your Member of 
Parliament 
Constitutional Design Parliamentary 73.0 49.4 
Presidential 63.7 48.1 
Hybrid 66.1 54.5 
Electoral System Proportional 74.2 58.1 
Plurality 65.2 50.4 
Mixed 48.9 32.8 
Party Dominance Absolute majority 67.1 50.7 
Simple majority 66.0 51.3 
No majority 63.4 48.8 
Records have been grouped according to electoral system: Proportional – Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, 
Mozambique and South Africa; Constituency – Botswana, Zambia, Malawi Mali, Madagascar, Ghana, 
Tanzania and Uganda; Mixed – Lesotho and Sénégal.  
Source: International IDEA, Electoral Systems Worldwide, 2008. Records have been grouped by the 
author according to current constitutional design: Hybrid – Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia, Senegal, 
Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe; Presidential – Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia; Parliamentary – South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana. Source: Constitutions  
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5.5.3 Preference for who should be the lawmaker 
 
In spite of the lower regard with which parliaments are held in this survey, compared with the 
executive, respondents prefer their laws to be made by their parliaments rather than by their 
presidents – about 66 percent preferred parliamentary lawmaking compared with 20 percent 
who preferred president to make the laws. 
 
The countries where this preference for lawmaking by parliaments was most pronounced are 
Cape Verde, Mali and Uganda. Those where the preference was more moderate are Botswana 
and Senegal. 
 
Table 5.10: Percentage of responses about who should make laws 
 Percentage of agreement with: The 
members of parliament represent the 
people; therefore, they should make 
laws of this country, even if the 
president does not agree. 
Percentage of agreement with: Since the 
President represents all of us, he or she 
should pass laws without worrying about 
what parliament thinks. 
Namibia 80.5 17.2 
Mali 78.1 8.0 
Uganda 76.9 12.6 
Ghana 74.4 17.5 
Kenya 74.0 19.5 
Cape Verde 73.7 10.8 
Madagascar 71.1 15.0 
Malawi 70.2 14.4 
Nigeria 69.9 15.9 
Mozambique 68.3 18.6 
Zimbabwe 59.9 30.0 
Zambia 57.7 20.8 
Tanzania 57.6 21.1 
Lesotho 53.0 23.9 
South Africa 52.4 22.7 
Botswana 51.5 41.6 
Senegal 51.3 40.2 
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President represents all of us, he or she 
should pass laws without worrying about 
what parliament thinks. 





5.6 Rejection of return to one-man rule 
 
Perhaps the most profound insight to be gained from considering the following table is that 
despite the strong support shown by respondents for their president vis-à-vis trust and approval, 
there was a very clear rejection of a return to one-party, one-leader rule. This was reinforced by 
their strong preference for retaining the electoral process and ensuring the existence of 
parliaments as a counterbalance to the executive. 
 
Table 5.11: Percentage rejection of one-party and one-man rule 
  Would you disapprove of the following 
proposition:  Only one political party 
should be allowed to stand for election 
and hold office? 
There are many ways to govern a 
country. Would you disapprove of the 
following proposition: Elections and 
parliament should be abolished so that 
the president can decide everything?
Benin 82.8 81.1 
Botswana 82.1 88.8 
Cape Verde 79.4 65.1 
Ghana 81.9 85.0 
Kenya 75.0 88.4 
Lesotho 70.4 86.2 
Madagascar 71.1 73.8 
Malawi 55.7 66.1 
Mali 72.5 73.6 
Mozambique 51.5 41.7 
Namibia 58.7 44.9 
Nigeria 82.1 74.4 
Senegal 76.3 85.8 
South Africa 66.0 65.2 
Tanzania 42.7 81.3 
Uganda 59.3 91.1 
Zambia 85.8 89.3 
Zimbabwe 88.5 90.1 
Average 70.7 76.2 
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It is of further interest to consider the percentage of citizens who believed their president 
‘often/always’ ignored the constitution. Nearly six in ten Nigerians believed that President 
Obasanjo violated their constitution, while five in ten Zimbabweans believed that President 
Mugabe ignored or failed to respect their constitution. Two years after the data was collected, 
President Obasanjo left office, while President Mugabe stood for re-election in polls in 2008 in 
a controversial and violent election.  
 
The Zimbabwean parliament has been an important breathing space for the oposition in the 
country. This analsyis of the public opinion polls reveals that Zimbabwe is consistently the 
country where the president is rated lower than the parliament. The data was collected before 
the election of 2008, where the oppostion won over the assembly. President Mugabe and Zanu 
PF claimed victory of the presidency following a single-candidate follow-up election. Months 
after the second election, the country remains in a deadlocked position, with power sharing 








African citizens make a discernible distinction between presidents and parliaments. There are 
citizens who are unable to form opinions about either institution; however, this number is 
considerably higher when parliaments are considered. Citizens show an aptitude for having 
opinions about both institutions, which is particularly important as a prerequisite for 
accountability. Multiparty African parliaments are still in their infancy; it is therefore a positive 
indication that already in people’s minds they are an institution that is distinct from the 
executive. 
 
The limitations of a direct comparison between one institution that has several facets (parties, 
staff and agendas) and the institution of the executive leader, who is charged with delivering 
In this country, how often does the President ignore the constitution? 




















development and efficiency, must be recognised. Still, presidents are perceived by their citizens 
as being more worthy of trust and of performing better than parliaments. 
 
Parliaments should provide the link between the people and those who govern and, moreover, 
should assure citizens that government will remain accountable to them between elections. For 
this to occur, citizens need to have access to continuous channels of communication with 
parliaments or, at least, be aware that the institution is there, in case of need. 
 
The parliaments examined here operate within countries still consolidating their democracies. 
In these cases, institutions are more vulnerable to abuse by other political players. Public 
support can be crucial in the event of a political crisis. In cases of a reversal in democracy, 
parliaments are usually the first victims and in the past have been suspended or completely 
abolished. If, hypothetically, President Mugabe decided to abolish the parliament, since his 
party does not have the majority, the data indicates that this attempt will face popular 
discontent, since Zimbabweans trust and believe more in their parliament than in their 
president.         
 
Elected African democratic parliaments need to make an effort to be more visible to and 
reachable by their communities. However, as previous analyses in other parts of the world have 
shown, this will presumably end in more critical attitudes and higher demand from citizens 
towards parliamentarians. Democracy is not supposed to be a quiet ‘game’ between citizens 
and their elected representatives. Gaining citizens’ support is not just crucial for parliaments to 
function in these countries, it can also be crucial for their very survival.  
 
The positive evaluation of presidents does not imply unconditional support. The findings reveal 
that citizens do not want to lose gains made under the multiparty regimes, and parliaments are 
preferred to presidents as lawmakers. These findings reveal that despite the appreciation for the 
current presidents, citizens prefer to place limits on their functions and powers.  
 
From a comparative perspective, African citizens show higher levels of trust and job approval 
for both institutions than citizens in the Western world. Literature on African democratisation 
is often underscored by negativism and scepticism. In contrast, for now, African citizens’ 




Test of an explanatory LegislativeScore model, and explanatory 
factors 
 
6.1 Dependent variable, independent variables and hypotheses 
 
6.1.1 Dependent variable: LegislativeScore 
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between the characteristics of individuals and their 
evaluations of legislatures – how do ‘citizen’s profiles’ influence their evaluations of a 
legislature? 
 
The Afrobarometer questionnaire provides seven questions for assessing citizens’ perceptions 
of their parliaments and their members of parliament. In constructing the dependent variable, 
LegislativeScore, four of these questions were chosen. Each respondent was assigned a score 
for each of the questions in the LegislativeScore. The four questions have values from zero to 
four, the LegislativeScore for the respondent Y1 will be the sum of this respondent’s answers to 
the four questions. The total LegislativeScore is therefore the sum of the all respondents’ 
scores, as is shown in the table below.  
 
Table 6.1: The four questions constituting the dependent variable, Y 
Question Scores Y1 Y2 ...Yi 
How much do you trust each of the following, or don’t 
you know enough about them to say?  
0;1;2;3;4 
0 1 ...
How much of the time do you think the following 
persons try their best to listen to what people like you 
have to say? 
0;1;2;3;4 
1 2 ...
Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the 
following people have performed their jobs over the past 




How many of the following people do you think are or 
have been involved in corruption, or  don’t you know 






Consequently, the LegislativeScore for country A is the sum of the LegislativeScores of all 
respondents. LegislativeScore Y for Country (A) =Y1+Y2+Y3+Y4+...Yi 
 
The overriding criterion for choosing these questions was whether they related to citizens’ 
evaluations of parliament. The three questions that were excluded from the LegislativeScore 
dealt only with contact between members of parliament and citizens. (Question 61 gives a 
score for how much time a citizen perceives an MP to be spending in a constituency. Question 
60 gives a score for the amount of time a citizen feels a member of parliament should be 
spending in a constituency, and Question 32 gives a score for how many times a citizen has 
contacted an MP.)  
 
Although these questions are relevant for our understanding of the relationships that citizens 
have with their legislatures, and their perceptions of these legislatures, they do not allow us to 
measure the level of satisfaction that a citizen experiences towards this institution and its 
members. On the other hand, the four questions chosen to build the LegislativeScore provide 
actual measures of evaluation. The four variables used to construct the index, LegislativeScore, 
showed reliability in being considered an index, the Standardised Cronbach's Alpha19 in this 
instance being 0.598.  
 
There have been other attempts at estimating a measure of citizens’ relationships with their 
parliaments. Usually, these attempts aim at measuring the support that parliaments receive 
from their citizens. Measuring ‘support’ is a challenge that has still not been fully conquered. 
The existing studies proceed from a simple approach that investigates only one dimension, e.g. 
trust. These studies try to infer from the level of support a parliament enjoys how much trust it 
has from its citizens (Doorenspleet, 2005).  
 
Other studies emerged in the search for a latent variable that would measure citizens’ support 
for their legislatures. In some of these studies, more sophisticated statistical techniques, such as 
factor variables, were applied. Both approaches are not ideal. The first approach referred to is 
                                                 
19 In psychometrics, a reliability coefficient indicating the degree of internal consistency of items within a test. If 
certain assumptions are met, it ranges from 0 (zero internal consistency) to 1 (perfect internal consistency); a 
negative alpha coefficient indicates that items of the scale are negatively correlated and that an inappropriate 
reliability model is being used. Also called the alpha reliability coefficient and coefficient alpha (“Cronbach's 
alpha n", 2008) 
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limited by the simplicity of its claim that what has been measured is ‘trust’. The second 
approach referred to provides insights into what can contribute to a measurement of the 
relationship between citizens and their parliaments.  
 
However, what is controversial is what is really being measured: specific support, diffuse 
support, or performance. Therefore, for this study, it was decided that a score would be used, 
not presuming or claiming that it will measure trust or support. The LegislativeScore is 
considered to be representative of how citizens rate their parliament.  
 
The primary intention of the study was to perform a comparative analysis of the 25 197 
interviewed citizens, omitting in its first phase the identities of the countries. However, 
agreeing with the general perception that the identities of the countries are relevant (Gronke, 
Levitt, 2004), as an alternative, it was decided to undertake the analysis by country instead of 
having country only as a control variable. As the results show, this procedure provided 
information on each country that analysed in any other way would have been lost. The 
underpinning idea was therefore to combine the richness of the comparative method with the 
accuracy of the country analysis. 
 
6.1.2 Independent variables and null hypotheses 
 
The model tests seventeen factors (independent variables) as predictors of the LegislativeScore. 
Accordingly, seventeen null hypotheses have been defined:   
1. Level of education has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
2. Cash income deprivation has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
3. Food deprivation has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
4. Being satisfied with the national economy has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
5. Satisfaction with personal living conditions has no impact on the LegislativeScore 
6. Trust in other citizens has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
7. Allegiance to a party has no impact on the LegislativeScore   
8. Listening to the radio has no impact on the LegislativeScore 
9. Watching television has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
10. Reading newspapers has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
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11. Age group has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
12. Gender has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
13. Habitat has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
14. Satisfaction with democracy has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
15. Perception of the fairness of elections has no impact on the LegislativeScore 
16. Perception of embeddedness has no impact on the LegislativeScore  
17. Frequency of political discussion has no impact on the LegislativeScore 
 
6.2. Expectations of findings 
 
In 2005, Reneske Doorenspleet (2005) published her study on Citizens’ Support for the 
Legislature of Mali. Doorenspleet also used the Afrobarometer data, but the previous version 
(Round 2). In this chapter, similar hypotheses are tested using data from the 18 countries, but 
this time from the Round 3 version of Afrobarometer. Based on Doorenspleet’s findings in the 
Malian study, it is expected that two main findings will emerge: 
a. Legislative support will vary with levels of poverty and people’s perceptions of 
economic performance; 
b. Interpersonal trust, people’s interest in and knowledge of politics, and the level of their 
support for democracy in general will be all important in understanding their support of 
their legislature (Doorenspleet, 2005, p. 95). 
 
6.2.1 Hypotheses  
 
The hypotheses are divided into two main groups of individual characteristics: socioeconomic 
characteristics and political characteristics, as summarised in Figure 6.1, below. The criteria in 
the first group socioeconomic characteristics includes the characteristics of the individuals’ 
social and economic statuses, such as their level of education; their level of poverty, gauged by 
the cash income and food deprivation that they are exposed to; their satisfaction with the 
national and their personal economy; their trust in other citizens; the age group (generation) to 
which they belong; their gender; and their habitat, rural or urban.  
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The second group, namely, individuals’ political characteristics, includes their allegiance to a 
party, their exposure to the media (listening to the radio, watching television, reading 
newspapers), their satisfaction with democracy, their perception of the fairness of elections, 
their perception of embeddedness, and their perception of the frequency of political discussion.  
 
Lipset’s (1959) argument that democratic parliaments depend on the existence of an active 
middle class exposes a potential threat to most parliaments in Africa, since the existing social 
disparities and poverty make middle classes in Africa a scarcity. As is shown in Chapter 3, 
Africa has the second highest uneven distribution of income of the world; Africa still ranks as 
the region with the largest population living on less than 1 USD a day, as is shown in Table 
3.2. Simply put, if people are preoccupied with their ability to subsist, it would be illusionary to 
think that they would be concerned with political institutions.  
 
Overall, the recent history of the African countries in this study includes fights for 
independence; the creation of nationalist movements, pan-African movements, one-party 
regimes; and recently, the introduction of multiparty democracies20. Accordingly, in each 
country, the citizens that constitute the electorate can be aggregated into generation groups, 
which will have witnessed different important moments in the histories of their own countries.  
 
By way of example, when a 50-year-old Mozambican was born in 1958, the country was a 
colony of Portugal; when he was 17 years old, he would have witnessed the attainment of 
independence; then for 20 years he would have lived in a one-party state, which means that he 
would only have experienced a multiparty regime when he was already 57 years old. Of his 50 
years of living, 27 would have been lived under an authoritarian regime. The opposite would 
have been the experience of a 25-year-old Mozambican who was born in 1985, when the 
country was at civil war. Most of her life would have been lived under a multiparty regime.  
 
These different experiences ensure that the profiles of citizens can be divided according to each 
country’s history. For each country of the study for which the LegislativeScore was 
constructed, ‘generation’ was included as an individual characteristic (see Appendix 6).  
 
                                                 
20 See for example Africa in History by Basil Davidson (2003).  
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Parliaments are situated in cities, more specifically in one city of a country. As is shown in 
Table 3.5, the population of each country, its density and the population living in the largest 
city varies significantly. There are cities with fewer than 1 million people, compared with 
Lagos with almost 10 million people. Still, it is expected that in the cities where there is more 
access to education and information, citizens will potentially have more information on their 
political institutions.  
 
While many liberation movements afford women a place in the political arena, politics is still 
dominated by male citizens, and for this reason, men will potentially pay more attention to 
politics.  
 
Section 3.14 of this thesis summarises the political changes African citizens have undergone. 
Again, it is important to empathise with the political life of African citizens. As with the rest of 
the world, politics is the domain mainly of the political parties, with important distinctions 
between new parties, historical parties, opposition parties, powerful ruling parties, and 
personalised parties. Nevertheless, all are political parties.  
 
It is through parties that citizens choose; they vote for parties, are members of parties, and have 
neighbours who are members of parties. Citizens follow some party leaders; they dislike 
others; they form opinions of parties; and they distinguish between parties. It is therefore to be 
expected that citizens’ evaluations of the institution that is constituted by different parties will 
be influenced by the party allegiance of the citizen.  
 
Regular elections are a novelty in most African countries; this has been perceived undoubtedly 
as an indication that democracy is strengthening in these societies (Bratton, 1998; Lindberg, 
2006), albeit that many of these elections have been only relatively free or fair (Adejumobi, 
2000).  
 
In this regard, the Nigerian elections have been characterised by electoral fraud (Olarinmoye, 
2008; Collier & Vicente, 2008); the Kenyan elections of 2007 were followed by widespread 
violence, due to President Mwai Kibaki declaring victory despite irregularities in vote counting 
(Kibaki, 2008); the Zimbabwean elections in 2008 were marked by violence and intimidation – 
as was reported by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, a non-partisan, independent 
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group of 38 Zimbabwean nongovernmental organisations which declared its condemnation of 
the election violence – that specifically targeted their observers (Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network, 2008).  
 
In Mozambique, domestic and international observers declared that the legislative and 
presidential elections of 2004 involved irregularities and fraud, although all observers agreed 
that overall election results were not in question because Frelimo’s victory entailed a wide 
margin. This was confirmed by the parallel vote tabulation conducted by domestic observers. 
However, these problems could have had an impact on the distribution of parliamentary seats 
in some provinces (Mazula, 2006). The reservations about the irregularities surrounding the 
elections caused a deadlock after the elections, with the leader of the opposition, Afonso 
Dlhakama, giving several press conferences where he threatened that the party would not be 
part of a parliament elected through fraud (Mazula, 2006, p. 147).  
 
In the area covered by this study, parliamentary seats are allocated in accordance with election 
results. Therefore, it is expected that the legitimacy of their allocation in the public’s eyes 
results in the first instance from how free and fair the elections were.  
 
Elected parliaments are core institutions of representative democracies; therefore, it would be 
logical to expect that democratic citizens would be more supportive of legitimately elected 
parliaments. Doorenspleet concludes “...perceptions of regimes have profound effects on how 
citizens perceive specific institutions” (2005, p. 91). Mishler and Rose (1993, 1994, 1997) 
postulate that legislatures in new democracies are important symbols of democracy, and that 
support for legislatures is more a consequence than a cause of the support of democracy by 
citizens.  
  




6.2.1.1 The impact of socioeconomic characteristics 
 
a) Level of education has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.  
b) A higher level of poverty is associated with a lower LegislativeScore. 
c) A higher level of satisfaction with one’s living conditions has a positive impact on the 
LegislativeScore.  
d) A higher level of satisfaction with one’s economic status has a positive impact on the 
LegislativeScore. 
e) A higher level of trust for one’s fellow citizens has a positive impact on the 
LegislativeScore (not studied in Zimbabwe). 
f) The multiparty generation is associated with a higher LegislativeScore. 
g) Males are associated with a lower LegislativeScore. 
h) Residents of rural areas achieve a higher LegislativeScore. 
 
6.2.1.2 The impact of political characteristics 
 
a) An association with the ruling party has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore. 
b) An association with the opposition party has a negative impact on the LegislativeScore. 
c) One’s religious affiliations have a positive impact on the LegislativeScore.  
d) Exposure to radio news has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore. 
e) Exposure to print news has a negative impact in the LegislativeScore. 
f) The level of satisfaction with democracy has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore. 
g) Citizens who believe that elections were not free and fair will confer a lower 
LegislativeScore.  
h) Citizens who believe that they do not live in a democracy (embeddedness) will confer a 
lower evaluation of the legislature. 
i) Political discussion has a positive impact on the LegislativeScore   
 
Of the two main groups of characteristics (socioeconomic and political), it is expected that 
socioeconomic characteristics will exert more of an influence over the evaluations that citizens 
make of their legislature. The political characteristics will also be important, but less so than 
the socioeconomic characteristics; for example, if citizens are poor and living in a rural area, 
rural characteristics will be intrinsic to them and very relevant in their daily lives, to the extent 
that their party affiliation, their perception of the fairness of elections, and other political 
concerns will be less important. These citizens will therefore be less aware of their legislatures 
and consequently less judgmental of them.  
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 Level of education 
 Cash income deprivation/food 
deprivation (poor) 
 Satisfaction with the national 
economy 
 Satisfaction with personal living 
conditions  
 Trust of others  
 Generation group 
 Party allegiance 
 Listening to radio 
 Watching of television 
 Reading of newspapers 
 Satisfaction with democracy 








characteristics will be the 
main group of variables that 
will explain their support of 
a legislature 
Individuals’ political 
characteristics will be 
moderately important in the 
explanation of their support 
of a legislature  
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6.3. The model  
 
In order to test these hypotheses, a multiple regression equation was selected and applied to 
the LegislativeScore for each country. It was assumed that the LegislativeScore was 
approximately normally distributed.  
 
Yi= β0+ β1X(1)+…+ βkX(k)+ ei 
Where 
X1, …, X(16) are the selected factors for country i, chosen from the 17 available, and ei is a 
random variable assumed to be normally distributed with a mean zero and constant variance.  
 
A predictor was included in the model for Y, and both its marginal and conditional effects 
were significant. A marginal effect shows the influence of the factor when it is the only one 
included in the model. A conditional effect shows its influence when it is added to a model 
that contains all the factors. These are shown in Appendix 8 for each country. Genstat 10.1 
was used for these tests.  
 
The residuals, Yi – Y^i, from each chosen model were examined, and the departure from 
normality was detected.  
 
The summary of the explanatory results for all countries is show in Table 6.2, and a more 
detailed description of the results by country is presented in Table 6.3. Appendix 8 shows the 
results of the marginal and conditional tests for all countries. For the significant factors, the 
value for each parameter was estimated (see Appendix 8). This allows one to measure the 
strength of the influence of each factor on the dependent variable, the LegislativeScore. The 
parameters also indicate whether the influence is positive or negative, as well as its strength.  
  
The primary goal of the analysis was to run a comparative analysis of the 25 197 citizens, 
omitting the country setting in a first phase. However, agreeing with the general perception 
that the country context is relevant, as an alternative, it was decided to undertake the analysis 
by country instead of employing the country as merely a control variable. As the results 
show, this procedure gave information for each country analysed that any analyse other way 
137 
would have been lost. The underpinning idea was therefore to combine the richness of the 
comparative method with the accuracy of the country analysis.  
 
For each country a screening of terms was conducted with the seventeen independent 
variables (predictors) having the LegislativeScore as response. The regression model 
(generalised linear model) was then applied to the variables with a statistical significance in 
the marginal and conditional tests, and these results are presented in Table 6.2. Subsequently, 
the variables that had shown high significance in just one of the variance tests were added to 
the model.  
 
The model was run repeatedly until it comprised only the variables with statistical 
significance 
 
As is shown in Table 6.3, the results do exhibit important differences among the countries; 
yet two variables show a pattern of influence in the majority of the countries: fairness of the 
elections and party allegiance.  
 
Since all of the predictors were ordinal categorical variables, the analyses were conducted by 
category, having as a reference factor the variable with a lower number.  
 
In the model used, y is the LegislativeScore, x is the 17 factors presented heretofore, and  
(beta) are the parameters that indicate the strength and the direction of the effect of that factor 
on the dependent variable.  
 
Table 6.3 reports the statistically significant variables for each country. As illustrated, the 
variables party allegiance and fairness of elections are the variables that have an overall 
effect in most countries. The R2 statistic shows that overall the model only explains between 
6% and 33% of the variation in the data. There is a small but statistically significant 
association between the factors presented; however, this is not adequate for making 
predictions.
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Benin * *** ~     *** *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ***  
 ~    * ~ ** ~ ** *** *  * ** ***  
Botswana  *** *  ~  ~ *** *** *** *** ***  *** ~ *  
 ** ~  *   * * ***    **    
Cape Verde *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
** **  * **  *** *** * **  * ***   ***  
Ghana 
  
* *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** ** ~ 
      *** * ** **     ~  ~ 
Kenya 
  
 *** ** ~ ***  *** *** *** *** ***  *** ~ *** ~ *** 
~    ~  **  ***    **    ** 
Lesotho 
  
 ~   *** *** *** *** *** *** ~ *** *** ** ~ * * 
    ~ * **  ** *  *** ***     
Madagascar 
  
~ ***  ** ***  *** *** *** *** *** ** *** ** * *** * 
   *   ***   **  *** ***   ~ * 
Malawi 
  
*  ~  ***  ** * ***   * ***    ~ 
      ~  **   ~ ***     
Mali 
  
*** *** * * *** * *** *** *** *** ***  **  * *** ~ 
 *   ~ ~ ***  *** ~   ~   ~ ** 
Mozambique *** ** * ** ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** * *** * 
 ~     ~ *** **  * *** ***    ** 
Namibia 
  
 * *** *** ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
   *** * ~ *** *** *  * *** * *    
Nigeria 
  
* ** ** * ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***   
 *      *** *** ***  * *** * * *  
Senegal 
  
*** * **  *** * *** *** *** *** *  *** ~ * ** *** 
 * *   ** *** ** ** *** ~  ***    *** 
South Africa ** *** *** *** ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  
  ~  **  *** *** *** **   ***     
Tanzania 
  
  * ~   *** *** * *** ***  ***  ~ **  
   ~   *** *  ~ *  *     
Uganda 
  
*** ** ** *** ***  *** *** *** *** ** *** *** ~  ***  
*   *   **   **  *** ** ***  ***  
Zambia  ** *  ***  *** *** *** *** **  *** ~ * * * 
  **  *  ***  ** ~   ***     
Zimbabwe 
  
 * ** **  * *** *** *** *** ***  *** *** *** ** *** 
* ***     *** ~   ~  ***  ***   
Coding: ~ .05<p<=.10; * .01<p<=.05; ** .001<p<=.01; *** p<=.001. The chance frequencies of symbols in 36 tests are ~=1.8; * =1.44; ** =0.324; *** = 0.036. The first row for each country corresponds to the marginal test, while in 
the second row, the conditional test marginal = the variable is the only one in the regression equation; it measures this effect by ignoring the effect of all other variables. Conditional = the variable is added to a regression model. It 
measures the effect of the variables in the presence of all the others. 
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Education                   
Cash income 
deprivation                   
Food deprivation                   
Satisfaction with 




                  
Trust in others                   
Party allegiance                   
Radio usage                   
Television usage                   
Newspaper usage                   
Generation                   
Gender                   
Habitat                   
Satisfaction with 




                 
Perception of 
embeddedness 




                  
R2 .21 .09 .33 .15 .12 .20 .13 .13 .15 .21 .32 .20 .29 .29 .06 .06 .16 .24 
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6.4. Discussion of results by factor  
 
Overall, there are two variables that show a pattern in most of the countries: party allegiance 
and the fairness of elections. There are only four countries in which the fairness of elections 
was not statically relevant: Nigeria, Namibia, Benin and Botswana. In only three countries 




Level of education has an impact on the legislative score in five countries: Benin, Cape 
Verde, Mali, Tanzania and Uganda. However, it does show differences in the type of impact 
that it has on the dependent variable. In Benin, primary school education contributes 
negatively to the legislative score, and it is only in this country that the level of education 
impacts on the outcome. 
 
In the other four countries where education impacts on the LegislativeScore, it was found to 
have a positive effect: In Mali and Tanzania an impact was only observed for a single level of 
education, namely, secondary and primary school education respectively. In Uganda and 
Cape Verde, an impact on the score was apparent at all levels of education. This happened at 
a decreasing rate (or with ‘diminishing returns’) in Uganda but at an increasing rate in Cape 
Verde, with higher education accounting for nearly double the impact that primary education 
has on the score. 
 
In the remaining countries of the analysis, education did not contribute statistically to the 
LegislativeScore.  
 
6.4.2 Cash income deprivation 
 
Lack of access to a cash income does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
LegislativeScore. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the presence of a steady stream of cash income 
that appears to impact negatively on the LegislativeScore in four countries: Benin, Nigeria, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
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In both Nigeria and Benin, only those who had never experienced a shortage of income 
contributed to the LegislativeScore (negatively). In Zimbabwe, it was those who had 
experienced a moderate level (‘just once or twice’) of shortage of income who contributed 
negatively to the LegislativeScore. In Namibia, all participants who did not experience a 
chronic shortage of income contributed negatively to the LegislativeScore.  
 
In Benin, this variable contributed to a negative LegislativeScore. However, this trend was 
only statistically observed for those citizens who did not have cash. This means that the 
respondents who chose the answers that they had ‘never’ in the last year gone without cash or 
had gone ‘just once or twice’ without cash were the ones who expressed a more sceptical 
view of their parliament. The some pattern was demonstrated in Zimbabwe, where the 
citizens who were sceptical of parliament were the ones who chose the category ‘never went 
without cash in the last year’.  
 
6.4.4 Food deprivation 
 
The scarcity of food only has a statistical significance in Benin and Nigeria. Its interpretation 
is not straightforward, however, since it appears to have had a negative impact (as would be 
expected) in Nigeria for those who went without food ‘many times’, but a positive impact at 
most levels on the LegislativeScore in Benin. 
 
6.4.5 Satisfaction with the economy  
 
In four countries, the level of satisfaction with the state of the country had an influence on 
how people evaluated their parliament. In Mozambique and Kenya all except those who had 
the most optimistic view of the economy contributed positively to the LegislativeScore. In 
Namibia and Benin, those who had a ‘very good’ view of the economy contributed 
significantly and positively to the score; in Namibia, those with a ‘fairly good’ view of the 
economy made a more moderate contribution (about one half); in Benin, those with a ‘fairly 
bad’ view of the economy (about one sixth of the most optimistic participants) made a 




6.4.6 Satisfaction with personal living conditions 
 
This variable shows statistical significance for the score in nine of the eighteen countries: 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Cape Verde. 
 
In six of the aforementioned nine countries showing statistical significance, the effect on the 
score was significant at all levels of response, ranging from a relatively small positive 
contribution from those who viewed their personal living conditions as ‘fairly bad’ to a 
highly positive contribution from those who viewed their personal living conditions as ‘very 
good’. In the other three countries where this variable was observed as contributing to the 
score, the contribution was not evident at all levels of response, and there was no contribution 
at the ‘very good’ level. 
 
6.4.7 Trust in others 
 
This variable was statistically significant in the two smallest countries of the sample – Cape 
Verde and Lesotho. In both countries, a level of trust, and in the case of Cape Verde, distrust, 
contributed positively to the score.  
 
6.4.8 Party allegiance  
 
Party allegiance is one of the few variables that was seen to impact on the LegislativeScore in 
most countries. In fourteen of the fifteen countries where this variable is a factor, citizens 
aligned with opposition parties contributed positively to the legislative score, Benin being the 
exception. In just seven of the fourteen countries, participants aligned with the ruling party 
contributed positively to the score: Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Malawi, Madagascar and 
Kenya. 
 
In these seven, the contribution to the score from participants aligned with the ruling party 
was consistently lower than for those affiliated with the opposition. 
 
The seven countries where opposition-party affiliation was a contributing factor are 
Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Namibia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania. 
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6.4.9 Radio use  
 
Radio-listening habits had an influence in Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mali and 
Mozambique. In four of these countries, listening to the radio contributed positively to the 
LegislativeScore, while in Benin, those who seldom listened to the radio (i.e. ‘less than once 
a month’) contributed negatively to the score. In Mali and Botswana, a positive contribution 
was made for all levels of radio listenership, from ‘less than once a month’ to ‘every day’, 
while in Cape Verde and Mozambique, only the most frequent listeners (‘every day’) 
contributed positive to the score. 
 
6.4.10 Television viewing  
 
Television viewership was found not to be a significant factor in all countries except South 
Africa, where those who watched television ‘a few times a week’ contributed negatively to 
the score. 
 
6.4.11 Newspaper reading  
 
Reading of newspapers had an influence in three countries: Namibia, South Africa and 
Uganda. In South Africa, people who read newspapers ‘less than once a month’ contributed 
positively to the score, while in Namibia, most newspaper readers (those who read upwards 
of ‘a few times a month’) contributed negatively to the score. In Uganda, the opposite effect 
was observed, with infrequent readership (up to ‘a few times a week’) contributing positively 




Only in Senegal was the post-independence generation seen to contribute negatively to the 
score. In no other country was the generation effect (designated the pre-independence, post-





Gender was statistically significant only in Cape Verde and Uganda. In both countries, 
females contributed negatively to the score. 
6.4.14 Habitat 
 
The difference between an urban and a rural habitat was a factor only in Senegal and Kenya. 
In both countries, rural dwellers contributed positively to the score. 
 
6.4.15 Satisfaction with democracy  
 
In all countries where this variable influenced the legislative score, the trend was the same – 
the more there was satisfaction with democracy, the higher was the legislative score. There 
was an important finding in the Mozambican results: those who did not believe that 
Mozambique was a democracy lowered the score (-3.18).  
 
6.4.16 Perception of the fairness of elections 
 
Second only to ‘party allegiance’, this variable was influential in the majority of countries. In 
fourteen of the eighteen countries in the study, the way people perceived the fairness of 
elections impacted on the LegislativeScore. 
 
In these fourteen countries, those who perceived the elections to be ‘Completely free and fair’ 
consistently increased the score significantly. Some of the ‘weaker’ replies, such as ‘Free and 
fair with minor/major problems’, were found to be significant factors in some, but not all of 
the fourteen countries, but they still contributed positively to the score. In a minority of 
countries, even those who viewed the elections as ‘Not free and fair’ contributed to an 
increase in the score. Moreover, the contribution to the score of the various levels of reply 
increases as the participants’ conviction of free and fair elections increases. 
 
6.4.17 Perception of embeddedness of democracy 
 
This variable gives a notion of how much democracy citizens believe exists in their country. 
In ten countries, this variable shows statistical influence on the LegislativeScore. In all, the 
trend is that the higher citizens’ belief is that their country is a democracy the higher will be 
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the LegislativeScore. In Tanzania and Ghana, where citizens that do not believe that their 
countries are democracies, they are more sceptical towards their parliaments with the 
parameters being -1.099 for Tanzania and -1.577 for Ghana.  
 
6.4.18 Frequency of political discussion  
 
In 6 countries, discussion of politics was statistically relevant to the LegislativeScore: Cape 
Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, and South Africa. In all of these countries, the 
inclination was that discussing politics contributed to a higher LegislativeScore. Citizens who 




Table 6.4: Observed and fitted LegislativeScore, by country 
Country Observed/Fitted Mean Median Min Max Lower quartile Upper quartile 
Benin 
O 7.4 7.0  - 16.0 5.0 
F 7.4 7.3 2.4 15.1 6.3 8.5 
Botswana 
O 9.9 10.0 - 16.0 8.0 12.0 
F 9.9 10.1 6.9 12.8 9.3 10.6 
Cape Verde 
O 6.6 7.0 - 16.0 4.0 9.0 
F 6.7 6.9 -0.5 12.4 5.5 8.0 
Ghana 
O 9.4 10.0 - 16.0 8.0 12.0 
F 9.5 9.7 3.3 12.4 8.7 10.5 
Kenya 
O 8.4 9.0 - 16.0 7.0 10.0 
F 8.4 8.5 4.8 10.8 7.7 9.3 
Lesotho 
O 9.1 9.0 - 16.0 7.0 11.0 
F 9.1 9.0 5.4 11.9 8.1 10.1 
Madagascar 
O 8.5 9.0 - 16.0 7.0 11.0 
F 8.6 8.6 4.1 12.2 7.7 9.4 
Malawi 
O 8.3 8.0 - 16.0 6.0 11.0 
F 8.4 8.5 5.2 10.2 7.7 9.1 
Mali 
O 9.2 10.0 - 16.0 7.0 12.0 
F 9.2 9.3 4.0 13.6 8.4 10.2 
Mozambique 
O 9.7 10.0 - 16.0 8.0 12.0 
F 10.0 10.2 3.8 13.6 8.9 11.2 
Namibia 
O 10.6 11.0 - 16.0 9.0 13.0 
F 10.6 10.7 6.5 14.6 9.7 11.6 
Nigeria 
O 7.1 7.0 - 16.0 6.0 9.0 
F 7.2 7.0 4.8 10.7 6.3 7.8 
Senegal 
O 7.5 8.0 - 16.0 5.0 10.0 
F 7.6 7.7 1.0 12.9 6.3 9.2 
South Africa 
O 8.7 9.0 - 16.0 7.0 11.0 
F 8.8 9.1 1.8 12.1 7.6 10.1 
Tanzania 
O 10.3 11.0 - 16.0 8.0 13.0 
F 10.5 10.6 6.9 13.3 10.2 11.1 
Uganda 
O 9.6 10.0 - 16.0 8.0 11.0 
F 9.6 9.7 7.0 11.8 9.2 10.1 
Zambia 
O 8.2 8.0 - 16.0 7.0 10.0 
F 8.2 8.1 5.8 10.9 7.4 8.9 
Zimbabwe 
O 8.4 8.0 - 16.0 7.0 10.0 




Table 6.5: LegislativeScore, observed and ranked 
 
 Mean Median Min Max Lower quartile Upper quartile 
Cape Verde 7 7 - 16 4 9
Nigeria 7 7 - 16 6 9
Benin 7 7 - 16 5 10
Senegal 8 8 - 16 5 10
Zambia 8 8 - 16 7 10
Malawi 8 8 - 16 6 11
Zimbabwe 8 8 - 16 7 10
Kenya 8 9 - 16 7 10
Madagascar 8 9 - 16 7 11
South Africa 9 9 - 16 7 11
Lesotho 9 9 - 16 7 11
Mali 9 10 - 16 7 12
Ghana 9 10 - 16 8 12
Uganda 10 10 - 16 8 11
Mozambique 10 10 - 16 8 12
Botswana 10 10 - 16 8 12
Tanzania 10 11 - 16 8 13
Namibia 11 11 - 16 9 13
148 
6.5. The fitted LegislativeScore compared with the actual data 
 
The ratio R2 is called the coefficient of determination, with its values lying between 0 and 1, 
which provides a measure of goodness of fit; values closer to 1 imply a better fit. A value of 
R2 = 0 implies that there is no linear relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables (Statistics, 2008). The R2 for the fitted model for each country is presented in Table 
6.3. It varies between 0.086 in Botswana and 0.327 in Cape Verde. For data typically found 
in the social sciences, values for R2 as low as 0.25 are considered useful (Statistics, 2008). As 
is shown in Table 6.3, the R2 ratios are all significant (different from 0), but range between 




The model tested revealed that, overall, individuals’ political characteristics were more 
important concerning their assessment of the legislature than their intrinsic socioeconomic 
characteristics. As part of political characteristics, party allegiance and the perception of the 
fairness of elections were the most important independent variables determining the 
dependent variable – LegislativeScore.  
 
Party allegiance was one of the few variables that was seen to impact on the LegislativeScore 
in most countries – in 15 of the 18 countries. In all of these countries, citizens aligned with 
opposition parties gave a higher LegislativeScore. 
 
The perception of the fairness of elections influenced the LegislativeScore in fourteen of the 
eighteen countries. In these fourteen countries, those who perceived the elections to be 
‘completely free and fair’ consistently increased the score significantly.  
 
The findings reinforced the view that differences among countries matter when studying 






The Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 
 
The Mozambican Assembly is 31 years old. Seventeen of these were spent under a one-party 
regime and only 13 under a multiparty regime. Of the 17 years of one-party rule, 12 years 
were dominated by civil war. After only 13 years of the existence of a democratic 
dispensation, it is reasonable to state that the multiparty Assembly of Mozambique is still in 
its infancy. When assessing the performance or the role of the Mozambican Assembly, it is 
important to bear in mind (as with any other institution) its age and origin. These will 
influence the Assembly’s institutionalisation process and the level of institutionalisation 
achieved.  
 
Besides its postconflict nature, Mozambique’s former status as a colony of Portugal – which 
was itself ruled by an authoritarian regime at the time – meant that Mozambicans, including 
colonial Portuguese citizens, had not prior to independence experienced government and a 
political environment that included representative and legislative organisations. This 
characteristic distinguishes the legislature in Mozambique from other former European 
colonies in Africa. 
 
A political assembly came together for the first time in 1977 in Mozambique’s history. The 
meeting took place in the old cinema in Maputo, since there was no infrastructure for this 
purpose in the country at the time. This old colonial-era cinema, in the centre of the city, was 
adopted as the Assembly building from that date onwards. During the one-party regime, the 
parliament was known as the Popular Assembly (Assembleia Popular). Since 1994, with the 
introduction of the multiparty system, it has been called the Assembly of the Republic 
(Assembleia da República). 
 
At present, the Assembly comprises two political parties, which are the two parties that 
fought each other in the civil war. These two antagonistic parties have been seated side by 
side in the elected Assembly of the Republic since 1994. The country has already witnessed 
three legislative elections, in which (as shown in graph 7.1) FRELIMO has always achieved 
the majority of votes. In the first term, there was a third party involved, but from the second 
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term onwards, the Assembly has consisted of two parties only. 
151 
 
The RENAMO parliamentary group is at present a coalition between RENAMO and several 
small parties21. This coalition, however, has not prevented RENAMO from being the smallest 
parliamentary group in Mozambique’s multiparty history.  
 
Graph 7.1: Seat distribution in the Mozambican Assembly 
 
Source: (EISA, 2008f) 
 
FRELIMO and RENAMO’s co-existence within the Mozambican Assembly has been marked 
by apprehension and animosity. In December 1994, during the first session after the first 
multiparty elections, which took place in a tense environment, the main opposition party, 
RENAMO abandoned the plenary session as a result of a disagreement over procedures for 
the election of the speaker. Without procedural rules for the Assembly and without any 
experience whatsoever of how to conduct multiparty assemblies, the very first session ended 
in a crisis, with the interruption of the Assembly.  
 
Before 1994, FRELIMO deputies were chosen from among the ‘comrades’22, among whom 
there were high levels of trust. They were also used to ruling their own assembly. On the 
                                                 
21 The small parties are the following: Independent Alliance of Mozambique; Mozambican Nationalist Movement; 
National Convention Party; National Unity Party; Front of Patriotic Action; People's Party of Mozambique; United 
Front of Mozambique. Source: (EISA, 2008g) 
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other hand, subsequent to 1994, RENAMO deputies participated in a political assembly for 
the first time. As stated by one of the MPs at the time: “To FRELIMO, we RENAMO 
deputies were just a bunch of bandits, the new arrivals in town23” (Raul Domingos, interview 
with the author, 2007, February 20, Maputo). Unlike RENAMO, FRELIMO had experience 
of an assembly albeit under a one-party regime. None of the deputies had experience of being 
seated next to members of another political party. Apart from becoming familiar with all of 
the practicalities of an assembly, such as how to vote, how to take the floor and how to 
organise the agenda, the Mozambican deputies had first to learn how to be with the enemy 
after a civil war. The first challenge for the deputies was to move from being enemies to 
being political adversaries. Whether this has been achieved is still debatable. 
 
The history of Mozambique in the twentieth century is defined by long periods of war. The 
war against the ruling colonialists for independence was followed by a civil war after 
independence. Peace was only achieved in 1992, and since then the country has been the 
darling of the donor community. Its economic growth has been used as an example to the 
continent, with an annual growth rate of 8 percent and with low levels of inflation. 
Nevertheless, Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 70 percent of the 
population living below the poverty line. Life expectancy is approximately 40 years; 
illiteracy is extremely high24, most of the population is not able to read or write, and many 
have no understanding of the official language, Portuguese. 
 
Mozambique has 20.4 million inhabitants25, and 65 percent of the population lives in rural 
areas. Economic growth is mainly through foreign investment, for example, in aluminium 
production. However, it has been pointed out that the lack of tax revenues from these 
investments will be a medium- to long-term problem for the consolidation of the economy of 
the country. Mozambique is ranked one of the lowest countries on the UNDP Human 
Development Index for 2006 (UNDP, 2006), in 168th place among 177 countries classified 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 FRELIMO members used the socialist expression comrades to address or refer to one another; the expression is 
still used among the party members.  
23 Interview with Raul Domingos, former leader of RENAMO parliamentary group until 2000; currently president 
of the Party for Peace, Democracy, and Development.  
24 According to UNESCO, six out of ten Mozambicans are illiterate (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation [UNESCO], 2004).  
25 Instituto Nacional De Estatisticas Moçambique, http://www.ine.gov.mz/, online 29 September 2007. 
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by this index. It is important to bear in mind that the Mozambican population is extremely 
juvenile – four in ten Mozambicans are younger than 15 years old (UNDP, 2006). This means 
that most young Mozambican citizens were born after the peace agreement and during the 
period of democratisation. Elections have been part of their lives; however, this does not 
necessarily mean that democracy has been a part of their lives. 
 
7.1 The assembly and democratisation 
 
The transition to democracy in Mozambique occurred alongside the establishment of peace in 
the country. During both processes the Assembly was a key institution.  
 
Not much is known regarding the role of African parliaments in their democratisation 
processes. What is acknowledged is that many one-party assemblies have given way to 
assemblies comprising several political parties. There is the common conjecture that 
assemblies are important for democracy, although how these institutions have developed and 
what their importance is for the development and democratisation of these countries needs 
further investigation. It is evident that the democratisation wave of the 1990s replaced one-
party assemblies with elected multiparty assemblies in several countries. The Mozambican 
Assembly is one of these.  
 
The study of the Assembly of Mozambique yields important insights into the relationship 
between democratisation and legislatures. The Mozambican case shows that a constitutional 
design in which the legislature’s powers are extremely limited in relation to those of the 
executive will result in a stagnation of the democratisation process. The Mozambican 
Constitution grants almost no powers to the Assembly, and this correlates with the stagnation 
of the development of liberties in the country.  
 
The stagnation of the democratisation process is indicated by the Freedom House scores for 
Mozambique, which have remained unchanged with regard to political values and civil 
liberties since 1994. With the value for political rights being 3 and for civil rights being 4, the 
country has been classified as ‘partly free’ for more than a decade (Freedom House, 2007). 
As demonstrated in Graph 7.2, in the transition period from 1993 to 1994, there was 
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significant development with regard to political and civil liberties, but since 1994 there has 
been no sign of evolution.  
 
Graph 7.2: Mozambique’s Freedom House Scores 
 
Source: Freedom House, 2007 
 
Further evidence of the stagnation of the democratisation process in Mozambique is the low 
participation in the elections in 2004, together with the problematic electoral process. In this 
election the turnout declined drastically from that of previous elections. In 2004, only 36.3 
percent of the electorate voted, in contrast with a high turnout in 1994 of 87.9 percent, and in 
1999 of 68.1 percent. In addition, according to several international observers, the elections 
in 2004 exhibited grave irregularities. However, these irregularities seem not to have 
influenced the final result, since FRELIMO won by a comfortable margin. Electoral 
irregularities lead to a lack of trust in the democratisation process and raise tensions between 
political parties. Moreover, this state of affairs led to the exclusion of RENAMO from state 
functions, as was evident from RENAMO’s refusal in 2007 to participate in the anniversary 
of the peace agreement, and for the first time, the peace celebrations did not have the two 
political parties seated side-by-side (“Vitória retumbante manchada por má conduta”, 2005). 
 
In 1990, the one-party assembly in Mozambique approved a new constitution allowing the 
formation of political parties. This constitution was the foundation for the peace agreement 
signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO in 1992. Two years later, the country held its first 
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multiparty elections. Present in the Constitution of 1990 and retained in the revision of 2004 
is a constitutional design that stipulates a strong presidential system. The president has full 
powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet. The premier and the ministers can be dismissed 
individually and collectively by the president with no justification to any other institution. 
The only limit that the Mozambican president has regarding the investiture of the government 
is that the president can be forced to dismiss the premier and cabinet if the Assembly rejects 
the Government programme twice (Mozambique. Lei nº17/2007, 2007, Article 108).  
 
The choice of a strong presidential system where the president is absolved of public 
accountability was made by the former pre-1994 Assembly. However, this constitutional 
design was not challenged in the subsequent constitutional revisions. The maintenance of this 
constitutional design is an expression of the will of the two main political parties and not just 
the legacy of the authoritarian former one-party regime. RENAMO, the largest opposition 
party, has not challenged this constitutional design in several revisions of the Constitution.  
 
Since 1994, the country has been under the governance of the same political party, 
FRELIMO. After independence this former liberation movement with communism leanings 
became the governing regime. Since the first election in 1994, FRELIMO has won all the 
elections, with the exception of the municipal elections in 1998, where RENAMO won five 
municipalities. In the legislative and presidential elections in 2004, FRELIMO registered the 
highest vote. In the last presidential elections, FRELIMO presented the electorate with a new 
presidential candidate – Armando Guebuza. In doing this, the party respected the 
constitutional provision that establishes a limit of two terms for the presidency (Mozambique 
Constitution, Article 147, 2004). Besides the term limits, Joaquim Chissano, the president at 
that time, expressed no will to run for a third term, even though his party could have voted for 
a constitutional revision to allow him to do so. Even though the international community was 
pleased with Chissano’s governance, he faced serious popularity problems in his own country 
during his last term, with one of his sons allegedly involved in a financial scandal. 
 
Armando Guebuza was elected as FRELIMO’s secretary general at its eighth congress in 
2002 and became the party president in 2005. During the ninth party congress, he was re-
elected president of the party with 100 percent of the votes. At the same congress, held in 
November 2006 (“Congresso confirma Guebuza para Presidente da Frelimo”, 2006), 
Chissano was accorded the title of honorary president. Guebuza is the second elected 
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president of the country. His style is less conciliatory than that of Chissano. For instance, 
since being elected as president of the country, he has not met with the leader of the 
opposition. Guebuza’s presidency has been characterised by a cold relationship between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO, with the latter accusing FRELIMO of showing a lack of tolerance 
and exhibiting an uncooperative attitude. RENAMO for the first time refused to participate in 
the 15th anniversary of the official commemoration of the peace agreement. Instead, Afonso 
Dlakhama met his RENAMO party members in their party office and read out his speech, 
which stated, “Our country is sick. The tyranny is back.” (“Renamo exclui-se do programa 
oficial”, 2007)26. 
 
Mozambique was included in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, launched in 2007, 
using 2005 data. It was ranked 23rd out of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa27. Placed in 
the middle of the table, the country is rated as doing well, at least in relation to the rest of the 
continent. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation awards an annual prize to a former African president 
for his contribution to governance and democracy. Joaquim Chissano won the first Mo 
Ibrahim prize for excellence in his leadership of Mozambique28 (African Monitor: African 
Voices for African Development, 2007). The Foundation’s press release indicated that one of 
the reasons for the choice of Chissano was his decision not to seek a third presidential term, 
and that, according to the Foundation, reinforced Mozambique’s democracy. Even though 
there are term limits, Africa knows several examples of presidents that at the last moment 
have tried to change the constitution to allow them one more term.  
 
Chissano signed the peace agreement in 1992, and during his two presidential terms had a 
cordial relationship with Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of RENAMO. The relationship 
between the President of the Republic and Dhlakama appears to have deteriorated with the 
arrival of Armando Guebuza. Across the political divide, Dhlakama has been accused of 
nepotism within his own party. In the last elections, Raúl Domingos, former parliamentary 
                                                 
26 Jornal Noticias, Maputo, 5 de Outubro de 2007 article ‘Renamo exclui-se do programa oficial'. Translation by the 
author. Original: ”O nosso país está doente. Os tiranos estão de volta, a democracia está em perigo e nós, homens 
e mulheres da Renamo temos que estar preparados para fazer o que for preciso em sua salvação 
27 This ranking measures the quality of governance, assessing five areas: safety and security, rule of law, 
transparency and corruption, participation and human rights, sustainable economic development, human 
development. See http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/index2.asp online October 10, 2007. 
28 See http://www.africanmonitor.org/node/103 
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leader of RENAMO, was expelled from the party, despite the general perception that he was 
a potential candidate for the leadership of the party.   
 
7.1.1 The foundation – the Popular Assembly  
 
The creation of the Popular Assembly was decided at the third FRELIMO congress, in 1977. 
In the following year a new constitution was drawn up. The 1978 Constitution differs from 
the Constitution of 1975 in its attempt to separate executive and legislative powers in 
government.  
 
The Constitution of 1975 vested six institutions with law-making powers. These included the 
Central Committee of FRELIMO, the Executive Committee of FRELIMO, the Permanent 
Committee of the Popular Assembly, the President of the Republic, the organs of the Popular 
Assembly, and the Council of Ministers. The Constitution of 1978 reduced these organs to 
four, slashing the power of the Executive Committee of FRELIMO and of the President.  
 
The permanent committee of the Popular Assembly was composed of deputies elected by the 
Legislature but proposed by the Central Committee of FRELIMO. This structure created a 
situation where there was no distinction between the Central Committee of FRELIMO and 
the Permanent Committee of the Popular Assembly. According to research by Macuane, 
decisions by the Permanent Committee were then taken for ratification to the plenary, which 
approved them with almost no exception, and unanimously with no debate (Macuane, 2000). 
Only in 1987 did the plenary of the Assembly acquire importance relating to the approval of 
legislation. This change was a result of the alteration of the Constitution (Mozambique 
Constitution, 1986) and of the standing orders in 1986. Among other amendments was the 
creation of three separate functions, namely, the President of the Republic, the President of 
the Assembly and the Premier. Up to this point in time, the President of the Republic also 
served as the President of the Popular Assembly.  
 
In 1990, with the Constitution that initiated the process of installing multiparty rule, the 
Permanent Committee’s law-making role was even further reduced, this function 
subsequently being more centralised in the plenary Assembly. 
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7.2. Development of the Assembly  
 
The institutional capacity of a legislature is limited primarily by the level of powers 
provided by the constitution. But the assembly’s capacity to perform its tasks will also is 
the consequence of a collection of different variables such as its party system, its 
resources, and its structure. Joel Barkan (2005) defined a set of seven variables to evaluate 
the way that legislatures are emerging in Africa. These include the pressures of patron-
client politics, the formal rules, the level of legislative salaries, the collective resources 
and capacity of the legislature, the type of electoral system for converting votes into seats, 
and the presence of a coalition of reformers and/or opportunists.  
 
An attempt to measure the institutionalisation of a legislature was first made by Nelson 
Polsby (1968) using the House of Commons. This concern with measuring 
institutionalisation is related to the belief that the level of institutionalisation will affect 
the political effectiveness of an institution. Polsby (1968) defined three criteria that a 
legislature needs to fulfil to be considered institutionalised. According to Polsby (1968), a 
legislature is in a positive process of institutionalisation when it progressively becomes 











Bounded – autonomy in 
relation to other 
institutions.  Yes No 
The Mozambican 
legislature is not 
independent of the 
political parties. 
Complexity – the 
organisation needs to be 
relatively complex with 
regard to its rules, its 
division of work, and its 
hierarchy. 
Yes No 
There has been an 
effort to move towards 
this. However, there 
are still noticeable 
deficiencies.  
Universalistic – that is, 
the organisation should 




The first symptom that 
this criterion has not 
been fulfilled is that 
not all deputies have 
the opportunity to 
belong to working 
committees.  
    
 
This analysis of the institutionalisation of the Mozambican Assembly reveals that there is 
still a long way to go along the route to institutionalisation. However, as stated previously, 
this judgment should be balanced by the fact that this weakness is in part caused by the 
constitution, which gives almost total power to the president of the republic. This does not 
equate to saying that the lack of institutionalisation is a result of the constitutional 
limitation of powers. Besides the constitutional limitation, the Mozambican Assembly 
struggles with other limitations.  
 
There are several challenges that the Mozambican Assembly faces. The first is that the 
Assembly is hostage to an electoral and party system that restricts parliamentary 
autonomy. The ruling party holds the majority of parliamentary seats, and this reduces the 
deputies of the ruling party to one solid block protecting the Executive. This situation is 
reinforced by an electoral system that makes the deputies dependent on the party’s 
hierarchy. In Barkan’s (1979, 2005) research, it was found that patron-client relations 
provide an incentive for constituency work. Even though the Mozambican deputies are 
also under the influence of patron-client relations, the result is the opposite. The reason 
for this is that in Mozambique patron-client relations exist mainly within the party. The 
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electoral system, being a proportional party, closed-list system, forces the deputies to be 
obedient to their political party above anything else. 
 
The autonomy of the institution in relation to other organisations and groups – that is, its 
demarcation from other organisations in the political system, including from the political 
parties – is seen as an essential feature of the development of a legislature. This is the 
main challenge that the Mozambican Parliament faces. In a state where the ruling party 
dominates all state structures, the Assembly is no exception, even though it is the 
institution where the opposition plays a role. There was a positive signal contradicting this 
characteristic when a few deputies were expelled from RENAMO, and the Assembly did 
not comply with RENAMO’s request to expel them. On the contrary, there was 
institutional solidarity, and the deputies kept their places and all their benefits. It is 
questionable whether this would have occurred if the deputies had belonged to 
FRELIMO.  
 
For a country that is a beneficiary of substantial international aid, international support for 
the institutionalisation of the Assembly has been negligible. On the contrary, that the 
country is a recipient of large quantities of international aid actually undermines the 
Assembly’s oversight function with regard to the executive. This is because negotiations 
between the donors and the executive exclude the Assembly, meaning that it is the 
international community that effectively negotiates and judges the executive’s actions. 
 
This situation illustrates how the international community can support and promote the 
democratisation process by giving substantial financial support for elections but 
simultaneously create circumstances that represent serious obstacles for democratic 
consolidation. This includes supporting a constitutional design that contains dubious 
checks and balances of power, and preventing the Assembly from performing its 
oversight function. In addition, the international community has given little support to the 
Assembly’s development. There have been sporadic projects by a few donors but no 
formal strategy plotted by these donors to manage and support aid to the country. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the Assembly’s buildings are still those of the 1970s one-party 
Assembly. Only the more recent buildings, which were constructed after 1992, were 
funded by the Chinese government. 
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The institutionalisation of the Mozambican Assembly has not been a priority for the 
international community. Between 1995 and 1998, United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) funded a project to improve the efficiency of the legislature, but it 
ran only from 1995 to 1997, while the United Nations for Development Programme 
(UNDP) rolled out one project and is starting their second project. However, these efforts 
are not part of a collective effort by the group of donors, constituted to manage aid to the 
country.  
 
The rhetoric used in the plenary debates in Mozambique is often not polite. This feature 
could reflect the embryonic stage of development of the legislature. This characteristic 
was noted with regard to the debates within the fledgling US Congress, as Polsby reveals, 
citing Thomas Reed as saying “These were not pleasant days. Men were not nice in their 
treatment of each other (...)” (Polsby, 1968, p. 167). In the early days of the US Congress, 
it seems that the environment was characterised as an ‘era of guns and dogs’ (Polsby, 
1968, p.168). The Mozambican Parliament appears still to be in the era of impolite 
language, but this has begun to improve.  
 
The legislatures that have been established in the recent wave of democratisation in Africa 
have faced the challenge of rapid development. The democratisation processes in the 
1990s were high-speed processes. With elections being supported by the international 
community, international advocacy for democratisation, and the exposure that citizens had 
to global events through the media, the political process did not lead the way. On the 
contrary, first-world influences led the changes. This context meant that these assemblies 
did not have, as their counterparts in Western societies had, decades or centuries to 
undertake their development. For this reason, these legislatures faced the challenge of 
actively promoting their institutionalisation as a strategy, rather than allowing it to 
develop as a natural process, as happened with these institutions in Western societies.  
 
The focus on institutionalisation over a short time span carries the risk of generating an 
increase in the complexity of the structure that will not necessarily mean 
institutionalisation. As noted by Polsby (1968), an increase in hierarchical structure is not 
a necessary attribute of the institutionalisation process. Polsby (1968) states that 
organisations other than bureaucracies have uniformly centralised patterns of authority.  
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Polsby (1968) pioneered the use of turnover of members to measure the level of 
institutionalisation of an Assembly, a feature that years later Hibbings (1999, p. 33) 
questioned: “The indicators of institutionalisation actually could be seen as an indicator of 
the absence of institutionalisation – an inability of the institution to quash variance in 
individual members”. To Hibbings (1999, p. 158), institutionalisation occurs when the 
turnover of members has minimal impact on the institution, and judgement of this 
criterion should also take into account the level of turnover. A high turnover can also 
reveal an increase in uncertainty. The Mozambican Assembly is in only its third cycle of 
turnover and it is thus too early to draw conclusions related to the turnover of its 
members.  
 
Hibbings’ (1999) findings, which correlated the development of the legislature with the 
surrounding environment, can be utilised to assist in an understanding of the Mozambican 
case. Hibbings noticed that members of parliament play according to the rules of the 
political game, which have mainly originated in the political parties and not in the 
legislature. This is observable in the Mozambican Assembly.  
 
It becomes virtually impossible to consider legislative 
institutionalisation without considering political parties. What we 
find is that individual members have been rendered relatively 
inconsequential by an institutionalising process, but parties and not 
the legislatures are primarily responsible for this effect. The parties 
are very good at obtaining the kind of behaviour they want, 
effectively reducing legislators, in many systems, to little more than 
drones (Hibbings, 1999, p. 159-160). 
 
In cases such as the Mozambican one, where the political parties control the parliamentary 
rules, institutionalisation will depend on the will of the political parties. Based on the 
example of the House of Commons in the UK, Hibbings (1999) shows that political 
systems lead the process of legislative institutionalisation. This prompts the important 
deduction that that there is a variation in the potential of an assembly to operate the 
institutionalisation process. Hibbings states in this regard, “... legislative 
institutionalisation itself should not be expected to be identical across legislatures in 
different political systems” (Hibbings, 1999, p. 162). This idea is central to the study of 
institutionalisation in legislatures, since it reveals that it is an error to believe that 
legislatures can develop autonomously. For this reason, Hibbings is sceptical in applying 
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the rigorous operationalisation theory developed by Polsby (1968) to measure legislative 
institutionalisation.  
 
Legislatures are designed to be in tune with their environment, not to 
develop boundaries cordoning off that environment. If 
institutionalisation is the process of an organisation isolating itself from 
its environment by developing distinctive norms, idiosyncratic inside 
lingo, magnificent infrastructures, and unique career tracks, legislatures 
are simply unable to go very far down the road of institutionalisation .... 
the process of institutionalisation cannot continue without an 
organisation – any organisation - becoming too complex, too rigid, and 
too isolated from its environment. (Hibbings, 1999, p. 161-162). 
 
Mozambique is a poor country. Development is at the top of the official agenda of the 
government and donor organisations. With regard to this, good governance and efficiency 
are goals for the national budget. This raises the question of how an assembly can be 
involved in the development of the country. The Assembly involves discussion, 
contradiction, and voting, and these processes are by definition time-consuming and 
therefore may not seem efficient. This problem raises the question of what role parliament 
should play in the development of the country. This question is even more pertinent to a 
country like Mozambique, where the two parties never collaborate, which means that 
opposing members of Parliament are constantly involved in political party struggles. This 
slows down and complicates the procedures of governance. On the opposite side of the 
coin, if the Assembly is not involved, how it could oversee and contribute to the political 
process is unclear. Efficiency may be compromised by the lengthy processes involved in 
the Assembly, but there is a gain in accountability.  
 
The Mozambican Parliament has various limitations, but without doubt, it is the only state 
institution that keeps the executive’s activities in the public eye. This seems to be a last 
resort practice of parliaments in developing countries (Smith & Muslof, 1979, p. 29). In 
many countries, legislatures help keep the activities of the executive in the public view.  
 
It is evident that the Assembly did not start from scratch the day after independence, but it 
is also important to realise that initially there were no rules, procedures, and coexistence 
patterns among parliamentarians, and between parliamentarians and the staff of the 
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Assembly. Even the South African parliament, which had inherited a partial29 multiparty 
structure, had to contend with inherited white staff with years of experience in a 
nondemocratic state.  
 
It is therefore obvious that these legislatures are still institutionalising procedures, rules 
and work habits. The scarce literature on African legislatures is mainly confined to works 
on former British or French colonies. Mozambique was a Portuguese colony, which is 
important for the analysis of its legislature, since Portugal was not a democracy at the 
time that Mozambique’s attained independence. As a consequence, Portugal’s colonies 
had not observed any legislative practices upon which to build. However, their colonial 
legacy did not prevent the Mozambican Parliament from reproducing their model. Even 
though there are currently institutional similarities to the present Portuguese model, the 
political system is substantially different. The similarities are more a result of the 
cooperation that exists between the Portuguese-speaking countries, as the common 
language helps the sharing of procedures, documentation and expertise. For instance, in 
1994 the Mozambican Assembly used the Cape Verdean standing orders as a foundation 
for its standing orders. This Lusophone cooperation appears to be nourishing a system 
distinct from the Francophone and Westminster models.  
 
Mozambique has a diversity of mother tongues. According to the census of 1997, the 
language most spoken at home is Emakhuwa (26.3 percent), followed by Xichangana 
(11.4 percent), and last, Portuguese, the only official language, which is the home tongue 
of 6.5 percent of the population30. The variety of languages does not appear to be an 
obstacle for the workings of the Mozambican Parliament though. This is unlike the 
situation in the Senegalese Parliament, according to Thomas and Sissokho (2005), in 
which many of its members do not speak French, limiting their participation. In 
Mozambique there is no disagreement regarding the use of Portuguese within the 
                                                 
29 The South African Parliament before 1994 comprised three houses: The House of Assembly (White 
representatives), the House of Representatives (Coloured representatives), and the House of Delegates 
(Indian representatives). This tricameral system was created in 1977. See for example 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/official%20docs/tricameral-parliament.htm, online 1 
September.  
 
30 See official site Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas  
http://www.ine.gov.mz/censos_dir/recenseamento_geral/estudos_analise/lingua, online 10 September 2007. 
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Assembly. On the contrary, having Portuguese as the official language is seen as a 
unifying and equalising force.  
 
There are many steps that the Mozambican Parliament still needs to take before it can be 
considered fully institutionalised. However, there are positive achievements that, in 
fairness, need to be mentioned. The Mozambican Parliament removed political conflict 
from the general population, and has been a political platform and resource for the 
opposition. It has aided political parties with recruitment and has made an effort to 
improve its internal structure.  
 
Definitely on the ascendancy trend, this effort carries an inherent risk that 
institutionalisation will instead result in a centralised bureaucracy. The Assembly has 
provided a ‘porthole’ view of the executive and has facilitated international networking 
for members of both parties and for the institution itself. In addition, as mentioned above, 
it has been the only place where the previous enemies have been able to become political 
adversaries. 
 
7.3 The Assembly in the multiparty context - the constitutional 
framework 
 
The assembly is the weakest link with regard to constitutional powers, comprising the 
junction between the executive and the legislative components of government. The 
Mozambican Assembly does not have any power regarding the formation of government. 
The power to appoint and dismiss the government (individually or collectively) is 
centralised in the figure of the president. The single exception is that the president can be 
forced to dismiss his newly appointed premier and cabinet in the event of the 
government’s programme being rejected for a second time (Mozambique, 2007, Artigo 
108) when it is presented for the approval of the Assembly. Conversely, rejection of the 
programme, as a consequence, can result in the dissolution of the Assembly by the 
president (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 188). Logically, this clause discourages a vote 
against the programme by the deputies. In reality, this scenario is difficult to imagine, 
since the majority of FRELIMO party members give unconditional support to the 
government.  
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The Council of Ministers is presided over by the president of the Republic (Mozambique, 
2004a, Article 160), and therefore, the president is the head of the government. The 
president appoints and dismisses the government at will. The president is only 
accountable to the Assembly with regard to giving his ‘annual information’, and this 
presentation is not subject to debate (Mozambique, 2007, Article 21). The president is 
excluded from any obligation to answer to the Assembly or to be present at sittings of the 
Assembly. The Assembly, however, can force other members of the government to be 
present and to answer questions. This power of the Assembly is limited though to verbal 
reprimand, since the Assembly does not have the power to dismiss the government 
collectively, or to dismiss individuals within the government. In fact, as was previously 
mentioned, the only power that the Assembly has is the power to reject the government’s 
programme. Finally, the Mozambican constitution does not make provisions for censuring 
of the government by the Assembly. 
 
Its constitutional powers relative to those of the president and the government definitely 
make the Assembly the weakest link among the political institutions in Mozambique. This 
condition is further highlighted by the constitutional division between the president and 
the government concerning their accountability to the Assembly. A paradoxical situation 
exists in which the president is the head of the government, but with reference to the 
accountability of the government to the Assembly, the government is represented in the 
Assembly by the prime minister. If the Assembly’s power in relation to the government is 
weak, then with regard to the president, the power of the Assembly is non-existent. 
Actually, the President – in constitutional terms – is not accountable to any state 
institution. The only provision limiting presidential power is that the Assembly can 
require the attorney general to initiate a penal process against the president, which to be 




7.3.1 The president, the Permanent Committee and the general secretary 
 
In 2004, with the objective of improving the Assembly’s administrative structure, the 
Organic Law was enacted, whereby the management of the Assembly was allocated to the 
president of the assembly, the permanent committee and the general secretary 
(Mozambique, 2004b, Article 8). 
7.3.2 The president of the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 
 
The president of the Assembly is the second-ranking figure in the state hierarchy of the 
Republic of Mozambique. It is the president of the Assembly who replaces the president 
of the republic in cases of incapacity or an absence from the national territory 
(Mozambique, 2004a, Article 151). Moreover, it is constitutionally forbidden for the 
president of the Assembly and the president of the country to be absent simultaneously 
from the country. 
 
The president of the Assembly has full powers to convene the Assembly. It is his or her 
responsibility to ensure that the Assembly’s instructions are respected, to sign all 
legislation approved by the Assembly, and to represent the Assembly both nationally and 
internationally. Also, and not least important, it is the president’s function to promote the 
Assembly’s relations with the remaining state institutions and with the emerging 
provincial assemblies.  
 
In addition, the president of the Assembly supervises the administration and financial and 
asset management of the Assembly, and can delegate the day-to-day running of the 
Assembly to the general secretary in matters such as the recruitment of staff. Furthermore, 




Mozambique’s Assembly consists of 250 deputies elected from a closed party-list system 
in 11 multi-member constituencies made up of the provinces (12 to 50 representatives for 
each, based on population). In addition, there are two single-member constituencies, 
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corresponding to the Mozambican communities on the continents of Europe and Africa, 
respectively. The seats are allocated according to the d’Hondt31 method and the mandate 
is for the same period as applies to the legislature, which in normal circumstances is five 
years (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 170). Each deputy is entrusted to represent the entire 
country and not only the district in which he or she is elected (Mozambique, 2004a, 
Article 168) 
 
In the event of suspension, resignation or justifiable absence, the deputy will be 
substituted, either temporarily or permanently. In the event of replacement, the deputy 
will be substituted by the next candidate on the party list. Suspension will be considered 
once justification is given as to why the deputy has asked to be absent from parliament. 
When or if the deputy returns to parliament, the substitute’s functions terminate, and the 
incumbent deputy is concurrently reinstated (Mozambique, 1995). Normally, suspension 
occurs when deputies are appointed to take office in government, as was the case with the 
14 FRELIMO deputies that were replaced in February 2005 as a result of their nomination 
to the government.  
 
Several other functions are considered incompatible with the position of deputy. These are 
judge, career diplomat, a position in active law enforcement (the police or military), 
provincial governor, district administrator, or member of a municipal organisation 
(Mozambique, 2004a, Article 171). 
 
To offer oneself as a potential member of parliament, one has to be over 18 and be 
included on one of the parties’ candidate lists, since only political parties are allowed to 
contest the legislative elections (Mozambique, 2004a, Article 169). The party lists can 
include independent individuals as an alternative to party members. Until recently, the 
electoral law had a legal constraint that specified a minimum of 5 percent of the national 
quota in order for a party to hold a seat in parliament. In March 2007, the electoral law 
was altered and this clause was abolished. This modification is expected to permit small 
parties to hold seats in the Assembly. If the five percent quota had existed in the last 
                                                 
31 “Method of voting for several electoral candidates, usually members of the same political party, with one 
mark on the ballot.” (List system, 2009,  p. 1)  
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election, the PDD party 32, led by the former RENAMO member Raúl Domingos, would 
have had a presence in parliament. 
 
Constitutionally, Mozambican deputies are vested with the power to initiate legislation 
(Mozambique, 2004a, Article 183); however, this is far from common practice, as a 
consequence of the party’s strict discipline and the centralised control that the deputies 
have over their parties. 
 
The literature on African legislatures covers the role that African parliamentarians play in 
the local development of their regions (Barkan, 1979; Hopkins, 1979; Le Vine, 1979; 
Mezey, 1983; Thomas & Sissokho, 2005). Thomas & Sissokho (2005), in their analysis of 
the Senegalese legislature, conclude that the deputies, confronted with a lack of formal 
legislative power, make informal appeals to the executive ‘behind-the-scenes’ through 
party structures.  
 
However, for a Mozambican deputy it is problematic to appeal to the executive, even 
behind the scenes. The reasons for this differ for the deputies of FRELIMO and 
RENAMO. The FRELIMO deputy is usually hierarchically inferior within the party 
structure and therefore to his or her comrade the executive member. This condition makes 
the parliamentarian powerless over the executive. For the RENAMO deputy, as a result of 
the deep divide between this party and FRELIMO, it is difficult to liaise with members of 
the government in a friendly and informal manner. This type of informal contact would 
also not be tolerated by the deputies of RENAMO’s coalition partners.  
 
The rhetorical language used in the plenary is antagonistic from both parliamentarian 
groups, with debates ending in severe quarrels. Plenary debates frequently degenerate into 
personal jibes or into accusations concerning the political pasts of both political parties.  
 
As has been stated, the official language used in the Assembly is Portuguese. The 
standing orders offer the deputies the opportunity to use a local language, but if they do 
this, they need to provide a translation for the rest of the Assembly. It seems that there is 
no controversy concerning the issue of language in the Assembly.  
                                                 
32 PDD – Partido para a a Paz e a Democracia. See the political party website 
http://www.pdd.org.mz/Pdd_Hstorial.htm (online May 24, 2007) 
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After three multiparty legislative sessions, parliament has started to employ some deputies 
with accumulated experience. Examining the parties’ turnover rate of deputies, we note 
the following trends. Under FRELIMO, roughly 47 percent of deputies kept their seats for 
successive terms for Assemblies IV-VI, that is, a 53 percent turnover. For RENAMO, the 
turnover is higher than for FRELIMO; for their first inclusion in the multiparty Assembly 
it exceeded 60 percent, and increased to 70 percent for Assemblies V-VI, that is, 30 
percent of deputies stayed on. 
 
Table 7. 2: Turnover of deputies in the Mozambican Assembly 
 FRELIMO RENAMO 
Before 1994: Popular Assembly 250 0 
1994-1999: Assembly of the Republic 129 112 
TURNOVER 61 (47.2%) 43 (38.4%) 
1999-2004: Assembly of the Republic 133 117 
TURNOVER 63 (47.3%) 35 (29.9%) 
2004-: Assembly of the Republic 160 90 
 
Within FRELIMO, the recent turnover of deputies was approximately 60 percent. As 
stated by one of the previous FRELIMO deputies, the party will usually introduce new 
members between sessions amounting to 40 percent of its seats and carry over the 
remaining 60 percent. In the last election, due to the new party leadership, this tendency 
was inverted to 60 percent new members and 40 percent returning deputies. 
 
Regarding the infrastructural resources available to deputies, there is not much other than 
common areas in the National Assembly. The deputies do not have offices or any 




7.3.4 Working committees 
 
The Mozambican Assembly has eight working committees. Each committee covers more 
than one policy area. These include:  
 
1. The Committee for Planning and the Budget  
2. The Committee for Social Affairs, Gender and the Environment  
3. The Committee for Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and 
Local Government  
4. The Committee for Economic Affairs and Services  
5. The Committee for Defence and Public Order  
6. The Committee for International Relations  
7. The Committee for Judiciary Issues, Human Rights and Law  
8. The Committee for Petitions 
 
Because each committee embraces a range of diverse issues, it is questionable whether the 
deputies can be focused on such different spheres. Each committee has a meeting room 
and a support room. The staff and the leadership of the committee share the support room. 
There are three staff assistants for each committee, most of whom have a university 
education. 
 
The working committee meetings take place within the session sittings. The committees 
meet once a week, normally on Mondays. Since each session lasts 45 days on average, the 
working committees comprise around six working days per session. 
 
Each committee consists of 15 effective deputies and five substitutes33. A deputy is not 
allowed to belong to more than two committees. The number of seats and the presidencies 
of the committees are distributed according to the proportion of seats for each 
parliamentary group. The importance of the working committees has increased since 2001 
                                                 
33 The Standing Orders, Article 40, stipulate that the working committees can have between 5 and 15 deputies. 
While the option exists to allocate the maximum value for each, there are 120 deputies who have not been 
allocated to working committees. 
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with the revised standing orders, which gave the committees the predominant role of 
debating and originating legislation. 
 
The allocations of seats and the chairs of the committees are based on each political 
party’s proportion of seats in the plenary. Only 120 deputies of the 250 have places on the 
working committees. The decision concerning the inclusion of deputies on the committees 
is made exclusively by the parliamentary groups and is then approved by a plenary 
resolution. Inclusion on a working committee is considered an important achievement 
within the party’s parliamentary hierarchy and among the general staff of the Assembly. 
Belonging to a working committee also means a substantial increase in the deputy’s 
remuneration.   
 
Given that each session lasts a few months, legislative outputs are expected by the 
executive, with no delays that would result in the postponement of the following session. 
For this reason, there is a lot of pressure on the committees to take the legislation that was 
introduced by the executive to the plenary. For example, the new labour law was 
introduced by the executive at the beginning of the first session of 2007. In the last week 
of the session, it was still under review by the committee. Under pressure from the 
executive, it was decided to extend the working hours of the committee. This decision was 
announced by the chair of the committee without the requisite justification to the minister. 
 
Mozambique’s Assembly has a working committee known as the Petitions Committee. A 
petition is sent by citizens through a simple fax or letter addressed to the speaker. The 
matters raised include complaints of abuse of power or violation of the law by a political 
figure, enterprise, or public administrator. In the plenary (Mozambique, 2007, Article 85), 
each petition has to be read. As a result of the affairs covered by this committee, the 
plenary of the last session of 2006 was closed to the media and public for the first time in 
the history of the multiparty Mozambican Parliament. According to some MPs and 
journalists, the reasons were that important FRELIMO figures were referred to in the 
complaints. Others justified the closing of the plenary on grounds that the complaints 
concerned private companies, the owners of which were MPs from both parties.  
 
The premise for closing the plenary to the public was based on a constitutional provision 
that establishes the principle of honour. However, invoking this provision was not 
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approved by the opposition, who did not accept the move and voted against it in protest. 
The petitions are numerous and the working committee struggles to deal with all of them. 
In many instances, the committee finds that the petition relates to a past court case which 
is out of its jurisdiction. A proposal has been tabled to change the petitions system in 
order to avoid the endless repetitive petitions that have been addressed to the National 
Assembly over the years.  
 
7.3.5 The Permanent Committee  
 
The Permanent Committee is the body that coordinates the entire Assembly. It sets the 
plenary’s agenda and the Assembly’s calendar, decides on the creation of task forces, 
coordinates relations with the other state institutions, and administers the Assembly’s 
budget and services. The Permanent Committee is elected at the beginning of each term 
and consists of 15 deputies, the president, and one vice-president from each political 
party. The rest of the seats are distributed in accordance with the proportionality of the 
parties in the Assembly (Mozambique, 2007, Article 44).  
 
In 2004, with the objective of improving the structure of the Assembly’s administration, 
The Organic Law (Mozambique, 2004b) was enacted, whereby the management of the 
Assembly was allocated to the president of the Assembly, to the Permanent Committee 
and to the general secretary (Mozambique, 2004b, Article 8) The Organic Law establishes 
a consultative council administrative body. The general secretary is appointed by the 
president. Requirements state that the incumbent must be a civil servant with a minimum 
of ten years’ experience (Mozambique, 2004b, article 25). 
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7.3.6 Parliamentary groups  
 
The Mozambican Parliament suffers from what Braga da Cruz (1995) calls ‘partycracy’ 
(in an allusion to the Portuguese Parliament), since, “there is an undeniable supremacy 
from the political parties in the creation of the electoral and parliamentary will” (Braga da 
Cruz, 1995, p. 189).  
 
The power of the parties starts with the electoral process, with parties monopolising the 
power to present candidates. As a consequence, the elected deputies view loyalty to the 
party as natural. Party discipline can be enforced strongly, as a violation can result in the 
removal of the perpetrator’s name from the party list in the next election.  
 
The structure of parliament is determined by the parliamentary groups, as are time 
allocated on the floor and the allocation of places in working committees; legislation is 
initiated only with the agreement of the political parties.  
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Few deputies can have the luxury of viewpoints outside their party’s orientation. Only the 
RENAMO-Electoral Union deputy, Maximo Dias34, is noted by his colleagues and the 
media for his relative ‘freedom’ from party constraints. His freedom results mainly from 
his position as leader of one of the small parties, which has links with RENAMO35. 
 
Leadership of a parliamentary group is obviously an important party position. Both 
parliamentary groups elect a leader from among their peers. However, this ‘election’ has 
always been proposed by the party's leader, with no controversy or dispute.  
 
Oddly, RENAMO has been more unstable with regard to maintaining the leadership of its 
parliamentary group than FRELIMO. In the first two multiparty terms, Armando 
Guebuza, current president of the country, was the parliamentary leader of FRELIMO. 
This contrasts with RENAMO, which has changed the leadership of its parliamentary 
group in each legislative term  
 
Table 7. 3: Parliamentary group leadership 
 FRELIMO RENAMO 
1994 Armando Emilio Guebuza Raúl Manuel Domingos 
1999 Armando Emilio Guebuza Ussufo Quitine 
2004 Manuel Tomé Maria Moreno 
 
An odd aspect of RENAMO’s behaviour towards the Assembly is the total absence of its 
leader from this institution. In fact Afonso Dlakhama was never a candidate for the 
Assembly. The RENAMO leader has never had exposure to any parliamentarian 
                                                 
34 It is common news that the Mozambican Parliament notes the exceptional behaviour of Maximo Dias. See, 
for example, one of the news reports about the provincial elections from the international Mozambican news 
agency: “Only one deputy, Maximo Dias, of the RENAMO Electoral Union opposition coalition, pointed 
out that the amendments do not address the main problem, which is the sheer lack of time to organise decent 
elections, if they are to be held in January.” http://allafrica.com/stories/200710110859.html, online 11 
October, 2007.  
35 In an interview with the author, the deputy stated that he had already told the leader of RENAMO that he 
would not participate during the next term. Interview with the author, 2 August 2007. 
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experience. Furthermore, it is not known whether he ever participated in any formal event 
in the Assembly of the Republic. There have been different speculations regarding 
Dlakhama’s decision. Some argue that this attitude is related to the traditional concept of 
the ‘African chief’ who cannot be exposed. Others argue that Dlakhama is awaiting his 
election as president, and therefore will not deign to be a deputy; he sees no point in being 
part of the Assembly. Whatever the reasons for Dlakhama’s decision, the effect is harmful 
for RENAMO’s long-term performance. Parliament is the only public space in the 
political arena of the country where opposition and ruling party function together. 
Dlakhama’s absence wastes an opportunity to strengthen the political dialogue between 
the two. In addition, media coverage of the Assembly is particularly significant during the 
session periods, and the absence of the RENAMO leader from the Assembly removes him 
from the debate. This bizarre political strategy from the opposition leader also suggests a 
lack of confidence in parliament as the dominant mainstream political institution.  
 
The absence of the leader of the opposition from the Assembly and the constitutional 
requirement that the president of the republic need attend the Assembly only once a year 
means the main political institution functions without the two main political figures of the 
country. The Assembly can hold major national debates, but the country knows that they 
were not debated at the highest level of the political parties.  
 
In the Mozambican Parliament, party discipline is practised within the ruling party and by 
the opposition party. This practice seems to be contrary to the practices in other 
parliaments in the post-communist era, where there is a rejection of the principle of tight 
party discipline36.  
 
All over the world, party systems shape the structure of the legislature and relations 
between the executive and legislature. The latter relates to whether the head of the 
government has control of the party with the majority of seats. Morgensen applied the two 
classic indexes in four Latin American countries and in the US: the range of the index 
varies from 1.96 in Chile to 7.98 in Brazil (Morgensen & Nacif, 2002, p. 429)  
 
                                                 
36 See for example Carey, Formanek, & Karpowicz (1999).  
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Mozambique is a one-party-dominant political system. As demonstrated in the table 
above, its rating on the Laakso & Taagepera indexes is consistently low and has been 
falling with each term.  
 
The serious division between the two parties was evident in a speech given in the 
Assembly at the closing of the first plenary session of 2007 by the leader of the 
FRELIMO caucus, when he criticised the behaviour of the opposition. He accused the 
opposition of using insults, lies and speculation in their interactions with FRELIMO. “In 
truth, at several points during this session, the minority opposition made the insult, the lie, 
... using political drama and even religious drama as the basis of behaviour in the plenary” 
(Tomé, 2007). 
 
FRELIMO was constituted in 1962 in Tanzania with the aim of fighting for Mozambican 
independence. In 1974 the party signed an agreement of independence with Portugal, the 
ruling colonial power. In the decades after independence, FRELIMO developed a one-
party regime based on a communist model. FRELIMO is simultaneously the party, the 
state and the country. There is no differentiation between these roles. The party was born 
before the state, and this creates a paternalistic legitimacy, since for FRELIMO, the 
country exists because of the party. This notion of legitimacy has translated into an 
attitude of ownership of the country. This can be seen as a version of absolute 
monarchism (‘L´État c’ est moi’) applied to a political party. In the first years of its 
independence, FRELIMO was seen as a menace by the neighbouring racist states. The 
white rulers of Rhodesia and South Africa feared that this liberation movement would 
inspire models in their countries. This situation, combined with some political discontent 
in a few Mozambican regions, created room for an opposition movement. It was for these 
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reasons that RENAMO came into existence. The civil war between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO only ended in 1992.  
 
Because of this background, the plenary sessions can be quite tense and adversarial 
between the two parties. In many plenary debates, it is common for there to be name-
calling, irreverent laughter, catcalling, and jeering. Inappropriate behaviour has included 
RENAMO MPs standing in protest in front of the President, which happened during the 
debate of the new Electoral Law, approved by the majority in April 2007. This behaviour 
shows the general antagonism that exists between the deputies of the two parties.  
 
7.3.7 Parliamentary staff 
 
At the end of 2004, the Organic Law regarding staff structure was approved. From this 
date the Assembly had unlimited power to manage and recruit its own staff. The staff 
have the benefits of public servants, but they are only accountable to the leader of the 
Assembly. Leadership of the staff departments is given to qualified individuals, and these 
key staff members are involved in international collaborative work on the continent or in 
bilateral agreements (mainly with Brazil, Portugal, Cape Verde and South Africa). 
For example, the director of the library and archive of the Assembly has participated in 
meetings held by the Association of Parliamentary Libraries in Eastern and Southern 
Africa, (APLESA), an organisation that the Mozambican parliament joined in 2001. 
 
In 1997, the average number of staff to members of the House of Commons in the UK 
was 2.737 ordinary members of staff for each member and 2.2 house staff members for 
each member. The ratio for the Mozambican parliament is 2.5 parliamentary staff 
members for each deputy. 
 
                                                 





Table 7. 5: Staff structure 
Post title Number of posts available 
Secretary General  1 
Assessor of the Pres. of Assembly  1 
Parliamentary Assessor  2 
General Director Assembly 2 
Director of Division 6 
Director of Cabinet of the President of the 
Assembly 
1 
Director of the Technical Office 1 
Assessor of the Secretary General 1 
Chief of the Central Department 12 
Chief of the Secretariat  1 
Personal Secretary of the President of the 
Assembly  
1 
Administrator of the Palace 1 
Chief of the Central Repartition  20 
Secretariat for the Working Committees  12 
Personal Secretariats  8 
Executive Secretariat  8 
Diverse Experts and Auditor 191 
Other Experts and Technicians  107 
Administrative staff, auxiliary staff, etc. 249 
Total  625 
Source: Mozambique , 2004b 
 
7.3.8 The Assembly budget  
 
Barkan’s (2005) findings showed that approval of the Assembly budget by the Assembly 
and not by the government is one of the strengths of a parliament. In Mozambique, the 
parliamentary budget is approved by the Assembly. However, this approval is unofficially 
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negotiated with the Minister of Finance. According to the Assembly staff, the negotiation 
of the Assembly budget is done before the plenary’s approval. Since 1994, according to 
the parliamentary staff and deputies, there has been no evidence of discontent with regard 
to the behaviour of the executive in this matter. The Assembly budget is presented later in 
this chapter. 
 
There is a perception worldwide that the salaries of deputies are always high. In 
Mozambique there is secrecy surrounding the deputies’ salaries. The reason given by the 
general secretariat for the confidentiality with regard to the deputies’ salaries is to avoid 
an increase in the public’s perception that the Assembly is a very expensive institution 
and that its productivity may not correspond to the benefits38 derived. However, a 
comparison of the budget of the Assembly with that of other state institutions reveals that 
this perception is at odds with reality, and the Assembly is by its nature just more 
noticeable. As shown in the table below, the expenses for the Assembly in Mozambique 
amounted to 13 720 USD, less than the expenses of the presidency and even less than the 
budgets of some of the other state institutions. The Casa Militar (that part of the army in 
charge of the security of the President), the Ministry of Defence, and the Army have 
budgets that are five times the budget of the Assembly. To this list of security, budgets 
must still be added the budget of the Services of Information and Security – 4112916 
USD, which alone is more than the budget of the Assembly. The budget of the South 
African parliament is 11 times bigger than the budget of the Mozambican parliament (The 
South African National Treasury, 2008).   
 
                                                 
38 In 2006, the newspapers published the story that the Assembly was debating to increase the deputies’ 
salaries by 27%. This raised serious discontent and criticism. This was exacerbated by the belief that the 
benefits that the deputies already receive are extensive. See, for instance, “Deputados Moçambicanos 
querem aumento”, 2006. 
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Table 7. 6: Analysis of the Mozambican national budget 2007  
 Meticais (MTN) Dollars (USD) 
President  463 011.91 18 520 000 
Assembly 343 010.96 13 ,720 000 
Constitutional Council  38 000.91 1 520 000 
Supreme Court  98 661.01 3 946 000 
Minister of Defence 274 697.24 10 988 000 
Military House 201 251.23 8 050 000 
Army 1 297 397.22 51 896 000 
Services of Information and Security 411 291 60 16 452 000 
 
7.4 The role of parliament and the international community 
 
Mozambique receives budget inputs directly from 19 donors. These constitute a formal 
grouping of donors who manage their donations cooperatively. Fifty-five percent of the 
national budget is financed through donor grants and loans39. The group G19 monitors the 
achievements of the Mozambican government in relation to the spending of the donations 
in accordance with what was planned, and each year it negotiates the areas of intervention 
it perceives necessary in a dialogue with the Mozambican government. 
 
During the period of the first session of 2007, G19 was seated with the government to 
ensure accountability for plans undertaken and to address future plans. During this time 
there was no commentary in the Assembly on this process by any of the parliamentary 
groups. The media covered the presence of the attorney general in the Assembly, as well 
as the presence of the donors overseeing the progress of the government. On 28 May 
2007, the Norwegian ambassador, Thorbjorn Gaustadsaether, as the leader of G19, gave 
an interview to one of the main newspapers of the country40. It was clear from the content 
                                                 
39 See, for example, Standard Bank Research Group January 2007 Blue Print. 
 
40 See the interview of the president of G19 by the newspaper Noticias on 28 May 2007. 
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of the interview that the donors judged the government’s performance not just at the 
negotiating table but also publicly. Paradoxically, the institution of the people, the 
National Assembly, was not mentioned once in the interview. The discussions between 
G19 and the Mozambican government showed disregard for the Assembly. 
 
The international community has indicated their satisfaction with the economic 
development of the country. This is evidenced by the choice of Mozambique as the first 
African country to receive aid upfront for five years. This allows the Mozambican 
Government to make medium-term plans instead of only annual plans. The problem of 
corruption has subsequently become a concern, and there have been corruption cases that 
have drawn the attention of the international community. An example was the Banco 
Austral scandal, which ended with the assassination of the journalist Carlos Cardoso.  
 
7.5 The Assembly’s functions 
 
7.5.1 Law-making  
 
All parliamentary bills need to be ratified by the president. However, legislation’s journey 
within parliament starts with a first reading in the plenary. Then printed copies of the 
proposed act are given to the parliamentary groups. The first phase of discussions takes 
place in the working committees, and only when they are ready will they be sent back to 
parliament for approval. 
  
In the working committee there is opportunity for debate, in which leading members of 
both political parties may take part. However, the small number of working committees, 
each with such large thematic areas and such short periods for each session, means that 
legislation gets superficially scrutinised by the deputies.   
 
Parliamentary debate can slow down the legislative process. In the event of this 
happening, there is the constitutional power of ‘iniciativa de lei’ (a law that does not need 
to be passed by parliament, but just needs pre-approval from parliament. This works 
similarly to a delegation from parliament to the government.). Another consequence of the 
work overload concerning the legislative process is that parliament, under pressure, will 
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give more and more tacit approvals. Both circumstances are a clear dilution of the role of 
parliament in lawmaking. If the law-making capacity of parliament is not reinforced, there 
is a serious risk that the Mozambican parliament will be sidelined, with the executive 
taking over the legislative function and an overlapping of the functions of the executive 
and the legislative. 
 
In the Mozambican parliament there are rarely expired or withdrawn bills. There is no 
record, as with other parliaments, of bills that die naturally in the legislative process. 
Historically, the law-making function was a task of the Central Committee of FRELIMO. 
As is shown in the table below, the one-party Assembly met very seldom and approved 
little legislation. Between 1990 and 1994, the Assembly approved more legislation than 









Laws Resolutions  




From 1977 to 1986, 85 laws and 
165 Resolutions were approved. 
During this period there were 15 
sessions. In total the Assembly was 
seated for 25 days. 
(First Legislative Assembly) 
 
1977 1st & 2nd 
session 
6 18 
1978 3rd 14 18 
1979 4th & 5th 13 24 
1980 6th & 7th 7 17 
1981 8th & 9th 8 21 
1982 10th 11 18 
1983 11th 7 15 
1984 12th 5 11 
1985 13th & 14th 8 13 
1986 15th 6 10 
19 October 1986 – Death of Samora Machel
1987 1st & 2nd 17 23  
 
In this period, 40 laws and 64 
resolutions were approved. 
(Second Legislative Assembly) 





1988 4th & 5th 6 9 
1989 PC 3 8 
1989 6ª & 7ª 4 7 
1990 PC 1 7 
1990 7º & 8 5 10 
     
 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the legislation essential to adopt a multiparty 









Laws Resolutions Observation 
1990 
 
1ª extraordinary session (5 Oct – 3 Nov)
Approval of the constitution. 
Members voted for a motion of congratulations to the Central Committee of 
FRELIMO, to the Central Commission of FRELIMO and to the Mozambican 
people. The Popular assembly is renamed the Assembly of the Republic. 
1990 Permanent 
Committee  
5  5 For the first time an augmentation of 
presence was decided on for the 
deputies for participating in the 
plenary sessions and in the Permanent 
Committee (Resolução nº 3/90 B. 
Republica, Maputo I serie (21) 29 
Maio, 1990). 




7  2 The resolution’s retention of two 
deputies (Manuel Manjiche and 
Sebastião Marcos Mabote). 
Lei nº7/91 stipulates the rules 
regarding the creation and activities 
of the political parties. 
1991 2º session (28 
June to 22 
July) 
13 1 In this session, the Freedom of 
Speech and Freedom of Association 
laws were approved. The Law of the 
Media was also approved.  
1991 3º session (9 
-20 Dec) 
11 6  
1992 4ª session (24 
March to 4 
April) 
10 8 8 (including the resolution that 
updated the augmentation of the 
deputies) 
 
In the era of the multiparty Assembly, i.e. during the multiparty period until 2004, the 
Assembly unequivocally increased its status as a law-making body. 
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Table 7. 9: Legislative achievements – 1999-2004 (three multiparty terms) 
4 October 1992 – General Peace Agreement
Year Session Laws Resolution  
1993 6ª & 7ª 7 11 Motion of thanks to the Government for information 
regarding the peace agreement. 
1994 8ª 9 5  
1994 1ª 1 3  
1994 CP 1  
1995 2ª 
 
3 15 Approval of the standing orders and MP’s Statute.







 2 This session was held to constitute the ad hoc 
commission responsible for the revision of the 
constitution and another ad hoc commission to 
change the national anthem. 
1995 5 ª 4 4  
1996 4 ª 3 15  
1996 5 ª 4 9   
1997 6 ª 13 3   
1997 2º 
extraordinary  
5 1 Resolution for the appointment of the members of 
the National Electoral Commission  
1997 7  5 Approval of membership of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentarian Forum
1998 8 & 9 13  19  
1999 10 4 10 Declaration of the Constitution of the Parliamentary 
Forum of Portuguese Speaking Countries
1999 3rd 
extraordinary 
4 4  
2000 1 & 2 3 13 Election of the deputies that would represent the 
Assembly in the SADC Parliamentary Forum 
2000 1 
extraordinary 
 3 Election of the members of the Electoral 
Commission. The ad hoc Commission for Revision 
of the Electoral Law created. 
2000 3 6  17 New standing orders approved (Lei n6/2001)
2001 
 
4 & 5 15 11  
2002 
 





5 0  
2002 7 5  6 Approval of the statutes of the Constitutional Court 
2003 8 & 9 9  13 Approval of the Statute of Deputies (Lei n3/2004)
 
2004 10 6   
2004 3 ext 3 4  
2004 4 
extraordinary  
Approval of the new constitution
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7.5.2 Oversight  
 
As has been stated previously, the Mozambican Assembly does not have any power over 
the formation of government. The power to appoint and dismiss the government 
(individually or collectively) is centralised in the figure of the president. The single 
exception is that the president can be forced to dismiss his newly appointed premier and 
cabinet in the event that the government’s programme is rejected for a second time 
(Mozambique Constitution, 2004, Article 188) and (Regimento Interno da Assembleia, 
2001, Article 159). The Government’s programme is presented for the approval of the 
Assembly. Conversely, the rejection of the programme, as a consequence, can carry the 
dissolution of the Assembly by the President (Mozambique Constitution, 2004, Article 
188).  
 
As Burnell (2003) pointed out in his research on the Zambian Parliament, to solve the 
poor performance of parliament in overseeing the executive, and especially to guarantee 
the control of corruption, there is often an executive strategy of developing sideline 
institutions to guarantee the oversight of state institutions. Burnell (2003) points out that 
in Zambia these organisations ended up having functions that were mere formalities. This 
also happened in Mozambique, an example being the creation of the High Commission 
Against Corruption. According to Burnell (2003), the new institutions that started off as 
alternative institutions to take on the parliamentary oversight role were not only 
ineffective but were also not democratic. These institutions were established mainly to 
placate the international community.  
 
7.5.2.1 Oversight powers  
 
Oversight is considered one of the classic functions of any parliament, be it in the context 
of a parliamentarian or a presidential system. Overseeing the executive serves as a form of 
ongoing monitoring of the activities of the government. Parliamentary oversight generally 
implies an adversarial relationship between the executive and parliament. The paradox is 
that this perspective of the oversight function is unrealistic and counterproductive for the 
entire assembly. The aim should be to have the assembly constructively engaged in 
184 
overseeing the government. It is unreasonable to expect that the ruling party will be an 
adversary of the government comprised of them. The point to stress is that effective 
oversight will serve as an aid to the executive’s performance. 
 
The Mozambican parliament has the power to request information from the executive, 
compelling testimony from members of the government, requesting reports, and holding 
questioning time with members of the executive. In addition, the working committees can 
call public hearings (Mozambique, 2007, Article 50; Mozambique, 2004a, Article 172).  
 
Table 7. 10: Oversight powers and capability 
Censorship of the Executive: 










Working Committee  
Public hearings 
Summons to force an appearance by the executive 
 
Yes 




Does the Assembly hold powers of agenda? (this means it can initiate and 
develop legislation pertaining to public policies) 
Yes 
 
The highest organ of FRELIMO is the Political Commission, with 17 members headed by 
the President of the country, who is also the president of the party. It is understood that in 
African parliaments the oversight function does not take place in public but in private 
within the political party; the same applies in Mozambique. However, as has been noted, 
the FRELIMO Political Commission comprises the majority of members of the executive. 
Of 17 members of the FRELIMO Political Commission, only six are members of the 
Assembly. Even the names of the Political Commission are important in the hierarchy, not 
just because of the functions that they have, for example, as the Speaker and the Vice-
President of the Assembly, but also because they are historically important members of 
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the political party. However, the balance of power is definitely in favour of the executive, 
to the detriment of the Assembly.  
 
The oversight function is a victim of the behaviour of the two parliamentary parties and 
the influence of the donor community in the country. The exclusive involvement of the 
international community with the executive, but not with the legislature, curtails 
parliament’s influence. 
 
Table 7. 11: Number of deputies in the FRELIMO Political Commission 
FRELIMO Political Commission  MP Government member 
1. Armando Emílio Guebuza No President of the Republic 
2. Filipe Chimoio Paunde No No 
3. Alberto Joaquim Chipande MP 
4. Manuel Jorge Tomé MP – Leader of the Parliamentary Group 
5. Eduardo Joaquim Mulémbwè MP 
6. Eneas da Conceição Comiche No Maputo Mayor 
7. Verónica Nataniel Macamo MP – Vice-president of the Assembly 
8. Margarida Adamugy Talapa MP 
9. Alcinda António de Abreu No Minister of Foreign Affairs 
10. José Candugua António Pacheco No Minister of Interior 
11. Luísa Dias Diogo No Prime Minister 
12. Aiuba Cuereneia No Minister of Planning and Development 
13. Conceita Xavier Sortane MP 
14. Raimundo Domingos Pachinuapa No No 
15. Aires Bonifácio Aly No Minister of Education and Culture 
16. Paulina Mateus Nkunda No No 
17. Teodoro Andrade Waty No No 
Source: “Membros do Conselho de Ministros”, 2008; Bancada FRELIMO, 2007  
 
As has been stated previously, the Political Commission is the key decision-making body 
of the party and meets weekly. It is composed of 17 party members. Of the 17, only six 
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are Members of Parliament (Alberto Joaquim Chipande, Manuel Jorge Tomé, Eduardo 
Joaquim Mulémbwè, Verónica Nataniel Macamo, Margarida Adamugy Talapa, and 




The constituencies are serviced, but this is done under the exclusive control of the 
political parties, as will be explored in Chapter 9.  
 
7.5.4 International lobby 
 
An important function of the Assembly is international lobbying, and the resolutions and 
decisions of the Assembly have an impact on Mozambique’s relationship with the 
international community. An example of this function was the Mozambican Assembly’s 
successful lobbying of the international community to cancel the country’s debt.  
 
In 1998, the Mozambican Assembly created a working group to study how the country 
should handle its international debt. The three political parties in parliament came 
together in a unanimous request for the international community to cancel the country’s 
debt. The joint voice of all political parties in parliament is rare, but on this matter they 
spoke with one voice. The Mozambican parliament also petitioned the parliaments of the 
developed nations to support their request in their countries and to put pressure on their 
governments in favour of cancelling the Mozambican debt. This was partly achieved in 
200741.  
 
7.6 The media and the Assembly  
 
The media has full access to the Assembly, including the plenary, committees and all the 
Assembly’s physical space. During the plenary sessions, the TV cameramen are allowed 
to circulate in the hemicycle. The media have media cabinets with sound systems and full 
visibility of the plenary.  
                                                 
41 In 2006 the Mozambican debt was reduced in 1.3 million USD. See, for example, “Dívida externa 
moçambicana orçada em 3,3 biliões de USD”, 2007.   
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The media has a strong presence during the plenary sessions, with radio and television 
stations broadcasting live transmissions. Because the sitting periods of the Assembly are 
concentrated into only two sessions of 45 days each, the Assembly’s activities receive 




The level of institutionalisation of parliament is still embryonic. Its autonomy from the 
political parties is far from a reality. Taking into account the political context, this 
situation is understandable, and it would be naive to advocate radical changes to a system 
entailing the role of parties not being central to parliament. With the existing electoral 
system and the pre-eminence of the parties in Mozambican society, parliament is an 
unequivocally privileged platform for political debate. As the Northern European 
countries have demonstrated, this is not necessarily a fatal threat to the role of parliament. 
But it could be if the Mozambican parliament does not move on from being only a 
podium for party disputes.  
 
The Mozambican Parliament is a forum for debate, and in addition to its other functions, 
this is praiseworthy for a postconflict country. Parliament is an institution where it is 
assured that guns have been replaced by words. But in the case of Mozambique, after 
three terms, the verbal battles need to have more substance. The deputies especially need 
to be seen to be more committed to the delivery of economic and social advantages for the 
population instead of being committed only to their parties’ agendas.  
 
For the consolidation of democratisation in the country, parliament needs to be 
strengthened. International donors have implemented programmes in this direction. This 
external support is important, but it is not the solution to the weaknesses of the 
Mozambican parliament.  
 
The imposition by international agencies of models for the development of the 
Mozambican political structure can be used as an excuse for any political failure. The 
political parties in the Mozambican political system are key actors, and therefore, they are 
definitely part of the problem, but without them, there would be no workable solution. 
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There are obvious areas in need of development. Firstly, there is the need to reinforce the 
role of the committees. This includes the need for the committees to be more specialised, 
and not to cover the large subject areas that they do at present. Then there is a need for the 
participation of all the deputies in functioning working committees. Also, there is a need 
for universality of the rules. There has been an outstanding and consistent development of 
the internal rules. However, it is pointless to have efficient internal rules if these are not 
accepted and understood in a universal way by all in the house. This was shown to be the 
case in the lack of consensus regarding whether the plenary should be closed to the public 
during the debate of the petitions. This lack of consensus regarding the management of 
the plenary debate demonstrates a lack of a common interpretation of the rules.  
 
The Mozambican parliament has progressed with regard to the transition of the 
participants from enemies to political adversaries. However, this progression is still, after 





Elite perceptions of the Mozambican Parliament 
 
8.1 Methodology of the chapter 
 
This chapter investigates how civil society leaders evaluate the Mozambican parliament42. 
The methodology of the chapter comprises in-depth interviews and data collected on 
parliamentary performance indicators. The interviews were conducted with a panel of 
leaders of several key organisations from Mozambican society, journalists with 
experience in parliamentary affairs43, and staff from the National Assembly. Due to time 
constraints, most of the interviews were conducted in Maputo. However, a visit to Beira 
was carried out to interview the mayor and a representative of a religious organisation. 
 
To complement any insights into public perceptions of parliament, data was collected on 
parliament’s performance indicators with regard to interactions between it and the 
executive. The aim of including such indicators was to assess public participation in 
general and, in particular, the public’s involvement in parliamentary activities – 
parliament is currently open to public participation in the form of public hearings. 
 
The parliamentary performance indicators collected consist of number of public hearings 
and visits to the regions by the working committees, covering the period of the two 
plenary sessions, the last session in 2006 and the first session of 2007.  
 
During the same time, data was also collected on the number of visitors to the Assembly’s 
Documentation Centre. This data was collected with the assistance of the Division of 
Working Committees and the Centre for Documentation. The choice of stakeholders was 
based on organisation type. The selection criteria limited organisations to those that were 
politically involved, but that did not have party affiliations. Additionally, these 
organisations were active in the national sphere, and not just in Maputo.  
                                                 
42 In all fifteen members of the civil society were interviewed.   
43 In all 4 journalists were interviewed.  
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The respondents were asked to comment on their perceptions and the perceptions that 
they believed existed across the country (based on the contact they had had with their 
members concerning public activities within the regions). An elected member of local 
government (the president of a municipality) was also included on the stakeholders’ 
panel.  
 
The selection criteria for the panel of journalists were similar to those of the stakeholder 
panel. Their selection was based on their experience and interest in parliamentary affairs 
and their national coverage of these.   
 
8.2 Parliament – engagement with civic entities 
 
8.2.1 Public hearings 
 
Parliament’s standing orders stipulate that parliament, through the working committees, 
can hold public hearings (Mozambique, 2007, Article 50). In the last plenary session of 
2006 and the first one of 2007, the working committees held 45 public hearings. It is not 
common practice for private/civic organisations to be called to public hearings. Of the 45 
public hearings, only six involved nongovernmental entities, namely, trade unions and the 




Table 8.1: Number of public hearings held during two plenary sessions (last 2006 and first 2007) 
As shown in the above table, public hearings are held mainly with members of the 
executive. According to the information collected, there is no record of refusal or 
problems regarding having the members of the executive present. Even among the 
existing staff, there was a perception that the public hearings were mostly for members of 
the executive. Public hearings are used mainly to discuss laws sent by the executive to 
parliament. This structure is rarely used to monitor the activities of the government.   
 
According to the standing orders, with the exception of the Petitions Committee, the 
working committees are open to the public. However, this structure is not commonly 
utilised in practice. During the last two sessions, out of 45 meetings of the working 
committees, only six had journalists present.  
 
                                                 
44 This working committee is not open to the public.  
 
 
Type of organisation involved
Executive Private
Committee on Petitions Not applicable44 
Committee on Defence and Public Order 1 1  
Committee on Planning and the Budget 10 10  
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment 2 1  
Committee on International Relations 4 4  
Committee on Judicial Issues, Human Rights and the Law 11 11  
Committee on Economic affairs and Services 12 8  
Committee on Agriculture, Regional Development, Public 
Administration, and Local Government 
5 5 
 
Committee on Social affairs, Gender and the Environment 5 1  
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Table 8.2: No. days worked by working committees, journalists’ attendance, and visits to 
provinces 
 
8.2.2 The Assembly’s Centre for Documentation  
 
The Assembly building houses a documentation centre, which is open to the deputies as 
well as to the public. This service keeps an archive for the Assembly, but it also has a 
small library. 
 
Currently, within the Assembly, it is the space most visited by the public. The number of 
monthly visitors to the library ranges from 20 to 500, depending mostly on the academic 
calendar, as most of the visitors are students.  
 
As shown in the table below, approximately 4000 citizens have visited the Assembly to 
witness the service it provides. Public visits to the Assembly should be encouraged in an 
 How many days on 
average do the working 
committees sit 
Number of meetings with 
journalists present 






Committee on Petitions    
Committee on Defence and 
Public Order 
18 0 




Committee on Planning and 
the Budget 
14 1  15 
Committee on Social affairs, 
Gender and the Environment 
20 4 10 
Committee on International 
Relations 
17 2 11 
Committee on Judiciary 
Issues, Human Rights and the 
Law 
18 0 3 
Committee on Economic 
affairs and Services 
46 0 4 
Committee on Agriculture, 
Regional Development, 
Public Administration, and 
Local Government 
14 4  7 
Committee on Social affairs, 
Gender and the Environment 30   
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effort to get the public more engaged with the Assembly. The Centre for Documentation 
is criticised by most of the respondents (civic leaders) for not delivering services 
promptly, such as providing legislation or other documentation.  
 
Table 8.3: Number of visitors from July 2006 to July 2007 
 Students Others 
July 537 3 
August 815 11 
September  726 10 
October 777 3 
November  92 5 
December 39 3 
January 33 9 
February 42 5 
March 95 0 
April 185 3 
May 192 6 
June 81 0 
July 81 1 
TOTAL 3695 59 
 
8.3 Findings from interviews 
 
8.3.1 What journalists say 
 
The media plays the role of disseminating all information pertaining to the National 
Assembly. There is no direct communication between the National Assembly and the 
public or even with nongovernmental entities other than through the media. All civic 
leaders interviewed referred to the media as the sole source through which they followed 
the Assembly’s work. Occasionally, information on the Assembly’s work was gathered 
through informal talks with deputies. The stakeholders interviewed reported that the 
deputies were generally friendly, helpful, and available when contacted. For each session, 
journalists receive a pass, which allows them to use the facilities of the Assembly and to 
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cover the proceedings of parliament. For journalists, gaining entrance to the Assembly is a 
simple process, requiring only that they obtain their badges. There is no record since 1994 
of any journalist having been forbidden to enter parliament. During the plenary sessions, a 
strong media presence exists, with live transmissions by radio and television stations of 
the plenary sessions. Because the sitting periods of the Assembly are concentrated into 
only two sessions of 45 days each, the activities of the Assembly receive intense media 
attention during these periods. 
 
The journalists interviewed were asked to rate on a scale of one (most important) to four 
(less important) the importance of the activities that parliament performs. The 
respondents’ evaluations are shown in Table 8.4, below. 
 
Table 8.4: Journalists’ evaluations of the importance of the functions of parliament 
 
In the opinion of the media, the oversight function is one that parliament needs to 
improve. From their understanding, based on observations of the parliamentarians at 
work, there are some failings evident: The parliamentary groups are not equipped to 
conduct oversight, mainly because there is a visible gap in information and technical 
expertise between the Assembly and the members of the government; moreover, there is a 
noticeable deficiency in the methodological and technical support that the parliamentary 
staff offers the parliamentary groups.   
 
For these journalists, the oversight function in Mozambique still has far to go to reach a 
level of normality. 
 
Representation of the interests of the political 
parties 
2 2 5 1
Representation of regional interests 5 3 4 3
Oversight of the executive 3 4 2 2
Law-making 1 5 1 4
Conflict prevention and resolution 4 1 3 5
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Table 8.5: Causes of the low performance of the Assembly  
 
Collectively, the journalists interviewed stated that the public image of the Assembly was 
negative. 
 
The collective voice of the interviewees believed that the main reason for this was the 
tendency to limit the plenary debates to those exhibiting party hostilities. Their perception 
was that there was a crystallised image among citizens that the Assembly was a place of 
political conflict, which was distant from the common citizen. 
 
Several media organisations cover the full plenary sessions live. The media cover mainly 
parliamentary press conferences, political parties’ press conferences, and plenary sessions. 
On the contrary, the meetings of the working committees receive far less interest from the 
press.  
 
Radio Mozambique, which gives national coverage, has two political programs that often 
cover the plenary sessions during the debates, as well as the Assembly’s proceedings. The 
Tribuna Parlamentar is a one-hour weekly program consisting of live debates with the 
participation of deputies, politicians, and civil society. The program also takes calls from 
the public. The Panorama Político is a short weekly program consisting of snapshots of 
regional and national political issues. This program is produced by a team in Maputo, with 
the collaboration and input of its journalists in each region. 
 
According to journalists, there is a satisfactory relationship between the media and the 
Assembly. Nevertheless, this relationship, according to journalists, has room for 
improvement. Journalists recognised that there was an increased turnover among their 
This is a area that needs to be improved Yes 
The parliamentary groups are not well prepared Yes (–) 
The staff body of the Assembly is not well composed Yes 
There is no political goodwill Don’t know
This function is normally exercised No 
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colleagues covering parliament. This implies that there is a lack of specialisation among 
media professionals covering legislative issues, which are often complex. 
8.3.2 What stakeholders say 
 
All stakeholders interviewed gave a negative evaluation of the Assembly’s performance 
of its oversight function. They maintained that the Assembly does very little regarding the 
oversight of the government. This poses a severe dilemma, since no other institution is 
vested with the power that the Assembly has.  
 
The majority of the respondents, when asked to give an example of a positive aspect of 
the oversight function performed in the last year, chose the synergy that exists between 




The main critique made of parliament was its extreme party-centricity, to the detriment of 
the public interest. This was seen as the main impediment to parliament’s performance.  
 
The primary recurring problem pointed out previously is the extreme focus on party 
politics. In the stakeholders’ collective opinion, this steers the discussions away from 
matters of real relevance to the country. This was seen as being potentially damaging to 
the public’s overall perception of parliament.  
 
Also considered problematic was the non-existence of legislation on bi-party agreement 
on policy. With the exception of a few laws in the first multiparty mandate, never have 
more than two political parties agreed on any policy or legislation. This was seen as 
unconstructive and counterproductive to the country’s development.  
 
Several respondents pointed out that the only exception to the lack of consensus in the 
National Assembly was the definition of MPs’ remuneration benefits. This was severely 
criticised. The critique from stakeholders was not so much about the benefits themselves 
but about how consensus on this issue contrasted with the lack of consensus on others 
national matters. “If they can vote in unison on salaries and benefits, why not on what is 
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important for us”. Ironically, this behaviour can be viewed with a degree of optimism, 
since it diminishes the taboo that the deputies of the two parties cannot vote in agreement 
– they have proven that they can. 
 
This party-centricity was perceived as being harmful to the oversight function. Since the 
deputies are preoccupied with party battles, the opportunity to oversee the executive is 
forfeited. Often policy debates or question time with the executive ends up being wasted 
in futile discussions about past events. 
 
Clearly, there is divided thinking on the evaluation of the behaviour of the two political 
parties regarding the oversight function. The ruling party was seen as being too protective 
toward the executive, and the opposition was seen as being too condescending toward the 
executive. The question was posed to the respondents whether the perception existed that 
oversight by the deputies of the ruling party of the members of government was 
performed in private. The answers varied – some believed that the deputies had indeed 
held members of the government to account in the party sphere, but that this was not done 
publicly in the Assembly. Others were sceptical of this hypothesis, while some mentioned 
that it was difficult to know and that any answer would be speculative.  
 
The important thing to note regarding this matter is that the general perception was that 
oversight entails a conflict between two parties; that it entails someone being kept in 
check, with its associated negative connotations. Journalists’ evaluations of the 
importance of the functions of parliament indicated that oversight could involve 
constructive engagement. If this perspective were to be adopted, then it would be 
plausible to anticipate that the ruling party’s deputies would take over the oversight 
function. 
 
One of the individuals interviewed explained that in Mozambique the state was still seen 
in a paternalistic light. If placed in the context of family values, it would be considered 
inappropriate to pass judgment on the ‘father’. On the other hand, using the same 
metaphor, constructive engagement could be viewed as the oversight that parents exercise 
over their children. ‘Be accountable to’ does not inevitably need to have negative 
connotations.   
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RENAMO’s conduct with regard to oversight was seen as suffering from the same 
syndrome as the ruling party – extreme focus on the party’s agenda. There was, however, 
the perception that, particularly concerning oversight, RENAMO had improved in recent 
years. The respondents acknowledged that RENAMO deputies were the animators of the 
political debate. This was despite their insufficient technical preparation and notorious 
lack of information regarding the activities of the executive.   
 
This constant clashing of the two parties does not help to improve the national esteem.  
 
8.3.2.2 Reactivity in relation to the government 
 
A general perception was that parliament was still reactive in relation to the government, 
not only regarding its oversight function but also in its legislative capacity. Because of the 
unmatched periods of activity between the government and parliament, this reactivity 
would be difficult to turn round. Nonetheless, the stakeholders felt that parliament could 
make an effort to alter this state of affairs.  
 
8.3.2.3 The absence of national leaders  
 
The absence of the president of the country and the leader of the opposition from the 
parliamentary arena was seen as a barrier to the development of an affable relationship 
between the two main parties.  
 
Because of the structure of the constitution, the president of the executive, who is also the 
head of the government, does not participate in the plenary sessions. On other hand, the 
leader of the opposition has always opted for not integrating the legislative party list, and 
as an obvious consequence, an opposition leader has never become a deputy of the house.  
 
The non-attendance of plenary sessions by the leaders of the two main political parties 




8.3.2.4 Participation and contact with parliament  
 
The stakeholders were aware that the National Assembly is open to the public; at least, it 
was known that the plenary sessions are open. Regarding the working committee 
meetings, there was some misinformation propagated that these are not open to the public. 
Moreover, there was no absolute certainty among all stakeholders about whether there 
was a need for an invitation to attend a plenary session. There were also doubts regarding 
the dress code; for example, there was a rumour that there is a dress code for women, in 
particular, that is not prevalent in other Mozambican institutions.  
 
Even though it was known that the plenary sessions are open, none of those interviewed 
had attended a plenary session.  
 
Regarding public hearings, the majority of those interviewed had never been called to a 
public hearing by a working committee. However, a few had had contact with the working 
committees regarding specific legislation.  
 
It is important to note that the stakeholders declared that, in their experience, the chairs 
and deputies of the working committees were willing to cooperate, revealing an open and 
friendly attitude. However, there was no direct contact between the Assembly and any of 
the civil organisations. The contact with deputies was informal, and typically, it was the 
civil organisations that took the initiative to contact the Assembly. 
 
In general, it was reported that contact with the deputies was uncomplicated, and that it 
was more bureaucratic and time-consuming to make contact with the Assembly as an 
institution. When asked about their impression or knowledge of the public visiting or 
attending the National Assembly, the majority of respondents declared that they believed 
the image of the Assembly was intimidating. The police, the army, and the relevant 




8.3.2.5 Cooperation with civic entities for policy and law development  
 
In the public’s view, parliament should embrace a deeper partnership with a diverse range 
of higher education institutions. The purpose of this collaboration could be to constitute 
advisory working groups on specific matters. However, it could also be to use these 
educational institutions to promote educational programs on parliament. Planned visits by 
student groups and sessions with the deputies could form part of an educational and public 
relations program designed and implemented by the Assembly. 
 
8.3.2.6 A tribute to the media 
 
Often, stakeholders have praised the role of the national media for their coverage of the 
plenary sessions of the National Assembly, not just because of the live television coverage 
by TVM (the Mozambican public broadcaster) and Radio Mozambique but also because 
of the newspapers’ provision of dedicated spaces for debate and analysis of the 
proceedings of the Assembly. 
    
Praise was also given to the translation efforts undertaken by the radio stations of the 
Assembly for their works translated into the diverse local languages, especially, allowing 
the average citizen in the rural areas to hear and understand news emanating from the 
Assembly. This was seen as an important manifest contributor to the awareness all over 
the country of the proceedings of the Assembly. 
 
Nevertheless, it has also been pointed out that further technical, legal and political training 
should be provided to journalists, in particular to those covering the field of politics. 
Parliamentary coverage requires specific technical knowledge that not all journalists 
reporting on legislatives issues possess. 
 
8.3.2.7 Visits to the provinces 
 
It is well known that parliament conducts several visits to the provinces. However, there 
were some concerns as to how these visits should take place. The main concern was that 
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there was no feedback about these visits. Also, the visits were not well publicised. In 
addition, local and civic entities did not receive a post-visit report. Therefore, there were 
no means of following up on the issues raised during the visits. 
 
8.3.2.8 Impact of the donor community  
 
Parliaments have been excluded from the process of negotiating international aid. 
External aid is arranged between the executive and the donor, and this denies parliament 
the right to see or scrutinise the conditions attached to the aid agreements. This exclusion 
results in parliament being unable to oversee the execution of the aid plan. Accountability 
is severely hampered under this practice, not only accountability related to aid but 
national accountability as well. 
 
The close relationship between donors and the government, to the exclusion of 
parliament, was seen as a weak component of parliament’s oversight role. There was a 
perception that more links should be developed between parliament, the government, and 
donors.  
 
8.4 Overall evaluation  
 
The interviews revealed discontent concerning the way that the Mozambican parliament 
performs. This finding was not unexpected. However, the findings do not end there. There 
are additional significant findings that should be carefully taken into account. For 
example, the findings indicate a belief and hope that the Assembly can and should do 
better. They also reveal a perception that the Assembly has improved gradually from term 
to term. Another finding is that, unlike many parliaments around the world, the 
stakeholders here show no apathy towards the workings of the Assembly. The Assembly’s 
activity is followed by the stakeholders with interest and curiosity.  
 
An important finding that should be heeded is the Assembly’s poor communication with 
the public. Also of concern is the lack of engagement of the public in parliamentary 
activities. This applies to visitors of political and technical activities such as public 
hearings, and public-excursion visitors to parliament.  
202 
 
An important finding is the notion existing among the parliamentary staff that the image 
of the Assembly is negative, not just regarding its oversight function, but in general terms. 
This can result in frustration and a lack of motivation, limiting the organisation in 
carrying out the activities aimed at improving its relationship with the public, since the 
staff feel this is a lost cause.  
 
It was pointed out in the previous section that the main difficulty regarding the oversight 
function by parliament is excessive party-centricity, which limits parliament. This party-
centricity was seen as making parliament a hostage of party interests, instead of allowing 
it to pursue an independent agenda as an institution. The reactive position of parliament 
vis-à-vis its relationship with government was seen as impeding its performance, 
especially in matters of oversight. The absence from the Assembly of the president of the 
republic and the leader of the opposition, in this case the leaders of both parties, is seen as 
an impediment to eliminating the tensions between FRELIMO and RENAMO. 
  
The structures for public collaboration with the Assembly regarding the oversight 
function are almost non-existent. Dissatisfaction was also expressed regarding how the 
visits to the provinces materialise. Even though the visits were appreciated, the lack of 
advance notification of the public was criticised, and there was suspicion that these visits 
were ceremonial and inefficient with regard to oversight of the activities of the 
government and in identifying the needs of the population outside of the capital.   
 
The relationship between the donor community and the government (excluding the 
Assembly) was seen as enhancing parliament’s difficulties regarding their oversight 
function. External aid is crucial for the country and is linked to stipulations with regard to 
government programmes and budgets. This makes the power that the Assembly holds of 
approval of the programme and the budget a mere formal procedure and not a real power. 
In addition, since the aid is conditional on the terms negotiated between the donors and 
the government being executed without the Assembly’s involvement, the Assembly is 
reduced to being an external witness to these agreements, with no power and often with 
insufficient information.  
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8.5 Conclusion  
 
The perception of the Mozambican parliament among the interviewed leaders of civil 
society was not positive. However, their evaluation conceded that there had been a slight 
improvement during the three multiparty mandates, and it revealed a desire for parliament 
to do better in future. This aspiration was based on the belief that parliament plays a 
crucial role in the sustainability of the political system, especially being the sole political 
institution that holds the power to oversee the executive. This was coupled with a 
willingness by the respondents to cooperate with parliament in its striving to improve its 
performance. Feedback from the interviews conveyed a belief that changes to the 
parliamentary activity, style, and procedures would have an impact on how the public 
views parliament. It is important to stress that, despite its low evaluation, parliament was 
seen as a vital institution. It appeared that parliament was not a ‘lost cause’ in civic 
stakeholders’ minds. Although the interviews revealed that there was no direct 
communication between parliament and the public, information on parliament was 
disseminated by the media, one of the parties, or through personal contact with individual 
deputies. 
 
The public opinion leaders interviewed were engaged with the daily activities of 





Insight into Mozambican MPs’ perceptions 
 
This chapter originated from interviews with 50 Mozambican MPs conducted in Maputo 
between February and May of 2008. Never before has such a study been conducted on the 
Mozambican Assembly. Hence, while previous chapters considered respondents’ 
perceptions of their parliaments, this chapter investigates how Mozambican MPs view 
their relationships with the electorate and their roles as MPs. It also explores who the 
‘Mozambican MP’ is. 
 
As was shown in chapter two, elected parliaments in Africa have received little attention 
in the literature on democratisation. Even less attention has been dedicated to 
parliamentarians. This is in spite of the common understanding that studies on 
parliamentarians are central to political science (Alcántara Sáez, 2008; Putnam, 1976; 
Cohen, 1989). According to Díez & Díaz (2008), for historical and academic reasons, 
studies on Latin American parliamentary elites have also been neglected in the literature. 
From an historical perspective, this was because of the fragility of the development of 
democracy in the region, which made parliaments vulnerable and resulted in them 
possessing only relative autonomy; from an academic perspective, this was due to the 
difficulty of accessing materials and human resources, and in addition, scholarly attention 
was focused on the political transitions themselves (Díez & Díaz, 2008, p. 9).   
 
Identical reasons can be extended to the scarcity of studies on African parliamentarians. In 
addition to the aforesaid reasons that also apply to Africa, there are few secondary sources 
available, such as political biographies or political publications written by politicians. 
With the exception of South Africa, political biographies are rare in African countries, 
especially biographies of second-tier politicians. In Mozambique, for example, there are 
few biographies and publications expressing the political ideas of political figures, 
although there are a few publications about the first president of the country, Samora 
Machel (Christie, 1989; Machel, 1976; Machel, 1975). Of the current politicians in 
parliament, there is not one political biography or one political publication written by or 
on one of the MPs, although there is a biography and a photobiography on the current 
president of the Republic, Armando Guebuza. 
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However, for the sake of being politically correct, both were published as authorised 
biographies in 2004 before the election (Cezerilo & Sopa, 2004; Matusse, 2004).  
 
There are some Mozambican MPs who from time to time do write in local newspapers, 
and among the younger generation, one MP has a blog (Araujo, 2009).  
 
Deputies are among the political elites of the country, and although they may be 
disempowered as a result either of the political parties’ culture and rules or as result of the 
political system, their ideas and beliefs are crucial to entrenching the progress and 
consolidation of democracy (Diamond, Linz, & Lipset, 1988; Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 
1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Dahl, 1971; Díez & Díaz, 2008). In short, politicians matter, 
as Alcántara Sáez puts it:  
 
Politicians matter. Political actions are influenced by institutional frameworks, 
but there is no political process without political players. Politicians have 
families, social and cultural origins, and they are marked by socialisation 
processes that influence their ideas. In turn, the ideas of politicians are 
important to understanding their strategic behaviour and, in the end, the 
outcomes of the political game. Their belonging to political parties and 
moving in a specific institutional framework can affect them, but politicians 
also affect the characteristics of their parties and the institutional environments 
they move in (2008, p. 2). 
 
This chapter looks at MPs’ perceptions in eight areas; additionally, the chapter includes a 
section describing the socioeconomic and religious backgrounds of MPs. As a result, this 
chapter is divided into the following sections: 
  
 Relationship with the electorate 
 Party discipline 
 How do MPs become MPs 
 Who is the Mozambican MP 
 MPs’ assessments of the Assembly’s powers and performance  
 Budget oversight  
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 MPs’ views on the public disclosure of assets 
 The Assembly of the Republic’s own budget 
 




As shown in Chapter 4, there appears to be little contact between citizens and 
parliamentarians in Africa. Only one in ten Africans said that they had some form of 
contact with parliamentarians.  
 
MPs, however, painted a very different picture when the equivalent question was put to 
them. They were asked how many people contacted them while they were in session in 
Maputo. All replied that there was not a single week during which the electorate did not 
contact them. This contact took place mainly via mobile phone, but occasionally, 
members of the public also made personal contact with MPs inside the Assembly or in 
their party offices. When asked how citizens obtained their cell phone numbers, as there is 
no information made available by the Assembly or the political parties on how to contact 
MPs, the MPs answered categorically that those who did not have their number would be 
able to find it. Further, all the MPs who indicated that primary contact takes place via a 
cell phone also said that citizens tended to give them a ‘missed call’, expecting the MP to 
return the call and enquire after them, in this way passing on the expense of the phone call 
to the MP.   
 
To better understand these contacts that MPs reported, it would be useful to have a 
follow-up question about who the citizens concerned were: Were these contacts initiated 
mainly by citizens who were close to the party of the MP and who, for this reason, felt 
comfortable contacting them, or were they are ordinary citizens who were strangers to the 
MPs? Unfortunately, this follow-up question was not included in the questionnaire, but 
some of the MPs mentioned that the contacts were normally made by people that were 







Table 9.1: Frequency of contact and contact method used by the constituents, according to MPs  
In an average week, how many of your 
constituents contact you in Maputo 
In general, how do your constituents contact 
you when you are in Maputo 
One or two per day 16.0 Via cell phone 96.0 
Many people every day 20.0 
In person 4.0 
One or two per week 64.0 
 
9.1.2 Presence of MPs in their provinces 
 
The 250 Mozambican MPs represent 11 electoral constituencies – circulo eleitoral. Each 
circulo eleitoral corresponds to one of the 10 provinces (Cabo Delgado, Gaza, 
Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Nampula, Niassa, Sofala, Tete, Zambézia) of the country, 
plus there is one for Maputo city.   
 




Source: Le Mozambique, 2009 
The table below shows the distribution of seats by party and region. In addition, the 
number of voters for each region is shown. It is evident that the number of MPs 
representing a province is in proportion to its population, with an average of one MP per 
36.804 voters. 
 
This section seeks to understand how MPs visit and interact with their provinces, although 
it is important to clarify that the Mozambican constitution establishes, in Article 168, No. 
2, that MPs represent the entire country and not only their electoral constituencies45.  
 
FRELIMO holds the majority in eight of the 11 provinces; RENAMO-UE gained the 
majority of seats in Sofala province and Zambezia. These two parties share seats equally 
in Manica, while in the northern province of Nampula, RENAMO-UE holds 23 seats to 
FRELIMO’s 27. The distribution of seats by province shows that the national split – 160 
seats for FRELIMO and 90 for RENAMO – hides the geographical distribution of power. 
                                                 
45 “2.O deputado representa todo o país e não apenas o círculo pelo qual é eleito.” 
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Despite the weaker national power of RENAMO, the party has significant support in 
some provinces, but these are distant from the capital. The geopolitical differences are 
noticeable even during the political campaigning: Most small parties campaign in just a 
few provinces (EU Election Observation Mission, 2004), while RENAMO struggles to 
gain support in the provinces in the south of the country.  
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Table 9.2: Distribution of seats by party and region after the 2004 election 
 Province Seats FRELIMO RENAMO-UE Voters 
Niassa  12 9 3 453 461  
Cabo Delgado  22 18 4 794 270  
Nampula  50 27 23 1 831 897  
Zambézia  48 19 29 1 749 121  
Tete  18 14 4 660 741  
Manica  14 7 7 531 264  
Sofala  22 6 16 802 149  
Inhambane  16 15 1 579 356  
Gaza  17 17 0 609 214  
Maputo -province  13 12 1 483 493  
Maputo city  16 14 2 600 249  
Africa  1 1 0  
Europe  1 1 0  
Total 250 160 90  
Source: Mazula, 2006 
 
Mozambique’s territory measures 799 380 km2 (INE, 2008). It is therefore no surprise 
that Mozambican MPs need to travel far to visit the constituencies. On average, MPs need 
to travel more than 1 500 kilometres just to arrive at the capital of a province. While 
visiting the province, additional travelling expenses will be incurred. Road access within 
the provinces is not always easy, and this often results in MPs needing to stay overnight in 
the areas that they are visiting. It is interesting to note that 50 percent of RENAMO MPs 
need to travel more than 1 930 kilometres, while the respective FRELIMO MPs at the 
median of the distribution need to travel 1 600 kilometres, the difference resulting from 
the geographic distribution of seats. This is a result of RENAMO having more seats in the 
north of the country. 
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Table 9.3: Kilometres that MPs need to travel from the capital city to get to the constituencies 
  FRELIMO RENAMO-UE
Mean 1328.8 1988.4 
Median 1600.0 1930.0 
Mode 1600a 1800.0 
Minimum .0 120.0 
Maximum 2800.0 3540.0 
Percentiles 25 287.5 1679.5 
50 1600.0 1930.0 
75 2000.0 2273.8 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
 
Most of the MPs do not travel to the provinces during the sitting periods. The sitting 
period in Mozambique is divided into two very busy three-month periods. During the 
sittings, which are usually from the end of September to December and from May to July, 
MPs are in Maputo.   
 
Again, this influences accessibility, as the presence of FRELIMO in the south allows 
FRELIMO MPs to visit the provinces during the parliamentary sessions.  
 
Table 9.4: Visits to the provinces 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
How many trips did you make to your constituency during a 
typical month when the National Assembly was in session?
2.9 0.8 
On average, how long did you stay? 4.4 2.1 
How many trips did you make to your constituency during a 
typical month when the National Assembly was not in 
session? 
3.9 1.0 
On average, how long did you stay (no. days)? 26.6 27.9 
 
The working conditions of the MPs in the provinces were also investigated in the study. 
The Mozambican MPs do not have offices in the provinces. Officially, they are allowed to 
use the resources of the provincial governments, but in general, the MPs use the resources 
of their parties, or their own resources.  
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MPs from FRELIMO tend to collaborate more closely with the local authorities, since 
they are usually members of the same party. RENAMO MPs, on the other hand, complain 
that some governors or mayors refuse even to meet with them if they request a meeting 
where only RENAMO parliamentarians will be present. Under these circumstances, they 
do not even dare to ask for any assistance in overseeing any governmental projects in the 
provinces.  
 
According to MPs, constituency work is done mainly under the instructions of, and 
coordinated by, their parties. Visits to, and work with, the electorate are normally done by 
teams of two or three MPs allocated by the parties’ provincial leadership. This has the 
advantage of reducing transport costs, and since the roads are not in a state of good repair, 
it is more convenient to travel in a team. 
 
Both parties’ parliamentary leaders control the performance of their MPs in the provinces, 
including requiring reports of visits to the parties’ parliamentary groups. In this regard, 
FRELIMO MPs have less freedom than RENAMO MPs.  
 
9.1.3 MP expenses for constituency work 
 
Regarding the costs that the MPs incur when visiting the electoral constituencies, it is 
important to differentiate between incidental travel and accommodation costs, and the 
expenses that MPs incur in assisting the constituencies. The National Assembly covers 
travelling expenses from the National Assembly to the MPs’ electoral provinces –
Mozambican MPs have four trips paid for between Maputo and their residences each year. 
However, if MPs reside in Nampula or Beira, which have a highly dispersed population 
(see map below), a visit to their outlying constituencies requires significant travel and, 
due to the dangers of driving in the evenings, a possible overnight stay in the region. 
These expenses are not covered by the Assembly, although MPs receive a travel 
allowance.  
 
The typical reaction from MPs when asked how much they spent on assisting voters was a 
relieved laughter at someone having asked them this question. Others were surprised at 
the question and fumbled for an answer, with a non-committal exclamation such as “oh 
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yes, we have spent”. From bicycles for traditional chiefs, and school fees, to funeral 
expenses, the population expects MPs to contribute generously. The main expenses for 
MPs are to satisfy the expectations of local citizens. One of the MPs exclaimed that this 
takes up to half of her salary every month. On average, a FRELIMO MP spends 7390 
meticais, and a RENAMO-UE MP spends 8472 meticais on assisting constituents during 
one field visit to the province.   
 
When in the provinces, the difference between the organisational structures of FRELIMO 
and RENAMO is evident, with FRELIMO MPs meeting the party’s provincial structure 
most of the time, while RENAMO MPs seem to prefer meeting in informal groups.   
 
Figure 9.2: Mozambique’s population density  
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica, Mapa de Distribuicao da Populacao, 1997 
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Table 9.5: How MPs spend most of their time when in their constituencies 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Talking to groups and holding meetings 21.9 50.0 
Listening to constituents 28.1 16.7 
Attending local political party meetings 50.0 27.8 
Inspecting development projects  5.6 
 
FRELIMO MPs consistently prefer to meet with their party structures as the primary 
method of getting to know what is happening in a region. An important distinguishing 
element is that RENAMO MPs attribute more importance to listening to the traditional 
leaders and religious leaders as a primary method of information gathering than MPs from 
FRELIMO.  
 
Table 9.6: Primary methods used when consulting with constituents 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Attend general public meetings 
(open to all) 18.8 11.1 
Attend meetings with religious 
leaders  16.7 
Hold meetings with traditional 
authorities 6.3 16.7 
Hold meetings with party officials 
(local and regional level) 53.1 33.3 
Live in the constituency  5.6 
Hold meetings with 
community/civic leaders 21.9 16.7 
 
9.1.4 MPs’ frustration with the public and the public’s frustration with MPs 
 
MPs explained that they are the scapegoats for the public’s frustration with politics and 
their rulers. The leader of the FRELIMO parliamentary group gave the example of a 
recent story involving a FRELIMO MP. On a visit by President Guebuza to one of the 
provinces, one of the MPs of that region served as an interpreter from a local language to 
Portuguese. The MP explained to his colleague that on this trip he experienced one of the 
most embarrassing moments of his life. He was required to translate to the president that 
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the MPs did not work, that constituents did not even know who they were, yet they still 
saw them in their fancy cars.  
Another MP from RENAMO that gave an interview in a well-frequented hotel lobby 
explained that no one knew him or her. Being an MP in Mozambique is being at the lower 
end of the scale of political and social figures. There is no deference to them because of 
an awareness that they are MPs.  
 
The riots of February 5 in Mozambique started with an anonymous SMS stating: 
The people are suffering; the children of ministers, parliamentarians and other 
dignitaries do not take public transport, which is so expensive. On 5 February, 
nobody should take public transport (chapas); no one should work. We will 
strike and demand justice, comrades. Send to others, united in the fight against 
poverty46 (Serra, 2008). 
 
The MPs were in the first line facing the popular angry, because of the popular perception 
that life was not easy for most Mozambicans, yet the MPs had a comfortable life. 
 
9.1.5 Ranking of MPs’ functions 
 
Representing the people is seen as one of the main functions of Mozambican 
parliamentarians from both parties. There is a division between MPs who see themselves 
as representatives of the entire nation and those who see themselves as representatives 
only of their constituencies. Among the answers that were unusual in ranking 
parliamentarians were ‘strengthen democracy’ and ‘To guarantee that Frelimo will be 
always in power’.  
                                                 
46 «O povo está a sofrer, os filhos de ministros, deputados e outros dignitários não andam de chapa e os chapas 
estão caros. No dia 5 ninguém deve apanhar chapa, ninguém deve trabalhar. Vamos fazer greve e exigir 
justiça camaradas, envie para outros, seja unido na luta contra a pobreza» 
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Table 9.7: MPs’ opinions about their functions 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 
Be the link between people’s 
problems and the government 3.1  9.4 33.3 27.8 5.6 
Represent women 3.1 3.1 3.1 33.3 16.7 5.6 
Represent the party 6.3 12.5 15.6   22.2 
Perform party leadership duties 6.3 3.1 3.1 11.1  5.6 
Perform parliamentary duties 9.4 12.5 3.1   11.1 
Make laws 12.5 9.4 15.6 11.1 16.7  
Represent my constituency 25.0 18.8 15.6 5.6   
Represent all the people/the 
entire country 34.4 6.3 6.3  5.6  
Fight AIDS  3.1  5.6  5.6 
Oversight  21.9 18.8  11.1 5.6 
Strengthen democracy  6.3 3.1  22.2 27.6 
Contribute toward development  3.1 3.1   5.6 
Facilitate self-development      5.6 
Guarantee that Frelimo will 
always be in power   3.1    
 
9.2 Party discipline  
 
Parliaments in the majority of countries are composed predominantly of political parties. 
Parliaments in which MPs are elected through proportional electoral systems result in 
severe party discipline. This is because the re-election of MPs generally follows from the 
party’s will to include them on the list, rather than because of their acceptance or approval 
by the electorate. 
 
Carey (2003), in his research on the new Latin American democratic parliaments, 
concluded that party parliamentary groups were subordinate to the parties’ national 
structures, and that they therefore took their instructions on how to vote on specific issues 
from the national leadership. Party discipline is a well-known characteristic of the British 
parliament, and it shows no evidence of decline (Wright, 2000). Alberto Martins, leader 
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of the ruling party in Portugal, said in an interview with a newspaper, “Party discipline is 
to be assumed 47“(Mota, 2008).  
 
Taking into account the existence of party discipline in parliaments worldwide, it is no 
surprise that party discipline is even more severe in the Mozambican context, because this 
parliament is composed of only two political parties, and the electoral rivalry has been 
encouraged by mutual accusations of misbehaviour.  
 
MPs were asked to describe whether, when taking up a position in parliament, they 
followed the party, the party leader, the national interest, the electorate, or their 
convictions. Most MPs unequivocally replied that they followed the views of the party, 
although the majority of FRELIMO MPs did not agree with the differentiation between 
the views of the party and the national interest. 
 
Few FRELIMO MPs attributed the party’s views to the party leader – they asserted that 
the party leader was the one who needed to follow the party’s views, and not the other 
way around. As a result, FRELIMO tends to operate as a collective. 
 
On the other hand, RENAMO MPs consider the views of the party leader to be those of 
the party. For them, authority is vested with the individual.   
  
Table 9.8: Rankings of importance of factors when parliamentarians take up positions on issues in 
parliament       
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
The views of your party leader 3.1 5.6 
The views of your party 59.4 66.7 
The views of your constituents 6.3  
The national interest 28.1 22.2 
Your personal convictions 3.1 5.6 
 
To the question of how often their vote differed from that of the party, 9.4 percent of 
FRELIMO MPs replied that it had, at least once, but explained that rather than voting in 
agreement with RENAMO, they had instead abstained. RENAMO MPs voted more in 
                                                 
47 A disciplina de voto e auto-assumida.  
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line with the party’s parliamentary leadership. It was insightful to note that when asked if 
there were times when they would have liked to have voted differently to the party’s 
orientation on an issue, the percentage increased significantly. Of the RENAMO MPs, 22 
percent said that there were times when their vote would have differed from the party’s, 
whereas 25 percent of FRELIMO MPs stated that there were a few times when they voted 
against their wills, with a further 6.3 percent stating that this had happened often. 
 
Table 9.9: Party discipline 
  FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
How often (if ever) has your vote actually 
differed from the wishes of your political 
party? 
Never 90.6 94.4 
Once or twice 9.4 5.6 
How often (if ever) have you wished you 
could have voted differently from the wishes 
of your political party? 
Never 68.8 77.8 
Once or twice 12.5 11.1 
Occasionally 12.5 11.1 
Often 6.3 -- 
 
9.3 How do MPs become MPs 
 
9.3.1 The process of appearing in the electoral ballot  
 
This section shows that there are different routes to becoming an MP in both parties. 
FRELIMO MPs will, generally, have had experience of some kind of state functions, 
either at a provincial or local level. Mainly, they will have been party chiefs, in the 
provincial structures or at a local level. RENAMO MPs generally follow one of two main 
routes: Either they are linked to the traditional leaders through their historical opposition 
of FRELIMO, or they are part of a second-tier of younger, educated urban professionals 
who were integrated onto the RENAMO lists during the last election, after several former 
MPs were expelled from the party.  
 
The process through which the names of MPs came to be incorporated on party lists is not 
clear in both parties, but it is significantly less transparent in the case of RENAMO.  
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FRELIMO holds party quotas for women, the youth, former freedom fighters, turnover 
and continuity, and 10 percent of the list can be determined at a national level by the 
Political Commission, as established in the party rules (FRELIMO: 9 congresso, 2006, 
Article 78).  
  
Even though FRELIMO MPs were more explicit about how party lists were determined 
and how their names came to be on the list, there was still some incongruence – some said 
that their name was proposed by the party cell (the smallest unit of the party structure), 
and then it was voted onto the list at provincial level. It is at this point that there are 
discrepancies on how the process is conducted. Some said that voting by delegates at a 
provincial conference was secret, while others said that party secretariats decided at a 
provincial level who would be incorporated onto the list. Still, all FRELIMO MPs could 
explain which quota they represented and how their selection process was conducted. 
 
When it comes to RENAMO MPs, it is unclear whether there actually is an electoral 
process for selecting names for the party list. Among RENAMO parliamentarians, 
answers vary widely, from MPs who said that they were surprised when someone called 
to tell them that they would be included on the list, to others who explained that the 
invitation come directly from the president of the party. There are also those MPs who 
represent parties that are in coalition with RENAMO, in most cases being the leaders of 
their respective parties. 
 
The table below records the responses of MPs. The numbers need to be interpreted 
bearing in mind that the answers do not give a complete description of the voting 
methods. This was due to a lack of consistency or formalisation of the process, especially 
where during the competitive primary election candidates were elected name-by-name vs 
whether voting was done in respect of the list.  
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Table 9.10: How MPs names appear on the party’s electoral list 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Competitive primary election (where there 
were at least two candidates from the same 
party) 
40.6 22.2 
Nomination by local branch 3.1 __ 
Nomination by regional branch 12.5 16.7 
Nomination by national party 12.5 50.0 
Internal party quota (women, youth, former 
combatant48) 31.3 5.6 
 
9.3.2 Financial contributions of MPs for their electoral campaigns  
 
Electoral campaigns in Mozambique are funded by the political parties, who receive funds 
from the state. International funds are prohibited. The MPs surveyed stated that most of 
the time they relied on the party machinery and its funds. The Electoral Law (2004) 
entitles political parties to financial support from the state for their political campaigns. 
For the elections of 2004, the government distributed 45 billion meticais (approximately 2 
million USD): 550 000 USD to FRELIMO, 500 000 USD to RENAMO-UE, and 175 000 
USD to two small parties49 – PPD and PIMO. The remaining small parties that 
participated in the legislative elections each received 33 000 USD (Mazula, 2006, p. 136).  
 
FRELIMO MPs use far less personal funds than RENAMO MPs. Only 34% of 
FRELIMO MPs said they contributed personal funds, compared to 61% of RENAMO 
MPs who said that they used their own funds besides party funds. On average, FRELIMO 
MPs spent 12 249.9 meticais, while RENAMO MPs spent more than double that amount, 
at an average of 26 027.8 meticais. As is evident from the table below, there are other 
important differences in the patterns of behaviour between the MPs from both parties. 
FRELIMO MPs that did spend personal funds are concentrated in a very small range (25 
percent), with the maximum individual contribution being 150 000 meticais per annum. 
                                                 
48 This concept includes ex-fighters from both Mozambique’s colonial war and its civil war. 




On the other hand, most RENAMO MPs contributed from their personal funds, the 
maximum being 100 000 meticais per annum.  
   
Table 9.11: How much MPs spent on the last legislative electoral campaign (currency in meticais) 
  FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Mean 12 249.90 26 027.80 
Median  22 500.00 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 150 000 100 000 
Percentiles 
25 0 0 
50 0 225 00.00 
75 4 749.75 50 000.00 
 
9.3.3 Career management of MPs 
 
It seems that the political tenure of MPs is an uncertainty for the majority of them. Of the 
FRELIMO MPs, 75 percent were not sure whether they would keep their positions as 
MPs in the next mandate.  RENAMO MPs were more certain of their tenures, with 39 
percent feeling assured that they would continue as MPs. However, RENAMO MPs were 
more hesitant concerning the possibility that the party would gain seats in the next 
election, many explaining that the elections in Mozambique were not free and fair and 
that, as a result, RENAMO seats were always under-allocated relative to the actual 
number of votes.  
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Table 9.12: Rankings of political parties and own electoral prospects in the 2009 election 
  FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Confidence in 
how the party 
will do in the 
next election 
We should gain many more seats 59.4 61.1 
We should gain a few more seats 37.5 22.2 
We will come out of it with about the 
same number of seats 3.1 -- 
It is too uncertain to tell -- 16.7 
Confidence in 
own election 
I should retain my seat by a 
comfortable margin 15.6 38.9 
Things are too uncertain to tell 75.0 61.1 
I am concerned that I might lose by a 
close margin 3.1 __ 
Do not know 6.3 -- 
 
9.4 Who is the Mozambican MP 
 
In a study on the personal roots of American congress members, Burden (2007, p. 14) 
stated, “Researchers tend to assume that legislators either work only on behalf of their 
constituents or as foot soldiers for their political parties”. In the case where there is strict 
party discipline and where the electoral system attributes to political parties the monopoly 
in deciding who can become MPs, as is the case in Mozambique, the tendency that 
Burden mentioned can be even more valid. However, parties are constituted of members, 
and MPs are unquestionably the elite within the political party. Who they are and where 
they come from can enhance an understanding of the functioning of the Mozambican 
parliament.   
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Table 9.13: Sociodemographic and sociopolitical characteristics of Mozambican MPs 











Average age 47.8 47.1 48.9
Education (%) 
 Primary school 
 Incomplete secondary school 
 Secondary school 
 2-3 years of university 
 Degree 

























MPs’ primary residences 
 Maputo 










Religious believer (%) 92.0 87.5 100
Is a full time parliamentarian (%) 50.0 43.8 61.1
Number of legislatures (%) 
 One 
 Two 
 Three  




















Average number of legislatures  1.80 1.84 1.72
 
9.4.1 Presence of women 
 
The table above summarises the sociodemographic and sociopolitical characteristics of 
Mozambican MPs. It is evident that, overall, women hold 40 percent of the seats. The 
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FRELIMO50 parliamentary group significantly contributes to this number, with nearly 
double the number of women that RENAMO contributes. Women also hold important 
positions of power, starting with the Vice-President of the Assembly of the Republic51, 
Veronica Macamo (FRELIMO). Macamo is influential within FRELIMO and is seen as a 
strong candidate to become the speaker during the next term. Among the leadership of the 
parliamentary group, Margarida Talapa is the vice-president and Maria Ângela Manjate is 
the third-highest ranking. The parliamentary leadership of FRELIMO consists of two 
organs: the Chefia da Bancada – this forms the top leadership of the group and is made up 
of four people, of whom two are women – and the Conselho de Chefia, which is a larger 
organ including the four members of the Chefia plus all the party leaders of the provinces, 
the presidents and vice-presidents of the working committees, and all members of 
FRELIMO who are part of the Permanent Committee. The latter organ has 19 members, 
of which eight are women. FRELIMO’s quotas put the minimum percentage of women 
members on the party’s electoral lists in parliament at 33%. RENAMO, on the other hand, 
does not have any policy regarding women’s representation. In spite of this, the 2004 
legislature saw the parliamentary leadership group electing a woman to lead RENAMO-
UE’s parliamentary group.  
 
9.4.2 Education of MPs 
 
The average age of MPs determines that the majority of MPs were born prior to 
independence (25 June 1975). As is also shown in the table above, the average age of 
Mozambican MPs is 47.8. For this reason, almost all were educated under the one-party 
state and during the civil war, both of which constrained the day-to-day functioning of 
educational institutions. 
 
In this regard, there are no significant differences between both parties.  
 
After independence, the state and FRELIMO were almost one entity. The new state and 
the ruling party inherited a territory that had fought a colonial war for its liberation, 
                                                 
50 FRELIMO has historically been concerned with the emancipation of women; see, for example, the section 
devoted to the necessity of the emancipation of Mozambican women in one of the first speeches of Samora 
Machel (Machel, 1975).  
51 The Assembly has two vice-presidents, one from each party. 
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inherited a deficient number of qualified civil servants, due to the exit of many of the 
former Portuguese civil servants, and the low level of education of Mozambicans52. One 
of the ways in which allies of the new Marxist party contributed to the fledgling state was 
through scholarships. As a result, university education was mostly carried out in the 
former Soviet Union, China, Cuba, or Germany, as was evident in the replies of 
FRELIMO MPs in response to be being asked which university they had attended. Being 
selected for higher education was a matter of academic performance at school but also of 
party performance. It is therefore unclear which organisation – FRELIMO or the 
Mozambican State – enabled and approved a given individual’s further education, since 
the distinction between the two did not exist at that time. 
 
It is not surprising that FRELIMO MPs with a high level of education had attended 
universities such as Karl Marx University in Germany; the Military Academy of the 
former Soviet Union; the University Pedagogic Cuba; the Weimar Public Institute in 
Germany; and some universities in Portugal, such as the Open University of Portugal and 
the Law Faculty Porto of Portugal.  
 
On the other hand, the RENAMO MPs with a high level of education mainly studied in 
Portugal, at the following institutions: the Pharmacy Faculty in Lisbon, the Catholic 
University, and the Industrial Technical Institute. Of three RENAMO MPs surveyed, one 
studied at Clara Setkin, one at the University Rostock in Germany, and one at the 
University Polytechnic in Kenya. 
 
Of Mozambique’s universities, FRELIMO MPs studied at the University Eduardo 
Mondlane; the ISLE, Maputo; the University Pedagogic; the University Catholic, 
Mozambique; and the Institute Technical Industrial, Quelimane. Mozambican-educated 
RENAMO MPs graduated from the University Eduardo Mondlane, the Institute Public de 
Public Administration (Maputo) and the University Pedagogic.  
 
It is interesting to note that even though Maputo city and Maputo province represent only 
29 seats in total (see Table 9.2), which account for 19 percent of the total number of MPs, 
                                                 
52 In the 1970 census, the last one before independence in 1975, just 14 percent of the population was literate. 
Only 6 percent of women and 12 percent of men had completed a primary education (Sheldon,1998). 
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36 percent of the surveyed MPs listed Maputo as their primary residence. This was a 
result of the country’s services and education still being highly centralised in Maputo, and 
therefore, it was more convenient to be based in the capital. Some MPs explained that 
they kept two houses, one in Maputo and another in their province, since they spent half 
of the year in each of the two locations. The MPs from outside Maputo berated how 
difficult it was to manage two homes, even when one was just temporary. A female MP 
expressed her frustration with the conditions while in Maputo, suggesting that the 
president of the Assembly would do well to consider where and how MPs lived while in 
the capital. The MPs also explained that it was common for those MPs from outside 
Maputo to use their time in Maputo to study at the institutions of higher education. 
 
9.4.3 Religions of MPs 
 
Most of the Mozambican MPs are religious. It is a fact that RENAMO MPs show more 
devotion to religion than FRELIMO MPs. This is because FRELIMO, in the period 
following independence, had had an unsympathetic, if not hostile, relationship with the 
churches. However, with the opening of the multiparty regime, the religions and churches 
recovered their rapport with the state and subsequently with FRELIMO.  
 
One of the FRELIMO MPs, who identified herself as a religious person, explained that 
during the monoparty era it was not acceptable to be religious. Religious practices were 
seen as a threat to the party’s beliefs, and so this MP did not attend ceremonies such as 
baptisms or weddings for a number of years. The church therefore did not play an active 
part in the life of this MP for decades, until the political climate changed sufficiently to 
permit this MP to return to her religious practices and attend religious services. It is 
against this background that 87.5 percent of FRELIMO MPs identified themselves as 
religious.  
 
The only notable episode in the history of the Mozambican parliament relating to religion 
was the attempt in 1995 to create two Islamic public holidays. The proposal was drafted 
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by Muslim MPs from both parties and consisted of the creation of public holidays for Eid 
al-Adha (sacrifice) and Eid al-Fitr (fasting).53  
The debates became very heated, with parliament briefly dividing for the first time along 
religious lines and not along party lines. After a series of problematic sessions, parliament 
approved the law in 1996, but the Constitutional Court later considered the matter to be 
unconstitutional. Parliament subsequently decided to postpone sine die a new discussion 
of this law (Morier-Genoud, 2000). It is interesting to note that Mozambican MPs are 
distributed across several religions. The majority are Roman Catholic, FRELIMO with 
56.3% and RENAMO-UE with 44.4%. The second largest group in both parties is the 
Muslim group, accounting for 21.9% of FRELIMO MPs, and 5.6% of RENAMO MPs. 
 
9.4.4 Exclusiveness of MPs 
 
Table 9.13 shows the proportion of MPs who are exclusively dedicated to their 
position/profession. Of RENAMO MPs, 61 percent are full-time parliamentarians, 
compared with just 43.8 percent of full-time FRELIMO parliamentarians. Although MPs 
were not asked about the nature of their second occupation, some FRELIMO MPs 
voluntarily added that they held part-time positions in parastatal companies, or in private 
businesses.    
 
Regarding their legislative experience, also shown in Table 9.13, more than half of the 
MPs in the current legislature are first-time members of parliament. One might have 
expected a significant difference in this statistic between the two parties, since FRELIMO 
has been ruling the country since 1975, and in the one-party state period at that time, the 
Assembly existed as the Assembleia Popular; however, it is evident that most of the 
parliamentarians from both political parties are inexperienced.   
 
                                                 
53 Muslims have two celebrations (Eid), namely, Eid of Sacrifice and Eid of Fast-Breaking. The Eid of 
Sacrifice is in remembrance of the would-be sacrifice by Prophet Abraham of his son. The Eid of Fast-
Breaking comes at the end of the month of fasting, Ramadan. The close of the Hajj is marked by a festival, 
the Eid al-Adha, which is celebrated with prayers and the exchange of gifts in Muslim communities 
everywhere. This, and the Eid al-Fitr, a feast-day commemorating the end of Ramadan, are the main 




Regarding the previous occupations of MPs, the main occupations common to both 
parties was that of teacher. A close second for FRELIMO was that of party worker, while 
for RENAMO, business was the second most common previous occupation, and that of 
party worker was at third place. 
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Table 9.14: Main occupations prior to entering parliament 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Businessperson (owner of a business) 3.1 16.7 
Teacher or headmaster/headmistress 25.0 22.2 
Government worker/civil servant 3.1 11.1 
University lecturer or professor 9.4  
Guerrilla/liberation fighter 6.3 11.1 
Journalist 6.3  
Provincial governor 9.4  
Government minister 9.4 5.6 
Leader of association of former freedom fighters 3.1  
Worker of the party 21.9 11.1 
Army 3.1  
Traditional chief/headman  5.6 
Student  5.6 
Musician  5.6 
 
9.5 MPs’ assessments of the Assembly’s powers and performance  
 
9.5.1 The Assembly in comparison with the executive 
 
The Mozambican Constitution (2004a) makes the political system highly presidentialised. 
As described in Chapter 7, the Mozambican parliament holds little power in comparison 
with the executive. When it comes to the formation of the cabinet, the president holds 
unrestricted powers to appoint the premier and individual ministers. The Mozambican 
president does not even require a proposal54 from the premier to appoint individual 
ministers, which effectively means that the composition of the cabinet is at the president’s 
sole discretion. The only restraint placed on the president’s powers is that the president 
can be forced to dismiss a newly appointed premier and cabinet in the event that the 
government programme is rejected for a second time (Mozambique, 2007, Article 108). 
                                                 
54 As happens in other Portuguese-speaking African countries (Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola 
and Guinea Bissau). 
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The Mozambican president, furthermore, has unrestricted powers to dismiss both the 
premier and individual ministers.  
 
The National Assembly does not have the constitutional power to censure cabinet and 
cannot dismiss the government (as a whole or a single minister). It does not have any 
formal involvement in the process of forming the cabinet. The heads of the government 
and state combine in the president of the republic, but the one who is accountable to the 
National Assembly is the prime minister, to whom questions are submitted in the plenary. 
 
The president addresses the Assembly once a year, with no room for debate, and this 
normally takes the form of a ceremonial session where the president reports on the state of 
the nation55. In his address on the state of the nation in 2008, President Guebuza’s speech, 
spanning 39 pages and distributed to/by the media, surmised that the state of the nation 
was good, and this generated tension in the Assembly (Machava & Sidumo, 2009). The 
RENAMO-UE deputies refused to stand when the president entered the room and 
abandoned the plenary room, as a show of defiance, when the president began to talk 
about the fight against poverty (Serra, 2008, 24 December). 
 
Taking into account the limited constitutional powers of the Mozambican Assembly, it is 
perplexing how the Mozambican MPs can perceive that the Assembly has sufficient 
constitutional powers. Overall, 64 percent of Mozambican MPs considered the 
Mozambican parliament to hold the right amount of power. Even the RENAMO 
opposition MPs considered the constitution to be generous toward parliament, with 55.6 
percent of the opposition MPs indicating satisfaction with one of the most restrictive 
constitutions in Africa, regarding parliamentary powers56 (see table below). 
 
                                                 
55 In 2004, parliament approved a revision to the constitution that reversed the criminal immunity of the 
president. For crimes committed not relating to the exercise of his functions, the president will answer to the 
normal courts once his term in office expires. For crimes committed as president of the Republic, the 
Attorney General together with the Assembly (voted by two thirds) can impeach the president 
(Mozambican, 2004a, Art. 153). 
 
56 See, for example, the comparison of constitutional powers of African countries in Nijzink, Mozaffar & 
Azevedo, 2006.  
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One of the few MPs who were conscious of the limited powers of the Assembly 
commented on the recent case involving a change of ministers by President Guebuza, as 
an example of the resultant public embarrassment: “Following the last government 
alteration, two of the ministers were present in the Assembly when they were dismissed 
and no one knew about it. Not them, not us. The media informed us on our way out!”  
 
RENAMO MPs who said that the balance of powers were ‘about right’ justified this by 
adding that the problem was not the constitution but the lack of respect that FRELIMO 
had towards the constitution and the opposition.  
 
Table 9.15: MP’s perceptions of the constitutional powers of the National Assembly  
“Do you think parliament has too much, too little, or about the right amount of 
constitutional power? (Response in %) 
 Overall FRELIMO RENAMO-UE
 Much too little/too little 
 About right  
 Too much/far too much 
32.0 28.1 38.9 
64.0 68.8 55.5 
4.0 3.1 5.6 
 
When MPs were asked who, in practice, had the most power to determine what the 
government did, the answers from the two main parties were distinctly different. Of 
RENAMO MPs, 94.4 percent perceived the president to be the one who had full control 
of government activity, compared to just 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs who considered 
this to be the case. 
 
FRELIMO MPs were equally split over whether the president or the Assembly had more 
control over the government. The perceptions of FRELIMO MPs, however, were 
contextualised by their stating that FRELIMO held the president accountable, and 
consequently, it was FRELIMO MPs who made sure that the government was 
accountable. This question was interpreted sensitively by FRELIMO MPs, especially by 
the more experienced ones, as FRELIMO is not a party of one person; one MP clearly 
stated this to be the case “because we argue about everything in the central committee”. 
This statement is indicative of the FRELIMO argument that the party itself keeps the 
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executive accountable. However, as was further revealed by their statements, this takes 
place behind closed doors, between the members of the political party.   
 
Table 9.16: MP’s perceptions about who holds more power – the Assembly or the president of the 
Republic      
“In practice, who has the most power to determine what government does, parliament or the 
presidency, or do they have the same amount of power?” (Responses in %) 
 Overall FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Presidency, much more 60.0 40.7 94.4 
Presidency 2.0 3.1 -- 
About the same 28.0 40.6 5.6 
National Assembly 10.0 15.6 -- 
    
 
9.5.2 Assessment of the Assembly by MPs 
Following the comparison of the powers of the Assembly and the executive, MPs were 
also asked to assess the Assembly’s powers related to controlling its own proceedings, the 
Assembly’s qualified staff, and the Assembly’s budget. The findings give cause for 
concern, with a clear majority of MPs on both sides stating that the Assembly holds very 
little power.  
 
Table 9.17: MPs’ assessment of the Assembly’s powers 
Power to control own proceedings Qualified staff 
 Overall, 48% said “about right” and 
48% said “much too little/too little” 
 68.8% of FRELIMO MPs answered 
“about right” 
 83.3% of RENAMO answered “much 
too little/too little” 
 Overall, 60% said “much too little/too 
little”, and 38% said “about right” 
 46.9% of FRELIMO MPs answered 
“much too little/too little” 
 83.3 % of RENAMO MPs answered 
“much too little/too little” 
 
Subsequent to expressing their belief that the powers of the Assembly were insufficient, 
MPs were asked whether the situation that they described had got worse or improved 
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during the last five years. Overall, 60 percent of MPs said that it had got worse, and 10 
percent said there had been no improvement in the status.  
 
Table 9.18: MPs’ perceptions of the extent of the Assembly’s power  
Over the past five years, has parliament’s influence in governing the country increased, 
decreased, or remained the same? 
 Overall FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Decreased somewhat 60.0 59.4 61.1 
Stayed about the same 10.0 __ 27.8 
Increased a great deal 30.0 49.6 11.1 
 
9.6 Budget oversight 
 
One of the crucial moments annually, if not the most crucial, of any parliament is the 
approval of the national budget and later the approval of the report of how the budget was 
approved. Regardless of the strength of parliaments, this is an unalterable instance of 
parliament’s power over the executive. Constitutions all over the world define the 
obligation of the executive at this time as being to submit their activities to the will and 
scrutiny of members of parliament. The Mozambican constitution has at least five articles 
(Articles 128, 130, 131, 179 and 206) that specify that the Assembly of the Republic is the 
institution that will deliberate and approve the national budget. Article 130 of the 
constitution is dedicated to the national budget, stating, “The proposal of the legal budget 
is elaborated on by the government and submitted to the Assembly of the Republic57”. 
Article 131 states that the Tribunal de Contas58 and the Assembly of the Republic will 
exercise oversight in respect of the execution of the national budget. Article 179(m) states 
that it is the exclusive59 responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic to approve the 
national budget.   
 
                                                 
57 Translation by the author : “3. A proposta de Lei do Orçamento do Estado é elaborada pelo Governo e 
submetida à Assembleia da República”. Author’s bold font.  
58 Accounts Court. 
59 Author’s italics 
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For this reason, the survey included questions to measure how Mozambican MPs 
perceived their roles as main actors in the approval of the national budget, and in their 
appreciation and deliberation of the report of the Tribunal de Contas.   
The results presented in the table below are, therefore, a cause for concern. FRELIMO 
MPs and RENAMO MPs believe that eight in ten MPs have a poor or very poor 
understanding of the national budget, and seven in ten have a poor or very poor 
understanding of the report of the Tribunal de Contas.  
 
Table 9.19: MPs’ perceptions of the ability of MPs to understand the national budget and the 
report of the Tribunal de Contas60 
  FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
National Budget 
Very poor 15.6 27.8 
Poor 59.4 50.0 
Good 25.0 22.2 
Report Tribunal de 
Contas 
Very poor 12.5 22.2 
Poor 59.4 44.4 
Good 28.1 33.3 
 
The results shown above raise doubts about how the process of the approval of the 
national budget is acknowledge and shared by the majority of MPs. However, with regard 
to the national budget, there are considerations that should be taken into account in order 
to form a better judgment of MPs: first, the country is a direct donor-aid recipient, and 
second, there is a culture among MPs that the doctors 61 would take care of the budget. 
 
9.6.1 Disempowered MPs  
  
Starting with the last point, the Mozambican Assembly has a single committee that deals 
with the budget and with the Tribunal de Contas (Report on the Budget). As a result, this 
committee invests considerable energy in preparing for the deliberation on both 
documents that will dictate the verdict. Both are presented in the plenary.  
 
                                                 
60 Accounts Court 
61 The term doctor is used for any person with a degree. In this case, the word is used in reference to the 
economists or accountants in parliament.  
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This committee is presided over by an MP Virgina Videira. Virginia is seen as one of the 
good old vanguard of FRELIMO party members from after independence, meaning that 
she is an honest, dedicated and a hard worker. She has been the president of the working 
committee since 1994.  
 
The boundary between the party, the executive, and parliament was definitely 
questionable when the president of the parliamentary committee that oversaw the budget 
was also part of the cabinet as advisor to the minister of finance. In institutions that 
function normally, this would be impossible, with some parliaments even stipulating in 
their standing orders that the president of the parliamentary committee needs to be from 
the opposition, as happens in the Cape Verdean Assembly.  
 
Therefore, what the Mozambican committee does at this stage does not constitute political 
oversight of the budget, but rather a form of technical oversight of the budget. There is 
constructive dialogue between the committee and the minister regarding technical gaps, 
necessary clarifications, etc. These limitations are acknowledged by MPs themselves. 
When MPs were asked to indicate the extent of their influence over the budget, 60% said 
that they felt that they had ‘too little/much too little’ influence. They felt even more 
disempowered concerning the international loans signed by the executive; 80% said that 
they had ‘too little/much too little’ influence in this matter.  
 
The working committee received a genuine expression of appreciation from MPs, with 
80% of them stating that the working committee did a ‘good’ job in its analysis of the 
budget and the Tribunal de Contas. It is even more representative of the lack of political 
awareness in this matter when the positive evaluation is made across both political parties. 
What contributes to this is the friendly relationship that the president of the committee 
(FRELIMO) has with the vice-president of the committee (RENAMO), which in the 
context of the Mozambican Assembly is seen as remarkable.  
 
9.6.2 The hijacking of parliament’s role in the national budget  
 
The political problem derives from the involvement of parliament at a late stage in the 
elaboration on the budget. As result of the country’s budgetary dependence on 
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international donors, when the budget arrives at the Assembly, it has already been 
negotiated politically and technically with the international agencies and, in the case of 
Mozambique, with the consortium that groups the 19 aid donors.  
 
During 2003, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed for programme aid 
(direct budgetary support) between the Mozambican government and the Programme Aid 
Partners (PAPs) (PAP Structure, 2009). This agreement established a form of consortium 
of 1962 cooperation partners who provide direct support to the Mozambican state’s 
national budget. In 2007, the budget support programme pledged 377 million USD. The 
Mozambican model of management of aid in the form of direct support of the budget is 
seen by the partners as a “…sophisticated and innovative process, which is already seen 
as an example to be replicated in other African countries and beyond”63 (The Programme 
Aid Partnership in Mozambique, 2009, #7). According to PAP, the direct-aid support of 
the national budget of Mozambique is one of the largest joint programmes in Africa, both 
in terms of amounts and the number of partners involved (The Programme Aid 
Partnership in Mozambique, 2009). The hope of the donors is that this sophisticated 
model of aid will:  
 
Provide an important avenue for dialogue between government and donors 
on development policies and public spending choices. In other words, 
general budgetary support allows for a dialogue that is more focused on key 
policy priorities instead of highly repetitive and fragmented dialogue 
processes with individual donors. The transfer of financial resources alone 
does not automatically generate policy, institutional and governance 
improvements: appropriate technical assistance and policy dialogue are also 
needed. (The Programme aid Partnership in Mozambique, 2009). 
 
Throughout the website developed by the PAPs and the Mozambique, government there 
is only one mention of the Assembly of the Republic’s role in the national budget. The 
PAPs not only design the policies and priorities but also assume their monitoring and 
execution, ministry by ministry. Complex and technical indicators were designed by the 
                                                 
62 The partners are the African Development Bank (ADB), Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European 
Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank.  
63 See also the World Bank statement about the success of this model of aid in Mozambique (Mozambique – 
Mozambique emerges as a success story on donor harmonization, 2009). 
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international organisations’ workers that ‘check’ the Mozambican government’s 
performance. This, again obviates any role that parliament could have in this matter. It is 
interesting to note that PAP does create working groups where civil society groups are 
invited to participate, but no MPs are part of the monitoring component of PAP64, except 
that in a recent memorandum of understanding, there is mention that the Mozambican 
government is accountable to Mozambique citizens through the Assembly of the 
Republic. The European commission explains the section involved as follows:  
 
The G19 works at three levels: (1) Ambassadors engage in political 
dialogue with the government on sensitive issues (e.g. corruption); (2) 
heads of cooperation steer the work – from the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP), donors choose their priorities; (3) economists 
and sector specialists work in 24 working groups, along with the 
government, donor representatives and civil society.65 The budget 
support group focuses on financial management, with five working 
groups: tax, budgetary analysis, procurement, auditing, and systems 
of financial administration (German Foundation for World 
Population, 2009, p. 2) 
 
9.7 MP’s views on the public disclosure of assets  
 
Mozambican MPs were asked if they would support the implementation in Mozambique 
of a public disclosure of assets of the president of the republic, members of the 
government, MPs and judges. The table below shows interesting variations on which 
disclosures the MPs would support and which they would not support. Regarding the 
president of the republic, only 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs would support disclosure, 
compared with 88.9 percent for RENAMO. Regarding members of the government, 53.1 
percent of FRELIMO MPs supported the public disclosure of the assets of the 
government, with 94.4 percent of MPs from RENAMO-UE supporting this.   
 
                                                 
64 For information on how PAPs work, see the webpage of the programme, 
http://www.pap.org.mz/history.htm, online 5 January 2009.  
65 Civil society is represented through a group called the G20, which includes churches, labour unions, 
networks of NGOs, the private sector, and academics. 
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It is important to note that the reactions of MPs to this question included apprehension, 
laughter, asking whether the questionnaire was really anonymous, and a very few being 
upset with the inclusion of this question.   
 
Regarding the question about public disclosure for the president of the republic, one of the 
MPs who did not agree, justified this, saying, “No, because he has a lot, and people will 
not understand”. Another FRELIMO MP who did not support public disclosure for the 
president and members of government but who did support public disclosure for MPs and 
judges said, “I will definitely support this in the near future, but at the moment we are not 
prepared”.  
 
Regarding the disclosure of assets by themselves, some of the MPs chose no disclosure, 
justifying this by saying, “How can I be corrupt? We don’t manage any money”, but 
others who also insisted that they could not be corrupt because they did not manage 
money, still preferred disclosure, for the sake of example and transparency, in the words 
of one MP, “Everyone should do it, even those who just have a cow or a goat!”  
 
One MP who emphatically did not agree with such measures gave the example of the 
Minister of Finances, Manuel Chang, who had made the mistake of declaring his assets 
publicly, and the result, according to this MP, was petty and malicious ‘talking’ in the 
newspapers based on malevolent speculations. According to the weekly newspaper 
Savana, the Minister had made public his assets in 2005 when joining the government. In 
the words of the newspaper, the minister had “… at the commencement of his functions in 
2005, believed, maybe naïvely, that transparency and integrity were the most important 
characteristics of a public servant; he was the only high-powered public servant who had 
publicly declared his assets”66 (2008, p. 2)   
 
The salaries of the members of government and of MPs are a secret in Mozambique. In 
2006, when the author tried to obtain information from the Assembly of the Republic 
about MP’s salaries, it was explained that this was confidential information. In 2008, in 
confidence, the author got access from MPs to the Assembly’s resolution detailing 
                                                 
66 Author’s translation: “ No inicio das suas funcoes em 2005, acreditou, talvez ingenuamente que a 
transparencia e integridade eram a cracteristica principal de um servidor publico; foi ate aqui o unico 
funcionario superior do governo a declarar publicamente os seus bens”. 
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salaries. From the staff this would definitely have been impossible, still based on the 
premise that MPs would not like it (which in general is the truth). The deputies’ salaries 
are not determined by a particular law. Rather, these are established in Norma de 
execuçao orçamental interna67, which is updated annually in line with national salary 
increases. The monthly salary for the deputies for 2007 was 46 000.00 MTN (1 750 
USD). The national minimum salary was 1 443.17 MTN (55 USD) (Portal do Governo de 
Moçambique, 2009). 
 
This culture of secrecy is justified by the view that ‘they’, the people, would not 
understand, since the average of salaries is very low in the country. The culture of secrecy 
goes as far as the MPs themselves, who do not know how much the salary of the president 
of the Assembly is. The resolution regarding the assembly salaries approved by MPs 
includes information on all MPs, with the exception of the president of the Assembly.   
 
Table 9.20: Support vs opposition to legally requiring selected groups to publicly disclosure their 
assets, with strong sanctions for non-disclosure  
      FRELIMO     RENAMO-UE
   Support Oppose DN Support Oppose DN
President of the republic 40.6 50 9.4 88.9 5.6 5.6
Members of government 53.1 43.75 3.1 94.4   5.6
Judges 56.3 37.5 3.1 83.3 5.6 6.3
MPs 43.7 53.1 6.3 88.9 5.6 5.6
 
The economic growth of Mozambique since the peace agreement in 1992 and the 
establishment of a multiparty regime pleased international donors, who considered 
Mozambique a success story. However, the assassinations of the journalist Carlos 
Cardoso in 2000 and the bank manager Siba Siba Macuacua in 2001 tainted this image of 
success. Cardoso and Macuacua were investigating and denouncing a case of fraud 
relating to the privatisation of the two major Mozambican Banks – 400 million USD went 
missing from the Mozambique banking system in the 1990s (Hanlon, 2004, p. 747).  
                                                 
67 Internal norms for budgetary execution. 
68 Rules for budgetary execution.  
240 
These public scandals took on an international dimension that in 2000 caused 
international donors to suspend the transfer of aid funds until the government committed 
to taking measures against corruption (Mosse, 2008, p. 67). However, this suspension was 
very short-lived, when two months after the death of Siba Siba Macuacua at the donor 
consultative group meeting in October 2001 it was decided to give 722 million USD 
dollars to the Mozambican government. The government had only requested 600 million 
USD; this increase by the donors was, according to the minister of security at the time, 
Sergio Vieira, in recognition of good governance that “overrides the bank scandal and the 
assassinations of Siba-Siba Macuacua and Carlos Cardoso” (Vieira, 2001, quoted by 
Hanlon, 2004, p. 748). The Mozambican government report containing the policy on anti-
corruption stated the following:   
 
The low wages in the public sector and poverty that affect most 
Mozambicans, while creating a favourable environment for so-called petty 
corruption (bribery, extortion and illegal charges), is not the direct cause of 
the proliferation of acts and practices of corruption. Rather, the promoters of 
the acts of corruption are some public officials, well paid and knowledgeable 
of the rules and laws, that moved by the spirit of living ostentatiously use 
their power and knowledge to extort money from the public and erode the 
coffers of the state69. (Mozambique: Comissão Interministerial Da Reforma 
Do Sector Público, 2006, p. 3) 
 
Corruption is a recurring debate in the Assembly’s plenary, with RENAMO-UE deputies 
often bringing the topic to the plenary, accusing FRELIMO of covering and blocking the 
debate. However, one the most striking statements in the plenary about the death of Carlos 
Cardoso was made by the FRELIMO deputy Teodato Hunguana in 2002 before the order 
of the day, and then published in a local newspaper: 
 
The only way to prevent the State from becoming riddled with crime is to 
trigger an all-out war against crime and its promoters, and also against its 
performers or instruments. A fight against the latter, leaving the promoters 
unscathed and untouchable, means keeping intact the sources of their 
                                                 
69 “Os baixos salários auferidos no sector público e a pobreza que afecta a maioria dos moçambicanos , 
embora criem um ambiente favorável a chamada pequena corrupção (suborno, extorsão e cobranças il 
ícitas), não são a causa directa da proliferação de actos e práticas de corrupção. Pelo contrário, os 
promotores dos actos de corrupção são alguns funcionários e agentes públicos bem pagos e conhecedores 
das normas, leis e informação mas que movidos do espírito de viver faustosamente usam o seu poder e 
conhecimentos para extorquir o cidadão e delapidar os cofres do Estado.” Translation by the author.  
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proliferation, sources that are becoming more dangerous and capable of 
taking ownership of the state itself (Hunguana, 2002). 
 
Hunguana’s speech was a clear statement that corruption existed in the highest spheres of 
the state, and that this required incisive action from his own party.  
  
One of the measures known as important in promoting transparency and, consequently, 
fighting corruption is the enforcement of public disclosures of the assets of public 
officials or politicians. The public disclosure of assets by politicians is especially 
important in new democracies, as a tool for increasing the confidence of the electorate 
(Carlson & Walecki, 2006; Goredema & Montsi, 2002).   
 
9.8 Assembly of the Republic’s own budget 
 
As has already been stated in Chapter 2, the approval of the Assembly’s budget by the 
Assembly, and not by the government, is seen to be an indication of the strength of a 
parliament (Barkan, 2005). This is the case in Mozambique, where the parliamentary 
budget is approved by the Assembly and not by the government. However, this approval 
is unofficially negotiated beforehand between parliament and the minister of finance. In 
theory, parliament decides its own budget; in practice, the negotiation process is more of a 
consultation process, where the government asks about the expectations of the Assembly, 
but the final decision is really the governments. In spite of the reduced budget, there is no 
history of the Assembly condemning the amount allocated. Furthermore, the 
modernisation of the public administration in Mozambique represents a setback, with all 
payments (except salaries) being made through the central government. Suppliers receive 
payments from the ministry of finance, and not from the accounting department of 
parliament.  
 
The only financial transactions that the Assembly has to manage are salaries and donors’ 
money that is allocated directly to the Assembly.  
 
Since 1994, according to the parliamentary staff and deputies, there has been no evidence 
of discontent by the political leadership of the Assembly with regard to the behaviour of 
the executive in this matter. The Assembly’s budget is presented further on in this chapter. 
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As is shown in Chapter 7, the Assembly of the republic receives a paltry budget compared 
with other state institutions. As is also observed in its analysis of the budget for 2009, the 
Mozambican civic organisation Centro de Integridade Publica, in its report, stated, “The 
budget is once again concentrated on the executive (98%). The Assembly of the Republic 
has the same budget for current expenses as the cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic 
and the Services of Information and State Security have” (CIP, 2009).  
 
Mozambican MPs also seem to be frustrated with their own power regarding the 
Assembly’s budget: 89 percent of RENAMO MPs say that MPs have too little influence 
over parliament’s budget; 68.8 percent of FRELIMO MPs share this sentiment. Still, 18.8 
percent of FRELIMO MPs are relatively happy with the Assembly’s budget.  
  
Table 9.21: MPs’ perceptions of their own influence over parliament’s budget 
With regard to parliament's own budget, does parliament have too much influence, about 
the right amount of influence, or too little influence over each of the following? 
 FRELIMO RENAMO-UE 
Too little/much too little 68.8 88.9
About right 18.8 -- 




Mozambican MPs are the contented foot soldiers of their political parties. What in the 
previous chapter was seen as a critique of parliament is shown here to be the only option 
MPs consider as being available to them. Also, the mistrust between the parties reinforces 
the sentiment that the party needs to be strong collectively. In a democracy, MPs from 
different parties are political adversaries and not enemies; in Mozambique, the transition 
from enemies to political adversaries is not yet complete.  
 
Two truths exist about contact between citizens and MPs – citizens indicated that they did 
not have contact, while MPs indicated that they did. As is shown in Table 3.10, the ratio is 
1 member of parliament per 100 000 of the populace, as it is in most of the countries 
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covered in the study. This ratio, along with the fact that Mozambican MPs always work as 
the representatives of their parties, weakens the association between citizens and MPs.  
With regard to interpreting relations with the executive, there are significant distinctions 
between FRELIMO and RENAMO MPs; however, in terms of socioeconomic 
background, there are no significant differences between both parties. There is a 
perception that RENAMO has fewer educated members, and while this may be the truth 
outside of parliament, inside parliament there are no noteworthy educational differences.  
 
A recurring pattern among RENAMO MPs’ responses is a fear for the democratisation 
process and a disbelief in the fairness of elections.  
 
Regarding the development of the Assembly, MPs stated categorically that the Assembly 
had worsened in recent years. This was related to mainly working conditions and the 
power of the Assembly over its own budget.    
 
A surprise finding is MPs’ beliefs that the Assembly holds sufficient constitutional 
powers, when actually the powers of the Assembly are nearly limited to the approval of 
the government program and the national budget.  
 
The donors’ intervention of direct aid to the budget, although made with goodwill, has, 
has added force to the notion of parliament being merely a rubber stamp, with the 
resultant weakening of parliament.    
 
Accountability and corruption are crucial issues in the process of consolidating 
democracy in Mozambique. These challenges seem more difficult with the role of the 
Assembly being limited to the formality of budget approval. The fight against corruption 
has been posited as a government priority; however, the culture of lack of transparency is 
a severe threat to the success of this offensive. There is even more reason for concern 
when, within the house that should be the guardian of the interests of the citizens in 
relation to the rulers, the practice is one of protecting the rulers from the citizens, as is the 
case with the opposition among MPs to the prospect of an enforced disclosure of assets. 






10.1 Parliament as seen by the public and parliament’s negative self-
image  
 
In March of 2007, the late general secretary of the Mozambican Assembly, Carlos 
Manuel, tried to persuade me to choose a topic other than my study of the public’s 
perceptions of parliament, saying, “Why do you want to know what the public says 
about us. I can tell you in just three words what their image of parliament is – a) useless; 
b) unperturbed, and c) too expensive” (Interview with the author, March 17, 2007). This 
statement reveals the widespread perception among staff and parliamentarians that the 
public perceives the Assembly negatively. However, this negative image is, as it turns out, 
not completely shared by the public.  
 
In the majority of countries surveyed, citizens, on average, gave a positive evaluation of 
their parliaments, especially on the measure of ‘trust’. In particular, regarding the 
Mozambican parliament, the Mozambican stakeholders stressed that, despite the fact that 
they attributed a low evaluation of their parliament's performance, they saw the 
Mozambican parliament as a vital institution. Certainly, the Mozambican parliament is 
not a ‘lost cause’ in civic stakeholders’ minds.  
 
The Mozambican stakeholders were aware of the problems that the Assembly had faced 
since its inception, but conceded that there had been improvements during the three 
multiparty mandates. In particular, they expressed the desire for parliament to do better in 
future, since they saw parliament's role as being crucial for the sustainability of the 
Mozambican political system. It is also interesting to note that the Mozambican public 
opinion leaders interviewed were engaged with the daily activities of parliament, and the 
plenary sessions were followed with interest.  
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African multiparty parliaments are still in their infancy. As shown in the study, the 
average age of the multiparty parliaments in the 18 countries is 16.2 years, and on 
average, they have experienced four mandates.  
 
The parliaments of six countries – Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Tanzania – have been given just three mandates. It is known that the roles of 
legislatures can be influenced by the circumstances of their origin and their age (Muslof & 
Smith, 1979).  
 
This period in their evolution presented problems of internal institutionalisation for 
legislatures in maturing their staff, procedures, rules, and the experience of politicians. It 
also presented the challenge to these parliaments of consolidating their space and role 
among others political institutions and, equally important, of fostering a relationship with 
the public.  
 
The main problem is that the challenges need to be embraced simultaneously. To some 
extent, these parliaments have been doing this, but it is a complex process. Aside from 
elections, parliaments are the main arena of political competition, made up of the cream of 
the country’s politicians. Consequently, parliaments are the alma maters of politics. This 
could sound infelicitous, but it is not, considering the persistent negativism that 
parliaments in Africa have been receiving in the literature (Nijzink, Mozaffar, Azevedo, 
2006).    
 
There is also the naive idea that there is too much politics in Assembly. The truth is that 
politics is the nature of parliaments. This question takes us back to the meaning of 
politics. As Sartori (1973) postulates, politics is different from morality, religion, ethics 
and economics. The problem is the stereotypical perception that politicians are morally 
worse than the rest of us (Walzer & Action, 1973). In emerging democracies, these 
stereotypical perceptions seem to be worse, due to the severe poverty and inequality that 
exists in these countries, and due to the narrow frontier between politics, private business 
and control of the state.   
 
By comparison, African citizens show higher levels of trust and job approval for both 
institutions than citizens in the Western world do. The literature on African 
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democratisation is often tainted by negativism and scepticism. By contrast, for now, 
African citizens’ evaluations look like a vote of confidence in their political institutions. 
 
Democratically elected African parliaments need to make an effort to be accessible to 
their communities. However, as previous analyses in other parts of the world have shown, 
this will most probably result in more critical attitudes and greater demands from citizens 
towards parliamentarians. Democracy is not supposed to be a quiet game between citizens 
and their elected representatives. Gaining citizens’ support is not just crucial for 
parliaments in these countries to function, it can also be crucial for their very survival. As 
Doorenspleet (2005, p. 84) put it, “These democratic institutions can also become a 
democratic façade without the support of citizens.”   
 
10.2. Public’s perception of the fairness of elections, and the effect of 
party allegiance on perception of parliament   
 
The public’s support for the majority of the legislatures in this study is widespread, but 
the findings also revealed that the level of support varies as a result of individual 
characteristics. Unlike previous studies by Doorenspleet (2005) on the Malians’ support 
for legislatures, this larger analysis of 18 countries indicates that political characteristics 
are more important concerning how citizens evaluate their parliaments than 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as poverty.   
 
Measuring the impact of different individual characteristics on the composite index 
‘LegislativeScore’ shows that the characteristics that have an effect on the score are not 
those that are inherent to socioeconomic status, such as habitat, gender or poverty, but 
rather those relating to the political profile of the individual: party allegiance and 
perception of the fairness of elections. These last two variables show a pattern of 
influence in the majority of countries surveyed. 
 
In democratic regimes, the formation of parliaments results from elections. By their cast 
vote, citizens choose the composition of their parliaments. Therefore, the way in which 
citizens perceive their parliaments will be a product of how free and fair they believe the 
elections that composed the houses were. The findings of this thesis reveal that this was 
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not just a likely hypothesis, but indeed, a fact. African citizens are still sceptical about the 
fairness of their elections, and this affects the way that they perceive their parliaments.    
 
Perceptions of the fairness of elections influenced the LegislativeScore in 15 of the 18 
countries; the only three where this variable did not have an effect were Benin, South 
Africa, and Namibia. In the remaining 15 countries, those who perceived elections to have 
been ‘completely free and fair’ consistently increased the score significantly.  
 
Individuals aligned with opposition parties attributed a higher LegislativeScore to their 
parliaments. On the other hand, when this phenomenon was investigated among the ruling 
parties’ supporters, party allegiance had an impact on the LegislativeScore in 15 of the 18 
countries (the three countries where the variable was not significant were Botswana, 
Ghana and Mali). Among the other 14 countries, participants aligned with the ruling party 
further contributed to the score in just seven countries: Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, 
Malawi, Madagascar and Kenya. In these seven, the contribution to the score from 
participants aligned with the ruling party was consistently lower than from those aligned 
with the opposition. The other seven countries where only opposition-party affiliation is a 
factor are Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Namibia, Senegal, Zimbabwe, and 
Tanzania. 
 
Parliaments are particular institutions composed, not of a united group, but of political 
rivals. Accurately described as representative institutions, parliaments clearly cannot 
please all citizens in equal measure if they are to perform this role. Which political parties 
citizens support is a factor that contributes to their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their 
parliaments.   
 
These findings represent both positive and not such positive news. The positive aspect is 
that poverty is not a veil of ignorance that conceals politics from citizens’ 
consciousnesses, as is often portrayed. Being poor does not mean that the citizen will be 
less politicised. The less positive aspect is that in Africans’ minds the fairness of elections 
is still a problem. The mistrust of the election process poses a serious problem for the 
legitimisation of the elected legislatures.  
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A more ‘neutral’ finding is that party allegiance does affect citizens’ appreciation of their 
parliaments. Again, this reinforces the independence of the citizen’s habitat as a 
determinant of politicisation: Whether rural or urban, educated or not educated, wealthy 
or poor, party allegiance plays a role.   
 
10.3 Electoral systems and party dominance do not affect the public’s 
perception of parliaments   
 
The closed-party-list proportional electoral system, which exists in South Africa, has been 
blamed for the alleged weakening of the South African parliament. The new political 
party in South African politics, formed by ANC dissidents, has been the most vocal 
supporter of the need to change the current electoral system (Southall, 2008). The former 
leader of the South African opposition party Tony Leon dedicated a full chapter of his 
biography to the decline of the South African democratic parliament from 1994 to the 
present. In his words, the decline of parliament has resulted in its becoming an ‘ethics free 
zone’ (Leon, 2008, p. 390). Patricia de  Lille, another opposition party leader and an MP 
known for her inquiries in parliament into political scandals such as the arms deal, seems 
to share this view, as one of her main slogans for the elections in 2009 has been "We want 
to put criminals in jail and not in Parliament" (“ID will reintroduce Scorpions: De Lille”, 
2009).   
 
In the academic literature, the debate regarding choice of electoral system has been an 
ongoing and classic one. Some scholars argue that proportional systems facilitate a better 
representation of societal and minority groups and, therefore, which will result in citizens 
being supportive of their institutions (Lijphart, 1999; Anderson, 1998). Other scholars, by 
contrast, argue that constituency systems show higher levels of satisfaction with the state 
and the regime, since under such systems voters have greater choice through their vote, 
which serves to strengthen the link between voters and the elected (Farrel and McAllister, 
2006; Norris, 1999).   
 
This thesis examines the impact of the electoral systems of the 18 countries studied 
against the way in which citizens perceive their parliaments. The cross-country analysis 
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does not reveal a relationship between a particular electoral system and a parliament’s 
pattern of support by its citizens.  
 
The dominance of ruling parties represents an area of interest that was also tested to 
examine whether party dominance was an influential variable indicating the way that 
citizens perceived their parliaments. As happened with the variable electoral system, this 
hypothesis was refuted. The parliament of Tanzania, where 87 percent of the seats were 
occupied by the ruling party, exhibited consistently higher appreciation from its 
electorate; on the other hand, the parliaments of Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya exhibited 
the lowest average scores for citizens’ appreciation.   
 
10.4 Citizens’ distinction between parliaments and presidents   
 
A legitimate concern regarding the elected legislatures in Africa is how they are handling 
the legacy of strong executives. The lessons from Latin America show that in new 
democracies strong executives dominate politics, placing parliaments on a lower level of 
the political hierarchy. It is also known that the majority of the African constitutions gave 
generous powers to executives, to the detriment of parliaments. This study, however, 
suggests that African citizens do make a distinction between presidents and parliaments.  
 
Citizens show an aptitude for having opinions about both institutions, which is 
particularly important as a pre-requisite for accountability. The positive evaluation of 
presidents does not imply unconditional support. The findings reveal that citizens do not 
want to lose gains made in the multiparty regime; parliaments are preferred to presidents 
as lawmakers. The findings also reveal that despite appreciation of the current presidents, 
citizens prefer to place limits on their functions and powers.  
 
The preceding findings on citizens’ attitudes towards parliaments are an important 
barometer of how these institutions are seen by external actors. Of equal importance is 




10.5 Members of parliament   
 
Parliamentarians are the main feature of a parliament. Parties, staff, rules and resources 
are fundamental to the functioning of a parliament, but the main actors in the plenary 
sittings, in the committees, in the corridors of parliaments are the MPs. They are the 
features of a parliament. As shown in Table 3.7, the parliaments in this study had, on 
average, four electoral cycles. The parliamentarians in these parliaments are pioneers. 
They lead their daily parliamentary lives based not on the precedent of a remote past but 
by relying on their own good sense and expertise. The parliaments in this study are 
grouped according to size; for example, the South African parliament has 399 MPs, while 
the Botswanan parliament has 62 MPs. Fifty Mozambican MPs were interviewed for this 
study. 
 
Mozambique’s Assembly consists of 250 deputies elected using a closed-party-list 
system, and 11 multi-member constituencies made up of the provinces (12 to 50 
representatives for each, based on population). Each deputy is entrusted to represent the 
entire country, and not only the district where he or she was elected (Mozambique 
Constitution, 2004, Article 168). 
 
The Mozambican civic leaders interviewed denounced as a weakness of the Mozambican 
parliament the extreme party-centricity its members exhibited. The study on the 
Mozambican MPs revealed that they were the contented foot soldiers of their political 
parties. In observing the Mozambican political context, it became clear that the 
parliamentarians were an accurate reflection of the broad Mozambican political society.  
 
The manoeuvres of the political parties in their interactions exhibit the complexity of 
Mozambican politics. Its two main political parties were belligerent opponents until the 
1990s. This legacy is evident in the relationship between the two parties, but also in the 
way it manifests between the different generations within each party. There is distrust 
between the parties, which reinforces the sentiment that the party needs to be strong 
collectively. In a democracy, MPs from different parties are political adversaries and not 
enemies; in Mozambique, the transition from enemies to political adversaries is not yet 
complete.   
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Moreover, the Mozambican democratisation process has been showing signs of a setback, 
as is evident, for instance, in the RENAMO MPs’ claims of their fear for the 
democratisation process and their disbelief in the fairness of the elections.  
 
The next issue examined was how democratic the parliamentarians are and how 
democratic the political parties themselves are. MPs were asked to describe whether, 
when taking a stand in parliament, they followed the party, the party leader, the national 
interest, the electorate, or their own convictions. Most MPs unequivocally replied that 
they followed the views of the party. A few FRELIMO MPs attributed the party leader’s 
views to the party as a collective – they asserted that the party leader was the one who 
needed to follow the party’s views, and not the other way around. On the other hand, 
RENAMO MPs considered the views of the party to be those of the party leader. 
Nevertheless, towing of the party line is practiced not only by the MPs of both parties, but 
it is also seen by them to be the only way of operating   
 
Since the combating of corruption is a priority of the government, the MPs were asked if 
they would support the implementation in Mozambique of the public disclosure of the 
assets of the president of the republic, members of the government, MPs, and judges. 
Regarding the president of the republic, only 40.6 percent of FRELIMO MPs said they 
would support disclosure. Regarding members of the government, 53.1 percent of 
FRELIMO MPs supported the public disclosure of the assets of the government. The 
reactions of MPs to this question included apprehension, laughter, asking whether the 
questionnaire was anonymous, and, for a very few, being upset with its inclusion. One of 
the MPs who disagreed justified this by saying, “I would not support this (disclosure), 
because he has a lot, and people will not understand”. This culture of secrecy is defended 
by the view that ‘they’, the people, would not understand, since the per capita income is 
very low in the country.  
 
The culture of secrecy exists among the MPs themselves, who do not know how much the 
salary of the president of the Assembly is. They not only do not know, but they accept 
that this ‘norm’ is an unquestionable ‘norm’. There is further reason for concern when, 
within the house that is meant to be the guardian of the interests of citizens in relation to 
their rulers, the practice is one of protecting the rulers from the citizens, as is evident with 
the MPs’ opposition to the prospect of an enforced disclosure of assets. 
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In addition, the MPs were convinced that the Assembly had ‘normal’ constitutional 
powers, and therefore these were sufficient, when in fact, the powers of the Assembly 
were nearly limited to the approval of the government program and the national budget.  
  
The Mozambican MPs contended that the Assembly’s performance had worsened in 
recent years. This was mainly due to the deficient working conditions and the decrease in 
the power of the Assembly over its own budget. In addition, in the MPs’ opinion, the 
financial aid intervention of international donors, with direct aid to the budget, albeit an 
expression of goodwill, had added  weight to the notion that parliament merely acted as a 
rubber stamp, with the resultant weakening of the role of the  MPs.  
 
MPs were frustrated with the public, and explained that they were the scapegoats for the 
public’s frustration with politics and their rulers. The leader of the FRELIMO 
parliamentary group gave the example of a recent story involving a FRELIMO MP. On a 
visit by President Guebuza to one of the provinces, one of the MPs of that region served 
as an interpreter from a local language to Portuguese. The MP explained to his colleague 
that on this trip he experienced one of the most embarrassing moments of his life. He was 
required to translate to the president that the MPs did not work, that constituents did not 
even know who they were, yet they still regularly saw them in their fancy cars.  
 
Two truths existed about contact between citizens and MPs – citizens indicated that they 
did not have contact, while MPs indicated that they did. As shown in Table 3.10, the ratio 
is one member of parliament per 100 000 of the populace, as it is in most of the countries 
covered in the study. This ratio, along with the fact that Mozambican MPs always work as 
the representatives of their parties, weakens the association between citizens and MPs.  
 
For Przeworski (1991), the consolidation of democracy requires that political actors come 
to view democratic procedures as serving their long-term self-interest. For Highley and 
Gunther (1992), consolidation occurs when there is consensus among the elite about the 
rules and codes of political conduct and when they agree on the worth of political 
institutions. For this to take place, the aforementioned consolidation requires convergence 
between the political actors and for the anti-system discourse to be dropped.  
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These conditions are far from the reality of Mozambican politics. However, the 
Mozambican parliament has an important role that is, enabling the process of learning to 
work together.  
 
10.6 Parliaments matter for the consolidation of democracy  
 
During the last days of January 2009, violence erupted in the streets of Antananarivo in 
Madagascar. In just a few hours, at least 43 people were killed in confrontations with the 
police (D’Ersu, 2009). The popular revolt was against what the press called the 
‘entrepreneurial president’, President Marc Ravalomanana. Protesters set fire to the 
government television-broadcasting complex, an oil depot, a shopping mall, and a private 
TV station linked to the president. This followed the government’s closure of an 
opposition radio station (“43 killed in Madagascar political violence”, 2009). 
Madagascar’s recent political history showed how the National Assembly was the only 
obstacle to the president’s attempt to extend his constitutional power even further. In 
2007, the president dissolved the National Assembly in response to its refusal to concede 
even more powers to the president (See Appendix 9).  
 
The Madagascan example of the clash of powers between the Executive and the National 
Assembly points to the problems of assemblies in emerging democracies: the lack of 
capacity of national assemblies to stand up to executives; the imbalance in constitutional 
power between both institutions; the confusion between the dominance of politics vs the 
dominance of private business; the feeling of being excluded from the political game by 
opposition parties, and the exclusion of the emerging private business sector. The result is 
that national assemblies ultimately become the only institutional space allowed for 
opposition parties.  
 
The missing element in the literature on democratisation is what is needed between the 
transition to democracy and the point when democracy is consolidated. The literature 
distinguishes between what constitutes a transition and the consolidation stage of a 
democracy (Linz, Stepan & Gunther, 1995), but it does not elaborate on what should 
happen in between. This is the case even though the literature on transitions is abundant 
from the perspectives of various approaches and theories (Lipset, 1959; Rustow, 1970; 
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Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Linz & Stepan, 1996), as are the discussions on how to measure 
the consolidation of democracy (Schedler, 2001).  
 
As far as conditions desirable for democracy are concerned, the debate on political 
institutions has mainly been about the constitutional design and the electoral system that 
are advisable for democracy. The aforementioned authors defend one system or another, 
aiming for greater accountability and political balance. However, for these elements to 
occur independently of the electoral system or of the constitutional design, parliament is a 
key element.   
 
There is no miraculous recipe that can guarantee that under a certain system parliament 
will be stronger than under another. Parliamentary systems can result in weak parliaments, 
and presidential systems can result in strong congresses, or the other way around. The 
choice of constitution and electoral system are important, but they are not the 
determinants of success. 
 
The new multiparty regimes in Africa have faced a lack of political accountability and 
fragile governance. To address these issues, parliaments are essential. This approach also 
has the benefit of being practical and attainable in the present compared with via a 
hypothetical change of the constitution.   
 
As the Mozambican case reveals, international aid donors, play a central role in the 
politics of many African countries. As was seen in the case of Mozambique, the form of 
aid supplied directly to the national budget is seen as innovative and efficient. However, 
parliament has been neglected in this process. The warranty of accountability by the 
executive is given directly to the donors themselves, and to civil society. This formula 
contains serious problems of sustainability in the long and medium term, and in the short 
term, it contains serious problems of legitimacy.  
 
The problem with this formula is that the elected Mozambican government, which carries 
the power of having been elected by Mozambicans through popular suffrage, has become 
the servant of international organisations, and accountable to non-elected civil society 
organisations. The members of these organisations are sometimes elected politicians 
(elected in a foreign country, and therefore, accountable to their electorate) from the 
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countries donating aid. Civil society in Africa, as Gyimah-Boadi (1996) postulates, has 
the credit of having been at the forefront of democratisation on the continent in the 1990s; 
however, as he explains, expectations regarding civil society's contribution are too high. 
Unfortunately, civil society in Africa remains too weak to fulfil these expectations.  
 
In the long term, this practice will crystallise into the executive not being accountable to 
parliament regarding the national budget, for control of the nation’s finances will be 
assumed to be the domain of the international experts. The confusion originates with the 
national budget being not only a technical document but also a political document. 
Therefore, it needs to be scrutinised by the political institution that is competent to do this, 
elected by the people and mandated by the constitution to do so. 
 
Despite all the problems that parliaments in Africa face, they are still the privileged forum 
of political debate. It is true that the ruling parties in the national assemblies tend to 
behave as a shield of the executive, but this is not peculiar to Africa. The former 
conservative Lord Chancellor Lord Hailsham described the Westminster system of 
parliamentary government as an ‘elected dictatorship’; since once the government is 
elected, it does whatever it wants (Rogers& Walters, 200, p.94). Also, as in others parts of 
the world, opposition parties in parliaments work, as Mitchell (2000) describes them, as a 
‘fire alarm’, monitoring government decisions and confronting members of government. 
 
Moreover, in emerging democracies, parliaments are living political schools. As a former 
Mozambican MP from the opposition said about arriving at the first multiparty 
parliament, they were seen as ‘bandits in town’. After three mandates, there is still 
discomfort between most of the MPs from the ruling party and the opposition; yet, it is 
much better than in the past. Mozambican parliamentarians have progressed slowly from 
being enemies to being political opponents.   
 
For consolidation of democratisation to occur, parliaments need to be strengthened. For 
this, external support is important, as are international agencies’ funds and expertise, but 
external assistance is not per se the solution to the weaknesses of Mozambican parliament. 
Political parties are key actors; they are definitely part of the problem, but without them, 
there would be no workable solution. It would be naive to advocate radical change to a 
system entailing the role of the parties not being central to parliament.  
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The quality of governance is seen as the main cause of the continual problems of the 
continent. The need for better governance, for the consolidation of democracy, and 
overall, to better the lives of ordinary citizens, demands guardian parliaments. However, 
politics does not operate in a ceteris paribus mode. As a result, parliaments cannot 
reschedule or suspend their development; it needs to happen this instant. As stated before, 
the development of parliaments needs to happen simultaneously on several fronts. 
 
Most of the parliaments in the countries studied began with very rudimentary staff 
structures, or nearly none existed, since the sitting periods under a monoparty regime 
were relatively short. Many of these multiparty parliaments inherited staff that were 
politically closer to the former monoparty regime than to the opposition. Therefore, there 
existed a need for institutionalised and professionalized parliamentary staff; however, 
again, with African parliaments, this is not so simple. This needs to be done as part of an 
integrated larger program, which needs to involve and have the assent and support of 
politicians. No parliament-strengthening project will succeeded without the genuine 
involvement of politicians.  
 
In cases of a reversal in democracy, parliaments are usually the first victims, and in the 
past, they have often been suspended or completely abolished. The parliaments examined 
here operate within countries still consolidating their democracy. In these cases, 
institutions are vulnerable to abuse by other political players. Public support can be 
crucial in the event of a political crisis. For now, in general, public support exists, and this 
is good news for parliaments. It can also be good news for democracy, if embraced by 
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Appendix 3: Distribution, party seats in the 18 lower houses 
(Country, date of the last legislative election, and seats, by political party) 
 
Benin 2007 
Cauri Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE) 35 
Alliance for Democratic Momentum (ADD) 20 
Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) 10 
Key Force (FC) 4 
Union for Renewal (UPR) 3 
Coalition for an Emerging Benin (CBE) 2 
Hope Force 2 
National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) 2 
Alliance for Renewal (AR) 2 
Restore Hope (RE) 1 
Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP) 1 
Party for Democracy and Social Progress (PDPS) 1 
Botswana 2004 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 44 
Botswana National Front (BNF) 12 
Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 1 
Cape Verde 2006 
African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) 41 
Movement for Democracy (MPD) 29 
Union for an Independent Democratic Cape Verde (UCID) 2 
Ghana 2006 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 128 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) 94 
People's National Convention (PNC) 4 
Convention People's Party (CPP) 3 
Independents 1 
Kenya 2007  
Orange Democratic Movement Party of Kenya (ODM) 99 
Party of National Unity (PNU) 43 
Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) 16 
Kenyan African National Union (KANU) 14 
SAFINA 5 
National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya (NARC-K) 4 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 3 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-People (FORD-P) 3 
SISI KWA SISI Party of Kenya (SKSPK) 2 
Democratic Party (DP) 2 
Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK) 2 
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CHAMA CHA UMA (CCU) 2 
New Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (NFK) 2 
Peoples Party of Kenya (PPK) 1 
Kenya African Democratic Development Union (KADDU) 1 
United Democratic Party of Kenya (UDM) 1 
National Labour Party (NLP) 1 
Kenya African Democratic Union ASILI (KADU-ASILI) 1 
KENDA 1 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-ASILI (FORD-A) 1 
MAZINGIRA Greens Party of Kenya (MGPK) 1 
Forum for the Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-K) 1 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 1 
Lesotho 2007  
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) 62 
National Independence Party (NIP) 21 
All Basotho Convention (ABC) 17 
Lesotho Workers Party (LWP) 10 
Basotho National Party (BNP) 3 
Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP) 2 
Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP) 1 
Basotho Congress Party (BCP) 1 
Basotho Democratic National Party (BDNP) 1 
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) 1 
Patriotic Front For Democracy (PFD) 1 
Madagascar 2007  
Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM) 106 
Independents 11 
Fanjava Velogno 2 
Vohibato Tapa-Kevitsa 1 
Isandra Mivoatra 1 
Brunly 1 
Liaraike 1 
Fampandrosoana Mirindra 1 
Leader Fanilo 1 
Mayors' Association 1 
ANAWI 1 
Malawi 2004  
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 174 
United Democratic Front (UDF) 164 
Independents 372 
Mgwirizano Coalition 295 
 
 
Mali 2007  
Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP) 114 
Democracy and Republic Front (FDR) 15 
Independents 14 
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African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI) 4 
Mozambique 2004  
Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 160 
Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) 90 
Other parties 0 
Namibia 2004  
South -West African People's Organization (SWAPO) 55 
Congress of Democrats (COD) 5 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 4 
United Democratic Front of Namibia (UDF) 3 
National Unity Democratic Organisation (Nudo) 3 




Nigeria 2007  
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 262 
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) 62 
Action Congress (AC) 32 
Progressive People's Alliance (PPA) 3 
Labour Party (LP) 1 
Senegal 2007  
Sopi 2007 coalition 131 
And Defar Senegal coalition 3 
Takku Defarat Senegal 3 
Waar Wi coalition 3 
People's Rally (RP) 2 
Convergence for Renewal and Citizenship (CRC) 1 
National Patriotic Union (UNP) 1 
Jef Jel Alliance 1 
Rally of Senegalese Ecologists - Greens (RES) 1 
Social Development Reform Movement (MRDS) 1 
Front for Socialism and Democracy- Benno Jubel (FSD-BJ) 1 
Social Democrat Party - Jant bi (PSD - Jant bi) 1 
Authentic Socialist Party 1 
South Africa 2004  
African National Congress (ANC) 279 
Democratic Alliance (DA) 50 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 28 
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 9 
New National Party (NNP) 7 
Independent Democrats (ID) 7 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 6 
Freedom Front Plus (FF+) 4 
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) 3 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 3 
Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) 2 
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Minority Front (MF) 2 
Tanzania 2005  
Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM) 206 
Civic United Front (CUF) 19 
Chadema (Party for Democracy and Development) 5 
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) 1 
United Democratic Party 1 
Uganda 2005  
National Resistance Movement (NRM) 206 
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 37 
Independents 37 
Uganda People's Congress (UPC) 9 
Democratic Party (DP) 8 
Conservative Party (CP) 1 
Justice Forum of Uganda (JEEMA) 1 
Zambia 2006  
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 74 
Patriotic Front 43 
United Democratic Alliance (UDA) 26 
United Liberal Party (ULP) 3 
Independents 3 
National Democratic Focus (NDF) 1 
Zimbabwe 2008  
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)  100  
ZANU-PF 99  
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-AM) 10  
Independents 1  
  






Appendix 4: Code variables, Chapter 4 
 
Corruption 
“How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say: Members of parliament?”  
Response categories recoded: Don’t Know = 0; None=1, Some of them= 2; Most of 
them=3; All of them=4. 
 
Performance 
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs 
over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Your 
member of parliament?”  
Response categories recoded: Don’t Know = 0; Strongly disapprove = 1; Disapprove = 
2; Approve=3; Strongly approve = 4. 
 
MP’s will to listen  
“How much of the time do think the following try their best to listen to what people like 
you have to say: Member of parliament?” 
Response categories recoded: Don’t know = 0; Never = 1, Only sometimes = 2, Often = 
3, Always = 4. 
 
Trust 
“How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them 
to say: Parliament?”  
Response categories recoded: Don’t know = 0; Not at all = 1; Just a little = 2; Somewhat 
= 3; A lot = 4 
 
Contact  
“During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about 
some important problem or to give them your views: An MP?”  
Response categories recoded: Don’t nnow = 0; Never = 1; Only once = 2; A few times = 
3; Often = 4 
 
Time MP should spend in the constituency 
“How much time should your member of parliament spend in this constituency to visit the 
community and its citizens?”  
Response categories recoded: Never/Not necessary =0; At least once a year=1; At least 
once a month=2; At least weekly=3; All of the time=4; Don’t know =9 
 
Time MP does spend in the constituency 
“How much time does your member of parliament spend in this constituency?”  
Response categories recoded: Never/Not necessary = 0; At least once a year = 1; At least 
once a month = 2; At least weekly = 3; All of the time = 4; Don't know  = 9 
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LegislativeScore 
Is the computation of following four variables: 
 
For this question, corruption codes were inverted to graduate the scale from negative to 
positive accordance with the others. 
A factor analysis was perfomed on with the four variables. The analysis shows that it is 
possible to extract one factor with reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha 0.598). The principal 
component analysis extracted one component showing a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 








N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Performance 25389 0 4 2.3 1.19 
Corruption 25395 0 4 2.2 1.37 
LegislativeScore 25381 0 16 8.7 3.31 
MP’s will to listen 25391 0 4 1.7 1.09 
Trust 25395 0 4 2.5 1.27 
Time MP should 
spend 25397 0 9 2.8 2.09 
Time MP does 
spend 25397 0 9 2.5 3.24 
Contact MP 24349 0 9 0.2 0.88 







Appendix 6: Coding  and recodingof variables, Chapter 6 
 




“What is the highest level of education you have completed?”  
Response categories recoded: No formal schooling=0; Primary schooling= 1; Secondary 
school=2; Higher education=3. 
 
Poverty 
 “Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without – 
Enough food to eat? And a cash income?”  
Response categories recoded as: Never=4; Just once or twice=3; Several times=2; Many 
times= 1; Always=0. 
 
Satisfaction with the economy 
 “In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?” 
Responses recoded as: Very good=4; Fairly good=3; Neither good nor bad=2; Fairly 
bad=1; Very bad=0.  
 
Satisfaction with personal living conditions 
 “In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?”  
Responses recoded as: Very good=4; Fairly good=3; Neither good nor bad=2; Fairly 
bad=1 ; Very bad=0. 
 
Trust in others 
 “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be 
very careful in dealing with people?”  
Responses recoded as: Most people can be trusted=2; You must be very careful=1; Don’t 
know=0 (this question was not included in the Zimbabwe questionnaire). 
 
Party allegiance 
 “Do you feel close to any particular political party? Which party is that?”  





 “How often do you get news from the following sources?  
Responses recoded as: Every day=4; A few times a week=3; A few times a month=2; 




 “How often do you get news from the following sources?”  
Responses recoded as Every day=4; A few times a week=3; A few times a month=2; 
Less than once a month=1; Never=0. 
 
Newspapers use 
 “How often do you get news from the following sources?”  
Responses recoded as: Every day=4 A few times a week=3 A few times a month=2 Less 
than once a month=1 Never=0. 
 
Generation 
 “How old are you?”  
Responses were recoded as: Individuals who were considered part of the ‘multiparty 
generation’ – they were 18 or less at the time of the first (of the continuous three) election 
– received the code 2; individuals classified as being part of th post-independence 
generation – they were 18 or less when independence was achieved – received the code 1; 
those who were considered part of the pre-independence generation received the code 0. 
The table below shows the proportions for the age groups for each country, listed under 
the respective codes.  
 
Country  Code 2: 
‘multiparty 
generation’  






Benin 18 - 35 36 - 65 66 - 99 
Botswana (has two age groups 
multiparty and independence) 
18 - 59 N/A 60 - 99 
Cape Verde 18 - 35 36 -50 50 - 99 
Ghana 18 - 35 36 - 68 69 - 99 
Kenya 18 - 35 36 - 63 64 - 99 
Lesotho 18 - 34 35 - 59 60 -99 
Madagascar 18 - 34 35 - 63 64 - 99 
Malawi 18 - 31 32 - 61 62 - 99 
Mali 18 - 33 34 - 66 67 - 99 
Namibia (multiparty was not 
included, since it is equal to post-
independence) 
18 - 35 36 - 99 
Nigeria 18 - 25 26 - 65 66 - 99 
Senegal 18 - 48 49 - 58 59 - 99 
South Africa (has two age groups 
– before and after multiparty) 
18 - 33 34 - 99 
Tanzania 18 - 30 31 - 61 62 - 99 
Uganda (no existence of a 
category multiparty generation 
since the multiparty election in 
2006 was not contested more 
than those preceding it) 
 18 - 63 64 - 99 
Zambia  18 - 35 36 - 61 62 - 99 
Zimbabwe (only two age groups 
are pertinent) 





“Responses were recoded as: Male=1; Female=2 
 
Habitat 
Responses were recoded as: Urban=1; Rural=2 
 
Satisfaction with democracy 
“Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mozambique? 
Responses were recoded as: Don’t know=0; Not at all satisfied=1; Not very satisfied= 2; 
Fairly satisfied=3; Very satisfied=4. 
 
Perception of the fairness of elections 
“On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national 
election?”  
Responses were recoded as: Don’t know and Don’t understand the question=0; Not free 
and fair=1; Free and fair, but with major problems=2; Free and fair, with minor 
problems=3; Completely free and fair=4. 
 
Perception of the embeddedness of democracy 
“In your opinion, how much of a democracy is the country today?”  
Responses were recoded as: Do not understand the question/Do not understand what 
‘democracy’ is/Don’t know=0; Not a democracy=1; A democracy, but with major 
problems=2; A democracy, but with minor problems=3; A full democracy=4. 
 
Frequency of political discussion 
Responses were recoded as: Never=0; Occasionally=1; Frequently=2. 
 
Defining the dependent variable: 
 
Z1="How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about 
them to say?" Responses were coded as: Don’t know=0; Not at all=1; Just a little=2; 
Somewhat=3; A lot=4. 
  
Z2=How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t 
you heard enough about them to say? Responses were coded as: Don’t know=0, All of 
them=1; Most of them=2; Some of them =3; None=4. Note: In the recoding of this 
question, not just the ‘Don’t know’ responses were considered but also the codes were 
inverted to progress the scale from negative to positive as for the other three questions in 
the questionnaire.  
 
Z3=How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people 
like you have to say?, Responses were coded as: Don’t know=0; Never=1; Only 
sometimes=2; Often=3; Always=4.   
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Z4=Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed 
their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? 
Responses were coded as: 








Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics, Chapter 6 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Education 25305 1.35 0.909 0 3 
Cash income 
deprivation 25262 2.00 1.370 0 4 
Food deprivation 25342 2.89 1.255 0 4 
Satisfaction with 




24831 1.57 1.255 0 4 
Trust in others 24313 1.14 0.405 0 2 
Party allegiance 25397 0.84 0.770 0 2 
Radio use 25361 3.12 1.303 0 4 
TV use 25234 1.75 1.746 0 4 
Newspapers use 25077 1.18 1.478 0 4 
Generation 25103 1.37 0.818 0 2 
Gender 25397 0.50 0.500 0  
Habitat 25397 0.62 0.486 0 1 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 25389 2.97 1.628 0 5 
Perception of 




25393 2.26 1.352 0 4 
Frequency of 
political discussion
25085 0.93 0.727 0 2 






















































































Appendix 9: Highlights on the 18 parliaments 
Benin 
The National Assembly originated with the national conference that took place on 
February 19, 1990. It included representatives of the ruling People's Revolutionary Party, 
trade unionists, civil servants, students, religious leaders, and representatives of the 
military. This first national conference overthrew the authoritarian regime, hence being 
named the first civil coup d’état in Africa.  
 
As result of it allowing the registration of opposition parties, the legislative general 
elections took place in 1991. The elections of 2005 were contested by 5580 candidates 
from 31 parties. The Assembly was enlarged to 83 seats (19 more than the previous 
Assembly had. The opposition won with an absolute majority of 51 seats. The third 
multiparty legislative election took place in 1999; the composition of the Assembly 
resulted in a majority of seats being distributed to parties opposed to President Mathieu 
Kérékou. In the elections of 2003, the parties in favour of the president recovered the 
majority of the parliamentary seats, with 52 of the 83.  
Sources: Robinson, 1994; IPU PARLINE database: Benin, General information, 2009; Englebert 
& Murison, 2007. 
 
Botswana 
1965-2008 – The National Assembly has numberous continuous multiparty elections. The 
National Assembly has been always dominated by the ruling Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP). However, the main opposition party, Botswana People’s Party, has been 
consistently present in parliament. 
2002 – The National Assembly changes the number of seats from 40 to 57, to be in place 
in 2004. 
2006 – Civic organisations publicly express the concern that parliament will not oversee 
the execution by the government of the Security Bill, which has been discussed in 
parliament. The Botswana Council of Nongovernmental Organisations is opposed to the 
legislation.  
Sources: Saunders & Brown, 2007a; Botswana Democratic Party, 2008. 
 
Cape Verde 
1991, 1995, 2001, and 2006 – Multiparty legislative elections occur four times. In 1991, 
the new opposition party MpD beats the ruling party PAICV. In 2001 the National 
Assembly is again taken over by a PAICV majority.   
Sources: Grepne & George, 2007; Assembleia Nacional de Cabo Verde, 2008. 
 
Ghana 
1991, May – A 260-member consultative assembly is constituted to draft a multiparty 
constitution. The constitution is passed by referendum.  
1992 – Dissatisfied with the process of the presidential elections, the opposition boycotts 
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parliamentary elections. Because of this, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) wins 
most of the seats (189 of 200). This NDC majority iss retained in the election of 1996, 
even though all parties participate in the election. In the elections of 2000 there iss a 
turnover in the Assembly, with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) becoming the majority 
party, which iss repeated in the election of 2004. 
 
1997 – The NPP boycotts sessions of parliament, demanding that parliament invests the 
authority to undertake procedures, which previously have been the exclusive function of 
the president, with the ministers. The Supreme Court rules that all presidential nominees 
for ministerial positions have to be approved by parliament. This measure is applied 
retroactively to the ministers already in place. This rule is to become one of the strongest 
powers of the Ghanaian parliament.   
Sources: Synge & McCaskie; 2007a; History of the Parliament of Ghana, 2008. 
 
Kenya 
1995 – 11 opposition MPs cross the floor to the ruling party, KANU 
1999 – The constitution iss revised by an independent commission, but President MOI 
decides that this should be done by the National Assembly. In 1999 the National 
Assembly creates a committee to revise the constitution. The MP Odinga is chosen to 
head the parliamentary committee charged with constitutional reform. The opposition 
boycotts the first meeting of this commission. 
 2000 – The parliamentary commission headed by Odinga presents its proposal to the 
Assembly.  
2001 – The National Assembly refuses to create an anti-corruption authority; as a result, 
the IMF confirms its suspension of aid to Kenya due to the epidemic corruption. The next 
day President Moi establishes a special police force to conclude the 132 cases of 
corruption that a previous anti-corruption commission has initiated.  
2002, Dec – Legislative elections. The opposition party, National Rainbow Coalition, lead 
by Kibaki, ends four decades of KANU (Kenya African National Union) rule. The 
opposition secures a victory of 125 seats out of the 210 seats.  
2003, Apr – Constitutional review conference starts. The government proposes that the 
executive power should remain with the president, but the 629 delegates to the 
conference, including 3 ministers, vote to reduce presidential powers. Also, the 
conference defends assigning additional powers to the National Assembly. The 
government withdraws from the conference. No constitution is approved.  
2003, May – The National Assembly passes legislation obliging all civil servants to 
declare and account for their income and assets. 
2005, Apr – The National Assembly reacts to the abuse of land ownership in the country 
and votes for a limit on land ownership by citizens.  
2005, Aug – The new constitution is approved by the Assembly, with the acceptance of 
the executive. However, The new constitution is rejected in a referendum.  
2007 – Legislative elections end in violence.  




1993, Mar 27 – First multiparty election after a military regime. Basutoland Congress 
Party (BCP) wins all seats. Basutoland National Party (BNP) denounces irregularities and 
rejects its two seats in the Senate. The king dissolves the Assembly and dismisses the 
government. 
1998 – Legislative election. Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) secures 78 of the 80 
seats. BNP secures one seat. Several petitions denouncing irregularities are presented in 
the High Court. Continual popular unrest; prime minister asks for support from South 
African government, which sends a military contingent. The SA army faces a 
discontented population and loses 68 soldiers.  
1999, October – An appointed tribunal resolves the conflict, proposing a combination of 
constituency and proportional systems.  
2000, Feb – The National Assembly rejects the electoral system proposal by the tribunal. 
Opposition parties demand the dissolution of the National Assembly.  
2002, May – Legislative elections take place under a mixed electoral system. BNP leader 
claimes that the results were manipulated. 
2005, Apr – Legislative elections. LCD wins again, securing three quarters of the seats. 
Voter participation is less than 30%. 
2007, Feb – Legislative elections. LCD secures 61 seats of a total of 80 seats. The 
elections are surrounded by controversy.  
Source: Saunders & Brown, 2007b; Silva, 2001. 
 
Madagascar 
1989 – The monoparty National Assembly changes the constitution to allow multiparty 
participation. 
1991, May – Members of the FV forcibly enter the chamber of the National People’s 
Assembly to submit their proposals for constitutional amendments (including a limit on 
presidential terms). 
1992, Feb – The interim government suspends the National People’s assembly.  
1993 – Legislative elections. The party winning the most seats is Cartel HVR, with 45 of 
the 138 seats. The National Assembly comprises 25 political parties. 
August 1993 – The National Assembly endorses the new ministers with 72% of the votes. 
1994, Jul – 31 deputies propose a motion of censure, which does not succeed.  
1995, Jun – some MPs cross the floor to support the new party, led by the prime minister, 
Ravony. President Zafy announces that he cannot collaborate with Prime Minister Ravony 
and calls a referendum to amend the constitution to allow the president, instead of the 
National Assembly, to appoint the prime minister. The president wins the referendum; the 
National Assembly looses its power to appoint the prime minister.  
1996, Jul 26 – The National Assembly votes, by 99 votes to 34, to impeach President 
Zafy, forcing him to resign.  
1998, Mar 15 – New referendum for constitutional amendments is held. The changes give 
even more powers to the president, to the detriment of the judiciary and the Assembly.  
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1998, May – Legislative elections. 
2007, Mar 4 – A referendum approves constitutional changes granting more powers to the 
president, including full powers of emergency and the power to terminate Senate 
mandates.  
2007, May-July – Several incidents of popular unrest; as result, the president dissolves the 
National Assembly.   
2007, Nov – Legislative elections. The party of President Ravalomanana ‘I Love 
Madagascar’ secures a large majority, with 105 of the 127 elected seats. 
Source:  Brown, 2008; EISA, 2008a; Political and social unrest hits Madagascar, 2008. 
 
Malawi 
1993, Jun 14 – Referendum supports the reintroduction of multiparty politics. 
17 May 1994 – Legislative Elections. UDF wins 84 of the 177 seats, MCP 55 seats, 
AFORD 36 seats.  
1996, May – Opposition parties boycott parliament and appealed to the high court to 
declare previous session illegal and unconstitutional.  
1997 – Opposition ends the boycott, based on the promise by president Muluzi to change 
the constitution in order to prevent MPs from crossing the floor from one party to another. 
1999 – Legislative elections. 
2004, May – Legislative elections. 
2005, Oct – The National Assembly votes in favor of beginning proceedings to impeach 
President Mutharika. High Court expresses concerns with the legitimacy of the process. 
Impeachment process withdrawn.  
2006 – President Mutharika opponents requested a court ruling on whether the speaker of 
parliament should declare a seat vacant when an MP crosses the floor.  
2008, Feb – President Mutharika stops parliamentarians from meeting until they agree not 
to expel 70 members of his Democratic Progressive Party, which is largely made up of 
defectors from the opposition. The United Democratic Front and another opposition party 
want to expel most of the government's MPs based on an interpretation of a constitutional 
provision which prevents deputies leaving one party to join another. Had the opposition 
succeeded, they would have had enough support to pass a vote of no-confidence in wa 
Mutharika's government, and an impeachment motion against the president, who quit the 
United Democratic Front to form his own party after the 2004 election. 
Sources: EISA, 2008b; Saunders & Brown;2007c;  Malawi runs without parliament, 2008. 
 
Mali 
1991 – National conference for a new constitution with 1800 delegates. Constitution 
approved by referendum in 1992. 
1992, Feb and March – Legislative elections. 21 parties contest the elections. Alliance 
pour la démocratie au MALI (ADEMA),) secures 76 seats of the 129 seats.  
1997, Jan – the National Assembly approves a new electoral law and increases the 
number of seats from 129 to 147 
1997, Apr – ADEMA wins the majority of parliamentary seats. There were 1500 
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candidates. ADEMA will have internal divisions. Political tension, with five opposition 
leaders arrested until the week before the legislative elections.   
1997, July – ADEMA secures 130 seats.  
2000 – The national assembly approves state funding for political parties. New electoral 
system will incorporate a proportional system: Of the 150 seats, 40 will be by 
proportional system. 
2001, Feb – Twenty-one ADEMA MPs form a new political party. 
2002 – 37 ADEMA MPs break away from the party in 2001 to form Rassemblement pour 
le Mali (RPM). 
2003, Jun – Seventeen MPs leave ADEMA to form the Union pour la Republique et la 
democratie (URD). 
Sources: ADEMA-PASJ, 2008; Englebert & Murison, 2007; Gouahinga, 2007. 
 
Mozambique 
1990, Nov and Dec – New constitution approved by the monoparty assembly – 
Assembleia Popular. Also approves the constitutions of political parties.  
1994 – Legislative elections. 3 parties secure seats in the assembly. FRELIMO rules. 
1999 – Legislative elections. Only FRELIMO and RENAMO secure parliamentary seats. 
2004 – Legislative elections. Observers unanimous in the existence of electoral 
irregularities in favour of FRELIMO, but all the observers stress that the irregularities 
were not sufficient to change the FRELIMO victory, but all noted that they were 
sufficient to take parliamentary seats away from RENAMO. However, observers also note 
irregularities and fraud perpetrated by RENAMO. 
2005 – The Assembly establishes an ad hoc commission to revise the four electoral laws 
(CNE, registration, national elections, and local elections) and draft a new law for 
provincial elections. But the commission gets paralysed due to the structure of the 
membership of the CNE (electoral commission). RENAMO refuses to allow it to do 
anything until this question is resolved. In May, the FRELIMO majority in parliament 
decides to abolish the ad hoc commission and remit the issues to the AR Commission on 
Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Power, chaired by 
Alfredo Gamito. FRELIMO in this way avoids the need for RENAMO votes, since the 
standing committees do not require unanimity.  
2006 – New electoral law approved by the Assembleia Nacional, ending the 5% threshold 
necessary for parties to be elected to parliament.  
Source: Vitória retumbante manchada por má conduta,2005; Interview by the author with 
Gamito, A., 21 March 2008, Maputo. 
 
Namibia 
1990, Feb – A constituent assembly designs a draft constitution and the independence of 
the country. Independence is granted on 21 March. 
1994, Dec 7-8 – First multiparty legislative elections. SWAPO secures 53 seats, the 
opposition only 15 seats.  
2003, Nov – The parliamentary opposition becomes even more fragmented due to the 
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Herero-based National Unity Democratic organisation (NUDO) withdrawing from the 
DTA and registering as an independent party.  
2004, Nov – Legislative elections. SWAPO has a large a majority once more. The High 
Court rules the results of the November 2004 National Assembly elections invalid and 
orderes a recount of the ballots.   
Source: Saunders, 2007; IFES Election Guide - Country Profile: Namibia – Elections, 2008. 
 
Nigeria 
1999 – The speaker of Nigeria's House of Representatives resigns after pleading guilty to 
lying about his age in election papers. 
2003 – Legislative elections are the first run by civilians since the transition from military 
rule four years earlier.  
2006 – The house of representatives and the Senate refuse to approve constitutional 
amendments to allow a third term for President Obasanjo.  
2007, Sep-Oct – Popular protests demand the resignation of the speaker of the National 
Assembly. In one of the protests, the police prevent several hundred protesters from 
marching beyond the gates of the National Assembly complex. 
2007, Oct – The Speaker of the Nigerian House of Representatives, Patricia Etteh, and her 
deputy resign over a corruption scandal. Their resignation comes before the house can 
vote on a motion to impeach the two. 
Sources: Lewis, 2003; Synge & McCaskie, 2007b; “Nigeria humanitarian country: Profile”, 




1978, 1983, 1988, and 1998 – Elections. Socialist Party dominates the National Assembly 
until April 2001, when President Wade’s coalition (Senegalese Democratic Party - PDS) 
wins a majority (89 of 120 seats). 
1991, Mar – The National Assembly makes constitutional changes, especially restoring 
the post of prime minister.  
1993, May – PS wins 84 of 100 seats.  
1996, Jan – President Diouf declares that a Sénat needs to be constituted.  
1998, Mar – The National Assembly increases the number of MPs from 120 to 140  
1998, Aug – The National Assembly removes the constitutional clause that limits the 
number of presidential terms to two; also eliminates the requirement that a president 
needs to be elected with at least 25% of the votes of all registered voters. The opposition 
parties claim that the changes are a ‘constitutional coup d’état’  
1999 – The party PS “lends” MPs to URF to allow this party to continue to have a 
parliamentary group. 
2001, Jan – Referendum abolishes the Sénat. 
2004, Dec – National Assembly abolishes the death penalty. 
2005, Jan – The National Assembly votes for an amnesty for politically motivated crimes 
committed from 1984 to 2004. 
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2007, Jan – The National Assembly approves the restoration of a Sénat. 
2007, Jun 3 – Legislative elections. Most of the major opposition parties boycott the 
elections, allowing the ruling Senegalese Democratic party (PDS) and its allies to capture 
131 of the 150 seats. 
Source: Englebert & Murison, 2007; “Senegal: Wade's historic turnaround”, 2008. 
 
South Africa 
1990, Feb 2 – Addressing the three Houses of parliament, President de Klerk announces 
the release of Nelson Mandela and lifts the ban on the ANC, PAC and 33 other political 
organisations. 
1994, May 9 – The first multiparty nonracial National Assembly elects Nelson Mandela 
president of the country. ANC secures majority in all legislative elections from 1994 to 
2004. 
Source: Saunders & Omer-Cooper, 2007; Parliament of South Africa, 2008. 
 
Tanzania 
1992, May – The monoparty Assembly approves a new constitution for a multiparty 
democracy. 
1995, Oct – Multiparty legislative elections held for the National Assembly and for the 
Zanzibari House of Representatives. CCM wins 186 of the 232 elected seats.  
2000, Oct 29 – Legislative elections for National Assembly. Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) secures 244 seats; the opposition only 21 seats.  
2000 – While elections in mainland Tanzania are peaceful, voting in Zanzibar is, 
according Commonwealth observers, problematic. Fighting between members of the 
Civic United Front (CUF) opposition party and police. Media reports at least 37 people 
killed. 
2005, Oct 30 – The election of the Zanzibari House of Representatives. Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) wins the majority of the seats, 30 of the elected seats.  
2005, Dec – Legislative elections for National Assembly. Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) 
guaranteed 266 seats.  
Source: (EISA, 2008d); (“Concern at Zanzibar elections mounts”, 2008); (Zanzibar Election 
Pictures,2000); (Msekwa, 2008) 
 
Uganda 
1995, Jun – Constituent assembly rejectes the immediate restoration of multiparty 
democracy. Candidates are required to seek election without official reference to political 
affiliation. 
2004, Feb – Seven main opposition parties form a coalition to negotiate a transition to 
multiparty democracy with the government.  
2005, Jun – Parliament passes legislation restoring multiparty democracy. This is ratified 
in a national referendum. 
2006, Feb – multiparty legislative elections, the president’s party National Resistence 
Movement (NRMO) secures 202 seats. The opposition contests the results, accusing the 
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ruling party of fraud.   
Source: (Rake & Jennings, 2007b); (About NRMO, 2008); (Parliament of Uganda, 2008) 
 
Zambia 
1990, Dec – Monoparty National Assembly approves constitutional amendments to allow 
a multiparty system. 
1991, Aug – Monoparty National assembly approves a new constitution.  
1991, Oct 31 – Legislative elections. Six parties and 330 candidates contest the elections. 
Ruling party of the monoparty Assembly defeated. Movement for Multi-party Democracy 
(MMD) wins 125 of the 250 seats.  
1993, Mar – National Assembly approves a state of emergency due to violence and 
political conspiracies. 
1996 – Legislative elections are boycotted by the main opposition party and five other 
allied parties due to the new constitution adopted prior to the election that bars the 
president and vice-president of the opposition United National Independence Party 
(UNIP) from standing for the presidency. MMD secures 131 of the 150 seats.  
2001 – Fifty MMD deputies (from the president’s party) sign a petition against a third 
presidential term.  
2001, May 3 – Sixty-five deputies sign a motion to impeach president Chiluba for alleged 
violations of the constitution. The Speaker of the National Assembly, Amusaa 
Mwamawabwa, does not allow the motion to be debated.  
2001, Dec 27 – Legislative elections. MMD secures only 69 of the 150 seats.  
2003, Aug – National Assembly vote to impeach President Mwanawasa, but the 
impeachment is defeated even after several MPs from the president’s party vote in favour 
of the impeachment.  
2005 – Opposition parties and civic organisations creat a forum, Oasis Forum, demanding 
a new constitution to be enacted by a constituent assembly and not by the National 
Assembly, since it does not have the forum’s trust.  
2006, Oct 28 – Legislative elections. MMD secures 75 seats. 
 
Sources: Mthembu-Salter, 2007; EISA, 2008c. 
 
Zimbabwe 
1985 – First general election since independence, with ‘20 white seats guaranteed’ and 
‘80 common roll seats’. 
1987, Sep – The seats reserved for whites are abolished. 
1987, Oct – The National Assembly approves constitutional amendments to replace the 
ceremonial executive with an executive presidency, including a prime minister. 
1989, Nov – National Assembly abolishes the Senate. The Assembly subsequently 
extended from 100 to 150 seats (120 elected, 8 provincial leaders, 10 chiefs, 12 appointed 
by the president) to be effective with the next election. 
1998, Oct – Government discusses a new constitution with the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA). 
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1998, Nov – NCA suspended, the result of 50 protesters urging democratisation being 
prevented by the police from marching. 
1999, Mar – President Mugabe appoints a commission of inquiry, dominated by ZANU-
PF, to propose a new constitution; the NCA refuses to participate. 
2000 – New constitution defeated in a referendum, followed by legislative elections (from 
the elected seats, Zanu obtains 62 seats and the MDC, 57 seats). 
2005 – Legislative elections. (MDC loses 16 seats). 
2005 – John Nkomo elected speaker (elected as independent, he is seen as a conciliatory 
figure). 
2008 – National Assembly votes for an increase in the number of deputies, from 150 to 
210 (more rural constituency seats, and all seats are elected). 
2008, Mar 29 – Legislative Elections. For the first time, opposition has the majority of 
seats – MDC 99 seats, ZANU-PF 97 seats 
2008, Aug – Member of the opposition, Lovemore Moyo, elected as Speaker.  
 
Sources: EISA, 2008e; “Zimbabwe opposition wins speaker vote,”2008; Brown, 2008. 
 
 
 
